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Abstract  
 
This dissertation is an attempt to explain the general principles behind the 
Palestinian political discourse that followed An-Nakba in 1948. This analysis will 
be carried out in three parts: the First Part starts with an introduction that lays 
out the questions, objectives and structure of this research before delving into 
the theoretical and analytical frameworks that guide the last two chronological 
parts of the dissertation. The Second Part focuses on the Palestinian political 
discourse between 1948 and the late 1980s. The Third Part examines the 
period that followed from the 1990s onward. While trying to distill discursive 
orienting-principles, the analysis will display how the discursive transformations 
evolved and it asks about their performative corollaries in everyday life, whether 
at the ideational or the spatial level.  
 
In addressing this question, this dissertation made two interdependent original 
contributions: the main contribution uncovers the main rules of formations and 
logics of the Palestinian representative discourse. That explains also the 
internal transformation and evolution of this discourse, and how these logics 
directed policymaking. In general, I attempted to summarize the Palestinian 
discursive rules of formation into eleven overlapping rules: (1) an-Nakba and 
the order of discontinuity, (2) an-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution, (3) 
provisional horizon, socialization and referentiality, (4) motion, (5) logic of 
division, (6) statehood, (7) realist-liberalist peace, (8) mathematico-judicial 
schema, (9) market logic, (10) security as peace, and (11) replacement. The 
second contribution is a byproduct of exploring the philosophical debates that I 
touched upon in order to build a methodological framework that helps us 
understand the connection between change and discourse. 
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Introduction  
 
 
In May 2013, the word ‘Palestine’ became a tagline to designate a rather 
attenuated version of Palestine on Google Maps. By using the same word 
(Palestine), Google has simply replaced the totality of the historical referent 
with some of its parts; it has also disseminated and universalized an elusive 
image. The Palestinian leadership welcomed this move as a palpable 
outcome of the “diplomatic victory” (al-nasr al-siyyasi) at the UN, which 
culminated in the recognition of ‘Palestine’ as a non-member state in 
November 2012. The new map unambiguously stands for only miniscule 
fragments of Palestine, one-quarter of its original size, yet applauded as a 
victory. However strange it could be, this Palestine has now two governments: 
a caretaker government (hukwmat tasrif a‘mal) in Ramallah and a deposed 
government (al-hukwma al-muqala) in Gaza. In the meantime, Palestinian 
refugees continue to reside in uncertain conditions where a second or a third 
term exile is not a hypothetical scenario but a reality, with the recent examples 
of Palestinian refugees in Iraq, Syria and al-Naqab being a case in point. 
 
A great deal of the political and academic literature on the subject addresses 
Palestine and Palestinians in relation to Israeli policies and mainly as an 
object of Zionism. For example, while searching for literature on Palestinian 
discourse, I found a book entitled “Discourse and Palestine” (Moors et al. 
1995). The theme of the book is uneven for obvious reasons: after all, it is an 
edited book composed of a collection of different conference papers. But 
here, too, the Palestinians still appear to be an object of Western and Israeli 
discourses not of their own. Furthermore, in the 1980s a group of (mainly) 
Israeli “new historians” produced a wave of publications that deconstructed 
the Zionist narrative and demonstrated with abundant evidence how 
destructive Zionism has been to the Palestinian community. Undoubtedly, this 
admirable literature have enriched our understanding and opened new 
avenues for the narrative of the victim to be taken seriously in the western 
academic world. 
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In relative terms however, only a narrow scholarship that takes the 
Palestinians as a subject in their own right. Therefore, internal mechanisms 
involved in the production of the Palestinian conditions acquired less attention 
in comparison to their effects. This study attempts to critically investigate the 
underlying mechanisms that have shaped the Palestinian political discourse 
since an-Nakba (the Catastrophe) in 1948 until 2010. My main assumption is 
that, once the discursive regime of Palestine is established, it becomes the 
regulator and producer of interaction between its subject-positions and 
concrete facts on the ground. From this perspective, the text of the pages that 
will follow is best read as an interpretation all the way down. In other words, 
this dissertation by no means presents the account of the Palestinian political 
discourse, but it is essentially a rudimentary interpretation of a specific aspect 
of the their political experience rather than a totality of what could possibly be 
said on the subject.  
 
The overflow of political concepts and vocabulary has regulated the 
production of self-image, reality (past and present) and the meaning of an-
Nakba to its own subject. All of this confluence has been assimilated in the 
Palestinian lexicon since then. Clearly, each term and concept has certain 
historical traces beyond any individual or group. The phrase ‘Palestinian 
discourse’ is neither a subject that Palestinians themselves have produced 
nor a fixed set of rules, but rather it is the discourse that has been 
re/producing ‘the Palestinian’ and to some extent the question of Palestine. 
Therefore, it is a continuous process of making and remaking.   
 
Taking Israel-Palestine as a research topic is a fraught task, not because of 
its complexity (which may or may not depend on the research problem) rather 
because of the psycho-political aura it usually invokes. Whatever it may entail, 
research is what researchers do and both of them, including this author and 
this study, are in the domain of constitution. Gramsci fittingly argued that, 
“everything [we do] is political, even philosophy and philosophies” (Gramsci 
1971: 171 cited in Said 1983: 144); this implies that academic research has 
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political conscious or unconscious meanings and consequences. To my mind, 
researchers are not judges, research is not a court, and their product is not a 
verdict but an interpretation that has both academic and political merits. 
 
It should be said that discourse is very broad, confusing and often used 
synonymous with language. However, wherever the word discourse appears 
in this text, it is there to signify the “rules of formation” or the logics behind a 
particular conceptualization of a certain phenomena. At the outset of an 
important book, William Connolly argued that, “To examine […] discourse is to 
translate tacit judgments embedded in the language of politics into explicit 
considerations more fully subject to critical assessment.” (Connolly 1983, 
preface, first edition) The examination of discourse is essentially critical and 
political in its commitment to uncover unstated meanings loaded in discursive 
elements. This philosophical ethos orients the analysis and serves as a 
source from which the methodological framework will be developed further in 
the next chapter. 
  
I attempt in this dissertation to uncover the rules of formations of the 
Palestinian political discourse. Meanwhile, I will explore the discursive 
transformations and their entailments on the ground with the aim to see 
beyond the current frames of ‘the real’, and hence ‘the possible’, in order to 
imagine a different path for positive possibilities. This may bring hope despite 
the present murky reality and shows that the Israel-Palestine conflict is 
contingent and thus ‘conflict’ is not a destiny. The opposite is true. If 
discourse, the system of constitution, has been in constant shifts, then change 
towards an alternative vision of an inclusive humane co-existence is not only 
possible, but also doable. Grasping discursive dynamics offers an opportunity 
to imagine how the current Palestinian reality is constructed ⎯with its 
successes and failures, and thus makes constructive intervention feasible. 
Such an intervention neither turns the clock backward nor eliminates the past 
but rather is an engagement with it while reconstituting the present and future.  
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The Palestinian discourse constitutes a temporal and spatial Palestinian self-
image: that is, their identity, the perception of the ‘other’ and Palestine in time 
and space. Because it is virtually impossible to study the totality of that 
discourse, we need to zoom-in and focus on the Palestinian representative or 
official political discourse. This would tell us about the Palestinian participation 
in shaping their own reality, how they acted and what dominant interpretations 
they embraced.  
 
Still this is very broad and the political-apolitical distinction is elusive. 
Moreover, the meaning of “Palestinian” is not so straightforward; it signifies 
different things to its own subjects.1 An anecdote in Sari Nusseibeh’s book 
(2001: 5) makes the point quickly. For example, although two Palestinian 
intellectuals, Walid Khalidi and Nusseibeh, were reflecting on the dominator 
‘us’ to signify the Palestinian people, they had different conceptions of it. For 
the former, it represents the diaspora Palestinians, while it refers to the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza for the latter. Yet, both are united by 
the idea of speaking of the parts as if they were the whole and with a sense of 
prioritization of one part over others. This spectacle, highlights that however 
fragmented the Palestinian populace is, it still maintains an ability to speak 
“Palestinianism”2 notwithstanding the munificent efforts to subdue this ability 
since the inception of the Zionist project in Palestine.  
 
To narrow it further, this analysis examines the genealogy of Palestinian 
political interpretations and decisions since an-Nakba while focusing on 
discursive shifts. Therefore, this research is situated within diaspora-
occupation experience and conceives the ‘Palestinians’ as a subject of their 
own. Although much (colonial, occupation and imperialist)  ‘power’ has been 
exerted on the Palestinians, it has produced a speaking and 
resistant/accommodating subject out of the diaspora-occupation conditions. 
                                            
1 The etymology of the words “Palestine” and “Palestinian” is already studied by many 
researchers, it is derived from various civilizations that inhabited that place. 
2 Several scholars in the field used the term “Palestinianism” before. 
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This is what I mean by ‘Palestinian discourse’, and thus the subject for 
scrutiny. It is a constellation of mini-discourses that belong to different eras 
and geopolitical sites, each discourse passing its rules of formation into other 
discourses. 
 
Since 1948, the Palestinian identity and experience have acquired three 
forms: refugees, the “Arabs of” Israel, and the occupied people in the West 
Bank and Gaza. To be a refugee, unequal citizen, or occupied involves the 
mediation of an entire network of regulations, political and legal judgments, 
language, and social practices to constitute each classificatory subject-
position. As a result of power redistribution, almost every Palestinian 
individual has become a subject of refugee regime, occupation, state 
discrimination, or a combination of thereof.  
 
A detail-focused debate on Palestine has multiplied exponentially at the cost 
of the overarching narrative and picture. The regularity of imagining the totality 
of everything within the mandate map Palestine and Palestinian population 
everywhere was discontinued leaving the stage for new forms of statements 
to articulate Palestine by its parts. This also triggered a process of a re-
interpretation of the ‘self,’ the ‘other,’ ‘context’ and the relationships that bind 
them together. While details have attracted ample academic inquiry, the 
evolution and change within and between these details did not muster the 
same attention. What are the underlying rules that produced and ordered 
these details and how they have changed over the last six decades is what 
this research attempts to establish.  
 
Therefore, instead of focusing on the details, this study examines the 
mechanisms of discourse production in Palestinian politics since an-Nakba 
with a commitment to uncover implicit judgments loaded in the language of 
politics. 
 
I find an-Nakba’s metaphorical denotation, which captures the Palestinians’ 
conditions since 1948, a very useful analytical gateway into the subject. An-
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Nakba registers the broken or malfunctioning joints between the Palestinians 
and their homeland. How to heal and reconstruct these joints has been the 
subject-matter of the entire Palestinian political enterprise since then, which 
took various scenarios that will be elaborated in Chapter 4. The post-1948 
conditions were perceived as essentially temporary and return to the 
homeland, once liberated, is inevitable. As a result, the political calculations 
were very much influenced by a provisional mood of thinking that has been 
deeply implicated in a spontaneous referenetiality to corpus of institutions and 
laws to which the Palestinians became a subject of. This spontaneity became 
self-fulfilling and an ipso facto slow moving socialization process.  
 
The 20-year peace process is undoubtedly a touchstone in the Palestinian 
political experience. This process is governed by the Western experience of 
peace and unpeace, which in practical terms, involves extractions from the 
realist-liberal traditions. The idea of moving forward (what I will be referring to 
as the logic of motion) has set the discursive order, priorities and introduced a 
new dichotomous classifications: progressive and backward forces. This 
metaphorical motion functioned as a yardstick for making judgments about the 
Palestinian rights, peace interpretation, and human subdivision. It also ignited 
an urge to revisit key concepts in the Palestinian struggle. Moving forward 
bifurcated the Question of Palestine into “issues” of dispute and gaps that 
need to be settled through negotiations only. By this way of thinking, what was 
considered complicated and an impediment to motion was postponed to a 
supposedly forthcoming stage. In doing so the key issues of the conflict such 
as the Palestinian national rights and self-determination were bypassed 
instead of being dealt with. Now what is left of the overall matter was put in a 
market-like interaction whereby each element is processed according to 
mathematical and judicial operations that disguised the human and historical 
face of the elements in question.  
 
The refugees have played a significant role in shaping the Palestinian 
discourse until the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) seriously 
contemplated abandoning the struggle for liberating the entire mandate 
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Palestine and became satisfied with four times less than that. And, this is not 
all. The negotiation record typified in the Palestine Papers leaked to Aljazeera 
(the Doha-based media network) in January 2011 show that the PLO and the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) once again went beyond its position in 1988 (a 
Palestinian state on 22 percent of Palestine, self-determination and return of 
the refugees) and ventured its readiness to settle for less than what the Oslo 
Accords were supposed to yield.  
 
How has all this happened? How could what used to be unimaginable and 
unrealistic have become the official and most realist goal? What is the relation 
between the Palestinian discourse at different stages of the struggle and 
present reality? What are the policies and decisions, made or missed out, in 
this discourse? One could argue that the Palestinian leadership had no option 
or was forced to settle for less, but this is dubious. After all, there is “no neat 
way to draw the line between persuasion and force, and therefore no neat 
way to draw a line between a cause of changed belief which was also a 
reason and one which was a ‘mere’ cause. But the distinction is no fuzzier 
than most.” (Rorty 1989: 48) Even if I do not go as far as Rorty, the argument 
remains too deterministic. As we shall see in the analysis, choices were made 
and constructed; they were never given. 
 
Delineating transformation, development (positive or negative) and change in 
the ways of conceptualization at different stages in the Palestinian struggle is 
a central question. The extent of Palestinian internalization of occupation 
discourse is yet another important issue to take on board. Arguing about 
discourse’s functionality and performativity invites the following question: how 
does internalization relate to occupation as a system of discourse? Connolly’s 
inspiring analysis of the “essentially contested concepts” leaves us with this 
question: does not the Palestinian internalization of occupation concepts and 
terminologies imply that they share with the Israelis a range of judgments 
loaded in them? Bearing in mind that to internalize something does not 
necessarily mean to accept it, rather to go along with it as a fait accompli. 
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I find the poststructuralist approach to social studies a very useful source for 
building the theoretical and analytical framework that will guide the analysis to 
answer the research questions. Poststructuralism is a philosophy of critical 
interpretation that takes discourse and language analysis as a method for 
constructing knowledge.   
 
I have examined a rich corpus of primary and secondary sources which 
include: literature, autobiographies, accounts written by politicians, 
newspapers, school textbooks, documents from the diplomatic record of 
negotiations including all Palestine Papers. Yet, there is still a lot left out. I see 
discourse as something already in the public domain; therefore this study 
does not venture to prove or disapprove certain claims, or compile ‘new facts’ 
and ‘truths’ from hidden archival material. My purpose here is to engage with 
the already too much known and visible material, and turn it into a “difficult 
gesture” (to borrow a phrase from Foucault) in the process of extracting the 
rules of its formation. These rules can be found in styles, moods, tropes, 
metaphors and statements. This aim and methodology does not necessarily 
require the examination of the entire literature on the subject. 
 
Interpretation is always context-based and informed by situational material, 
whether linguistic or non-linguistic. However, language remains a key space 
for the constitution of power-relations and meaningful acts. Therefore, 
examining political statements is indispensable to accessing underlying rules 
and logics that form and regulate the flow of these statements. Although 
political statements are found in political texts, acts and institutions, discourse 
analysis transcends individualities and intentions to mediate on the subject-
position from which individuals speak and act. As such, while examining 
statements (associated with particular individual names) I am merely 
concerned with the authority and representativeness with which they speak. 
As Shapiro argues: “What is privileged is the linguistic structure within which 
subjects are caught up” (1984: 4, emphasis added). 
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The transformation in the Palestinian discourse is obvious; yet it remains a 
lacuna in literature. It is quite a challenge to define the exact point at which 
transformation and change occurred. After all, social developments are slow 
moving. Many scholars attribute this change to major developments on the 
international scene, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the first Gulf 
War. In consequence, the United States has become the main dominant 
player (or perceived as such) in world politics and the Israel-Palestine conflict 
in particular. Accordingly, the realist argument has ascribed the shift in the 
Palestinian goals to this mega narrative (see Ben-Ami 2006; Finkelstein 2004, 
Khalidi 2006, among others). To be fair this argument appears sound and is 
backed with rich empirical evidence. However, the analysis of this study 
exposes its limitation and demonstrates first, how transformation has been a 
continuing feature inside the political discursive regime from the beginning. 
Second, spectacular shifts, such as the Palestinian declaration of 
independence in 1988, were only the effects of a much deeper, but slow 
moving, changes.  
 
Briefly put, this dissertation has two interdependent original contributions: the 
main contribution uncovers the main rules of formations and logics of the 
Palestinian representative discourse. That explains also the internal 
transformation and evolution of this discourse, and how these logics directed 
policymaking. In general, I attempted to summarize the Palestinian discursive 
rules of formation into eleven overlapping rules: (1) an-Nakba and the order of 
discontinuity, (2) an-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution, (3) provisional 
horizon, socialization and referentiality, (4) motion, (5) logic of division, (6) 
statehood, (7) realist-liberalist peace, (8) mathematico-judicial schema, (9) 
market logic and (10) security as peace, and (11) replacement. The second 
contribution is a byproduct of exploring the philosophical debates that I 
touched upon in order to build a methodological framework that helps us 
understand the connection between change and discourse. Processes of 
change are tightly related to the dynamics of discourse and its ways of 
development. That is not because discourse causes change or one precedes 
the other, but rather because change itself is not outside discourse. Indeed, 
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we can only make sense of change through interpretation and narrative as will 
be explained in the next chapter.   
 
It is almost impossible to study the totality of any discourse, or more 
accurately, totality itself is impossible; therefore cutting through history to 
delimit the (non-) boundary of the case study is inescapable. Albeit necessary, 
boundaries and questions are arbitrary and among the primary exclusions 
researchers commit. 
 
The first delimitation is the subject of this study itself. Examining the 
Palestinian discourse comes at the cost of grasping the whole discursive 
regime of Israel-Palestine. The Israel-Palestine system of occupation is 
entrenched in Palestinian and Israeli everyday life. Occupation involves two 
things: occupier and occupied. Palestinians occupy the latter whereas Israelis 
occupy the former; meanwhile both remain subjects of occupation discourse. 
To interpret the system of occupation requires an understanding of two forms 
of subjectivities. Although studying the Israeli-Palestinian discourse, as one 
unit is far more instructive, yet it is beyond the capability of a lone researcher. 
Furthermore, it is analytically and practically more useful to study Palestinian 
and Israeli discourses separately while being mindful of their 
interconnectedness. The outcome would be two related interpretive versions 
out of which one may constitute a broader interpretation of the whole 
phenomenon of occupation in Palestine. Therefore, this effort aims to 
examine the Palestinian discourse separately as an initial step towards a 
more developed scrutiny of the whole phenomenon. 
 
The second delimitation springs from the demarcation of a beginning and end 
to the historical “positivity.” I follow Foucault’s understanding of positivity as an 
emergence and transformation of a particular discursive system. As we shall 
explain later, post-an-Nakba order represents a historical positivity and the 
subject of this research. Nineteen forty-eight and the subsequent events of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict have led to enduring and deep transformations to and 
within Palestinian society. The spontaneous collective Palestinian national 
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identity and narrative acquired a conscious delineation to cope with the 
existential changes that have befallen them since 1948.  
 
The Palestinian discourse after the 1947-8 events developed mainly in exile 
by those whom were (forcibly) garnered a refugee identity. Nineteen sixty-
seven events added another layer to the collective Palestinian identity and 
narrative that include: the occupation, occupied people and occupied 
Palestinian territories (oPt). Currently, the Palestinian narrative is colored by 
‘refugeeism’, occupation, marginalization and hence the resistance of each. 
This trinity, or assemblage, is spatially, socially, economically and politically 
fragmented. The reality of this disintegration is loaded in the metaphorical 
meaning of an-Nakba, as I will explain later in Chapter 3. The Palestinian 
discourse after 1948 became hyper-politicized; this suits the meta-theory of 
discourse analysis very well. Needless to say the history before 1948 informs 
the discourse after. The historical perspective and familiarity with literature on 
Israel-Palestine in general inform the way I approach post-1948 politics. 
 
Thirdly, this research does not include the discourse of Palestinians in Israel, 
as their subject deserves an independent research of its own, yet I benefit 
from existing literature on the subject. Finally, this dissertation stands without 
an examination of the Islamic turn in the Palestinian politics,3 which coincided 
temporally with the PLO’s diplomatic maneuvers at the outset of the first 
Intifada. Considering how the two discourses interacted would have provided 
a more holistic interpretation, but due to familiar research constraints, this 
research is adjourned to another project in the future.   
 
Since an-Nakba, Palestinian politics has undergone constant change and 
transformation. Patterns of political statements were sustained for a period of 
time, and gradually other patterns appeared while others disappeared. 
Therefore, the discursive rules of formation have evolved through a manifold 
                                            
3 Islamic-oriented political discourse is often referred to as ‘Political Islam’, which is a dubious 
term because Islam has been always political. 
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process of deferral, differentiation, equivalence, juxtaposition of concepts and 
ideas that belong to different historical and political thoughts. This dense inter-
discursive process encompassed ample conflicting, ambiguous and 
paradoxical elements, hence the dynamic and unfixed relationships, which 
served as the means of articulation and de-articulation. 
 
The Palestinian perception of Palestine as a totality of an entire area between 
the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River was discontinued in their political 
calculations. Today, it is imaged through its parts and visions. This has 
implications on how Palestinians perceive themselves as an “imagined 
community” while conducting politics and making choices. Indeed, more than 
half of the Palestinian population (the refugees) was marginalized and later 
characterized as a burden and obstacle to peace and progress. Palestinian 
exile was the initial author4 of the Palestinian narrative. As Edward Said 
argues, “[e]xile is thus the fundamental condition of Palestinian life, the source 
of what is both over ⎯and underdevelopment about it, …” (Said 1992: xxviii). 
This implies, that Palestinian narrative, struggle and conscious identity had 
actually developed in exile and by the exiled. The paradox is immaculate in 
the way the Oslo Process represented and dealt with the question of 
refugees. 
 
The story in the pages to follow may seem as fragmented and confused as 
the reality of Palestinian society and politics. But again, this must be better 
than an artificial and neatly structured narrative. The fragmentation is reflected 
in the confluence of various complex discursive layers and logics. However, 
putting this into a historical perspective is essential if we are to understand the 
connections between different parts of the story. The story emerges as 
symbioses between theoretical, historical and concrete policymaking inputs. If 
this study is to have any political focus, I hope that it is clear enough to the 
reader that theoretical tools and thoughts (I have in mind the realist-liberalist 
                                            
4 By ‘author’ we mean the “principle of grouping discourse” (Foucault 1984: 116). 
   
 19 
peace paradigm) are not neutral but part of the invisible action-orienting 
regimes at macro and micro levels. These regimes pivot on abstractions and 
hence lapses and erasures of a rather complex reality, and still in the realm of 
“problem solving” (Cox 1981). The following chapters do not aim to solve the 
problem but to make problems in what seems otherwise unproblematic.  
 
Chapter outline 
The dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first part expounds on 
the theoretical and analytical framework. I try to make a simplified 
interpretation of discourse and how it functions based on relevant literature. 
Then, the chapter continues to develop a theoretical framework in order to 
grasp the meaning of political change and transformation in social studies and 
attempts to explain mechanisms of change in relation to discourse. I touch 
briefly on the role of metaphor in discourse theory that will help analyze the 
linguistic sources. The chapter ends with a guideline for doing discourse 
analysis by highlighting possible ways to analyze, select and contextualize the 
research material. 
 
The second chapter builds the analytical framework of this research. It 
develops an interpretation of Palestinian political discourse as a social 
phenomenon of complex and multi-layered clusters of different discursive 
regimes and practices. Besides the historical contextualization, this discourse 
is also situated within a world already equipped with political norms and 
concepts.  
 
The second part consists of five chapters and focuses on the period between 
1948 until the late 1980s. Chapter 3 establishes the genealogical discursive 
developments after 1947-8 and an evaluation of some familiar historical 
events. It begins by examining the metaphorical meaning of the word an-
Nakba, which serves as an analytical lens. An-Nakba provides two themes: 
the first is the broken links between the Palestinians and Palestine. While the 
second theme embodies the struggle to recover the links with the homeland, 
this is the subject of Chapter 4. Then the chapter investigates the organizing 
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system of the Palestinian discourse that includes: the ‘self,’ ‘other,’ and the 
interpretative framework of the context. The analysis shows how the 
disappearance of Palestine as an ‘imagined totality’ has evolved, which 
opened up for the emergence of new identities and spatial mapping. I argue 
that an-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and a new discursive reconstruction 
emerged in a relatively short period of time.  
 
The analysis explores how the already available political terminology, in 
conjunction with the regional context, constituted a perspective on what was 
happening in Palestine and decision-making. The concept of liberty and self-
determination as the performative practice of peoples (or nations) informed 
the construction of the required re/action, i.e. struggle for liberation of the 
homeland. Although the link between liberation and the armed struggle was 
dominant in the discourse, it started to recede as the PLO began to consider 
diplomatic options until it disappeared completely. Liberation and armed 
struggle stabilized the discourse, yet both gradually receded and gave way to 
the concept of “political settlement” through “non-violent” struggle and 
negotiations. Then, the perception of the 1967 war and how it affected armed 
struggle among other concepts is examined. The war opened a new horizons 
and opportunities, which strengthened the PLO and the other organizations. 
The armed struggle and its link with liberation began to be qualified and to 
appear in a typological order with other political principles and was therefore 
no longer “the only option”. The chapter ends with a scrutiny of the 
mechanisms of power distribution internal to the Palestinian political regime. 
Ruling by consensus was intended to created national unity and democratic 
power-relations between the Palestinian movements.  However, it led to 
disunity and undemocratic distribution of power. Finally, the first Intifada in 
1987 helped to migrate the PLO political discourse into the West Bank and 
Gaza. 
 
By and large, Chapter 4 and 5 are a continuation of Chapter 3. They move the 
analysis into the second theme of an-Nakba and develop an account of the 
imagined solutions. The chapter begins with a brief contextualization of the 
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imaginative horizon.  It establishes that the provisional and temporary 
calculations were the rule after 1948, and from then on, the discussion 
continued to map out the constitution of imaginable solutions. A process of 
socialization and interdiscursive interactions opened up for new terminologies 
and concepts to materialize.  In effect, a process of re-articulation and de-
articulation of previous constructions ensued. Then the analysis mediates on 
imagined solutions: liberation as the restoration of the past and the creation of 
a democratic state over entire Palestine. While Chapter 5 begins by 
discussing the interpretation of the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David Accords of 
1978 and then the emergence of liberation as establishing a state on any part 
of Palestine. The later scenario discontinued and gave rise to a more focused 
political thinking based on the two-state solution as stipulated from resolution 
242. Finally, Chapter 5 ends with a discussion on the political status of the 
Palestinian refugees’ subject-position. Refugees became the main authors of 
the Palestinian political discourse especially after various Palestinian 
organizations joined the PLO in 1968. The refugees were framed not only as 
a problem, but also a “burden”; and the issue became the transfer of the 
refugees to other institutions and de-linking the ‘problem’ from the PLO’s 
responsibility. Later, the right of return construed a “bargaining chip”. 
 
Chapter 6 draws on the rules that implicitly informed the construction of the 
Palestinian discourse discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. In addition to the 
process of socialization and provisional horizon, I found a referential function 
governing the dispersion of discursive statements. By the referential function I 
mean referral practice to a wide range of diplomatic, political and legal 
discourse that the Palestinian constituted as international and Arab legitimacy. 
The dual legitimacy premeditated the contents of a possible settlement and 
negotiation in advance.  
 
The reference to dual legitimacy supplied the Palestinian discourse with raw 
discursive materials and served the internal justification by representing the 
UN or Arab interpretation of the Palestinian question to be legally and morally 
above any other interpretations. Apparently within the invisible alliance 
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between socialization, provisional horizon and referentialism with the 
systematic imbedded power-relations in the referential function, the 
Palestinians are likely to remain at the receiving end no matter what kind of 
balance of power exists in the relationship between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  
 
Chapter 7 explores how the politics of the first Intifada helped the gradual shift 
in the PLO’s spatial and political focus into the West Bank and Gaza. The 
analysis shows how the Intifada provided the necessary nexus between 
‘outside-inside’ Palestinians.  With the help of the flyer-mechanism, the 
referential political language was migrated into the discourse of ‘inside’. 
Despite the increasing intensity and spread of the events on the ground, 
diplomacy-ridden subjects dominated the local newspapers’ themes and 
space. What is outstanding from this spatial juxtaposition on paper is yet 
another unuttered spatial juxtaposition between inside and outside (exile), and 
a relationship between internal concrete events and external diplomatic ones.    
 
A correlation was made between the “possibility” of the statehood and the 
Intifada. From the beginning, the statist discourse gave the Intifada a function 
and lever to back the pursuit of state. Framing the Intifada through a matrix of 
referentiality and PLO politics led to socialization en masse in the West Bank 
and Gaza. This involved a public assimilation of the terminologies of 
diplomatic scenarios for the Question of Palestine, which we are now familiar 
with in hindsight. Assimilation entails sharing the meaning loaded in imported 
terminologies and concepts. 
 
The Third Part covers the period after 1990s in four chapters and ends with 
concluding remarks. Chapter 8 engages with the theoretical debate around 
metaphor and peace discourse. It mediates on the role of kinetic metaphor in 
an active peacebuilding process. I investigate the role of latent motion tropes 
play in conceptualizing the “process” of peacemaking to see what this tells us 
about the “peace” and its “making”. Later, the discussion moves to show how 
the embedded metaphor in the Israel-Palestine peace process has provided 
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an analytical lens and helped structure the Palestinian discourse for the last 
two decades (since 1990). I contend that logic of motion has set the 
discursive priorities and constituted contradictory forces: forward, progressive 
and backward forces. This “process” of peace coincided with another 
“process” to govern motion.  
 
The analysis then moves to the effect of metaphorical abstractions and their 
entailed actions on key concepts in the Palestinian discourse. The 
preeminence of transition and motion rule intercepted the possibility of 
articulating and making interpretations. Peace rituals became another 
constitutive substratum. Later the discussion evaluates the representation of 
peace and justice, and the concrete implications of that. 
 
Chapter 9 analyzes the representation of material and ideational existence of 
Palestine in the Palestinian political discourse. It demonstrates how the logics 
of partition and market embedded in peace rituals dismantled the 
representation of Palestine as an imagined totality; this had an impact on the 
Palestinians as an “imagined people”. In accordance with the logic of partition, 
Palestine was spatially and demographically bifurcated. In other words, each 
of these subjects was categorized into issues and sub-issues, core and 
generic ones. Then I scrutinize the conceptualization of the means of struggle 
and its internal transformation.  
 
After that the analysis moves on to the market-like operations in the 
Palestinian discourse in combination with a mathematico-judicial schema of 
ratios and referentiality. While analyzing the language of the diplomatic record 
I find a pattern of logics and tropes organizing the discourse. The 
metaphorical market logic in conjunction with the mathematico-judicial formula 
modulated the key aspects of the conflict and correlated them with ‘peace’, 
this logic objectified land, the human body and language. The peace agents’ 
imaginative thinking was framed by market vocabulary and concepts. After 
that, I discuss the idea of state “viability”, and argue that the Palestinian 
engagement with the definition of what viability means implies an acceptance 
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of the right of others to determine the quality of their statehood and thus 
sovereignty and self-determination. Finally, I examine the primal scene of 
Palestinian school textbooks prepared by the PA. The disappearance of 
Palestine as an imagined totality is clearly reflected in the textbooks. The 
visual and textual representation of Palestine emphasis the West Bank and 
Gaza, while places beyond that are ignored.  
 
The first part of Chapter 10 discusses the role of security in the construction of 
peace.  It begins with a genealogical tracing of the concept of “security and 
peace” in the Western experience and the realist-liberalist theory on 
peacemaking. It shows how peace is frequently juxtaposed with security as a 
singular phrase, “peace and security”; therefore, the two concepts are 
normally articulated together with an underlying essential linkage between 
them. However, security-ridden tropes are discursively hegemonic, both 
linguistically and performatively (in form of policies, plans, and acts). This is 
the rudimentary linguistic material in the process of peace securitization. 
Then, the discussion turns to the Palestinian engagement with security/peace 
discourse. It shows how the Palestinians internalized the discourse of “peace 
as security” in their concrete policymaking. The second part of the chapter, 
however, moves into the liberal component of peace, institutional/capacity 
building. It examines the actual contents of institutional-building programmes. 
As a result, the chapter illustrates, firstly, how the concept of security oriented 
these programmes, the allocation of funds and the setting of priorities. 
Secondly, it examines the relationship between capacity-building plans and 
the existing occupation order. I argue that these plans did not pose any 
challenge to the existing occupation order rather a symbiotic relationship 
unfolded. Finally, the discussion shows how securitization infiltrated the 
Palestinian discourse.  
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 1  
Theory and Methodology of Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse  
The word ‘discourse’ is usually received with ambiguous connotations that 
encumber the reader. One of the immediate objections has to do with the 
discourse-reality relationship and what causes what. Leaving aside the meta-
theoretical debate on the matter, of which there is already enough,5 I argue 
that discourse is not esoteric or beyond comprehension outside the 
supposedly ivory towers of academia. In simple words, discourse constitutes 
how we conceive things in one way rather than another. It governs the regular 
distribution of vocabulary, allegories and statements about a certain subject. It 
is a regime that produces regularities, rules, subjects, and defines the social 
boundaries through particular power structures (Foucault, 1972; 1984). 
Edward Said explains the relationship between discourse, interpretation and 
reality in a very elegant and succinct way that deserves a quotation:  
 
All knowledge that is about human society, and not about the natural world, is 
historical knowledge, therefore rests upon judgment and interpretation. This is 
not to say that facts or data are nonexistent, but that facts get their importance 
from what is made of them in interpretation. No one disputes the fact that 
Napoleon actually lived and was a French emperor; there is however, a great 
deal of interpretative disagreement as to whether he was a great or in some ways 
a disastrous ruler of France. (1997: 162) 
 
Then we are not concerned with the validity or correctness of judgments and 
constructions of things, rather how things are transformed into social and 
political meaningful objects of discourse through interpretation and the 
“violence that we do to things” in order to put them in a certain regular order, 
articulation, classification, codes (Foucault 1972: 229). 
                                            
5 More on this debate see Rorty 1989; 1992; Guzzini 2000; Lyotard 1983; Gaddis 1996; 
Campbell 1998a; 199b. 
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Poststructuralism takes discourse as the “political site” for the re/production of 
subjectivity, operation of power-relations and identity (Hansen 2006: 16). 
Discourse analysis aims neither to predict nor provide causal explanations for 
it does not see the problem in the cause or in the point of origin, but rather in 
the rules and the relations that made particular outcome possible at the first 
place. Moreover, “causes,” “truths,” “change,” and similar concepts have to be 
constructed before one can speak of them. The approach is bound up with an 
interpretive “ethos” which has  “inherently critical” aims to uncover the 
contestability of established truths, and certainly not an alternative theory of 
“truth” (cf. Connolly 1984: 151-2; 1993; Campbell 1998b; 2010: 223). 
Foucault’s understanding of “critique” is at the heart of poststructuralism. It is 
worth citing this understanding at length because it will enlighten the analysis 
in the pages that follow:  
 
A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest. 
… It is something that is often hidden, but which always animates everyday 
behavior. There is always a little thought even in the most stupid institution; 
there is always thought even in silent habits. Criticism is a matter of flushing out 
that thought and trying to change it:  to show that things are not as self-evident as 
one believed, to see what is accepted as self-evident will no longer be accepted 
as such. Practicing criticism is a matter of making facile gestures difficult. 
(Foucault 1988: 154-5; cited in Campbell 1998: 191) 
 
As a critical ethos, poststructuralism is attentive to “how” questions: how 
things became social things, how subjects are constructed and how the “real” 
becomes “reality.” Simply put, it aims to write the history of the present. Most 
of Foucault’s work ponders first-order questions.6 “Why” questions assume a 
pre-given reality, pre-social, subjects and objects, that is, the possibility of a 
certain course of actions and policies. In contrast, “how” questions investigate 
processes that constitute subject-positions in a particular discourse (i.e., it 
                                            
6 For example, Foucault investigates the construction knowledge in The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972), concepts formation in The Order of Things (1970); and transformation of 
penal system in Europe in Discipline and Punish (1977) among others.   
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examines the possibility for becoming). Hence, how questions reveal power-
relations that animate the mechanisms that construct social realities (cf. Doty 
1993: 298; 1996: 4).  
 
Poststructuralism adopts a discursive ontology that construes meaning as 
unstable, unfixed and always-in motion (Foucault 1977; Derrida 1982). 
Simultaneously, there is always a struggle within discursive structures for 
meaning, stabilization and transformation. However, while bearing on the 
Gramsci’s thoughts, Lacula and Mouffe (2001: 111) argued that meaning 
could be stabilized temporarily when hegemony becomes possible. 
Hegemony should not be confused with dominance; the former refers to 
meaning negotiation that leads to wide acceptance of, or ideally a consensus 
over, certain principles. Such agreement is a matter of degree, contingent and 
unfixed (Fairclough 1992: 74).   
 
This account does not deny the material existence; to the contrary, what is 
denied is the claim that material objects “could constitute themselves as 
objects outside of any discursive conditions of emergence” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001: 108). Discourse constitutes subject-positions, moves the 
material existence into the discursive reality and hence to a social existence. 
In short, “there will be no way to rise above the language, culture, institutions, 
and practices one has adopted, and view all these as on a par with all the 
others.” (Rorty 1989: 50) The discussion turns now to answer this question: 
how does discourse constitute realities?  
 
Performativity of Discourse  
Foucault develops the most thorough understanding of discourse, its 
formation and performativity in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). 
Although, he does not wish to establish a methodology of discourse analysis, 
ambitious reading of his works helps researchers to build their own discursive 
analytical toolkit. 
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For poststructuralism discourse is the only site for meaning production and a 
place for the objects and subjects of which discourse speaks. Discursive 
analysis is about interpretation. “[U]nderstanding involves rendering the 
unfamiliar in terms of the familiar, interpretation is unavoidable and such that 
there is nothing outside discourse, even though there is a material world 
external to thought.” (Campbell 2010: 229)  
 
For many people, discourse is often conflated with language (script or 
speech) and many discourse theorists define discourse by what it does. For 
example, Campbell (2010: 226) defines it as “a specific series of 
representations and practices through which meanings are produced, 
identities constructed, social relations established, and political and ethical 
outcomes made more or less possible.” In a similar fashion, Howarth and 
Stavrakakis (2000: 3-4) define it as “systems of meaningful practices that form 
the identities of objects and subjects.” Obviously, these definitions do not tell 
us anything about discourse itself. There is no accurate definition of 
discourse, so the only way to define discourse is to understand how it works, 
its formation and internal mechanics (see figure 1). For this purpose, I will 
build a specific analytical model to analyze the empirical case and research 
material based on my reading of Archaeology of Knowledge. 
 
It is true that discourse is a language, but only if we understand language as 
more than just a series of words one after another. It is composed of 
meaningful signs: linguistic (e.g., words, coded message) and non-linguistic 
(e.g., culture, traditions, norms, images, films) (Fairclough 1992) which 
produce and do concrete things irreducible to language itself. The entailments 
of certain articulations, signs and what discourse does are the concerns of 
research and discovery (Foucault 1972: 54).   
 
 In The Order of Things (1970), Foucault examined the pre-conceptual level 
(concepts’ raw material) in great details. Analysis of the pre-conceptual 
belongs to the internal configuration of text and schemata that define forms of 
deduction, inference, derivation, coherence and incoherence. Concepts 
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formations are at the level of discourse. Concepts are composed of a group of 
signs, both linguistic and non-linguistic. These signs are attached to one 
another according to particular “rules of formation” or “logics” in Laclau’s 
(2000) words; the relations between various signs produce “statements.” 
Concepts provide the schemata for linking, arranging, weighing and ordering 
statements inside discourse. 
 
Statements create relationships between a proposition and a designated 
referent(s). Discursive rules of formation do not determine the nature of the 
referent but rather they put it within a particular framework and perspective in 
order to make social purpose and meaning. A referent is therefore a variable 
entity, a place that can be occupied by other possible objects, subjects, 
individuals, groups, etc. It is not the ‘object’ itself, but a contingent 
‘corresponding’ discursive representation. On this account, discourse consists 
of an array of statements governed by a single system of formation and rules 
(Foucault 1972: 103-121). 
 
Discourse analysis must uncover the rules of formation, relations, determining 
the subject-positions (what position should the referent occupy to constitute a 
subject of discourse), material function, entailments and meaning, therefore it 
is not about semantics or the grammar of language. More specifically, to 
analyze discourse involves uncovering and scrutinizing its rules of formation 
while bearing in mind that “one must neither, embody them [rules of formation] 
in things, nor relate them to the domain of words; in order to analyze the 
formation of enunciative types, one must relate them neither to the knowing 
subject, nor to a psychological individuality.” (Ibid. 70) 
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Figure 1: Discourse formation 
Transformation and Change 
Titles of the sort “change of x to y” are common in comparative research that 
aspires to explain historical and sociological conditions that underlay change. 
Yet, very limited research attempted to address change itself, its mechanics 
and logics (or illogic) of operation. Then how could one compare or explain 
change in the absence of a reasonable ontology of change, in other words: 
what is change? It is easier to show how discourse is sustained than to 
expose its internal processes of transformation. Discourse transformation is 
under-theorized; hence, mechanisms of transformation remain unclear.  In 
this section I shall try to mediate on the process of transformation and change 
in the theory of discourse. 
 
Positivism declares “objective reality” as the source of meaning, and hence 
the origin of transformation and change. As a result, change is attributed to 
prior changes in material objects. For example, Mearsheimer argues (1994-5: 
42-3) that ideas are “imaginary” and in the mind of the subject; therefore 
“objective reality” determines their nature. A little thought unravels the 
limitations of such arguments. Firstly, words like ‘ideas,’ ‘objective,’ ‘reality,’ 
‘fact,’ ‘truth’ are not properties of material objects, rather they become 
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significant within discursive statements and mediation of the rules of formation 
(e.g., style, codes, presuppositions, order, exclusion). Secondly, these words 
and their derived adjectives (e.g., objectively, ideally, factual, etc.) are defined 
by other words that are beyond any material objectivity in a circular way 
(Shapiro 1985-86; Hacking 1999: 22-3; Carver 2008). Furthermore, their 
meanings have already gone through considerable transformation over time, 
which is still ongoing and always problematic (Connolly 1983).  
 
One needs to distinguish between correspondence with meaning and emitting 
meaning. Correspondence between objects and constructed concepts 
projected on them is possible and logical. However, the latter (objects emitting 
meanings) is impossible because objects (out there) are indifferent to 
conceptualization and meaning. For example, realism and rationalism are a 
set of ideas and criteria that “don’t just float around in empty space … they 
are there because they materialized in, they inform, social practices.” (Hall 
1985: 103) At the same time, conceiving social practices within discourse is 
not idealist determinism. Discourse is performative: it creates representations 
and practices that produce meanings. This also challenges the assumption of 
causality and its priori (i.e., ideas cause practice or practice cause ideas). 
Performativity indicates that both representations and practices are mutually 
constitutive, concomitant, and involve the linguistic and non-linguistic 
elements (Campbell 1998; Hansen 2006; Bialasiewicz et al. 2007). 
 
Unlike the positivist approach, constructivism considers ideas to be the source 
of change. For example, Dueck (2004: 522-3) argues that “strategic ideas are 
the implicit or explicit causal assumptions” that produce change.  He also 
adds that these ideas are reactions to the “external pressures” from the 
anarchical international system. Dueck is right in saying that ideas do matter, 
however, there are two corollary prejudices here. Firstly, treating ideas as 
something coming from outside, i.e. a pre-given anarchic system, the 
necessity of chronology (an existing structure, ideas followed by change). The 
second prejudice is linking causes and origins of change to ideas. Then, 
assuming that ideas emanate from external pressure and from outside, while 
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simultaneously arguing that ideas cause change entails that change is a 
product of that “thing” called external, which is beyond ideas themselves. 
Form this perspective, the view that recognizes ideas as a cause of change 
succumbs to the positivist trap, that is, objects have significance in 
themselves. 
 
In fact, the external and anarchical international systems are themselves 
ideas. Similarly, Risse-Kappen (1994: 208-214) argued for an account that 
considers ideas as intervening causal variables between ideas’ 
promoters/makers and the leaders. However, he puts two conditions for ideas 
to be influential: firstly, the promoters of ideas should gain access to the 
leadership, and secondly promoters must establish “winning coalitions” with 
local groups. In this case, the individual matters and becomes the focus; if the 
leader is “open-minded” and local “new thinkers” are ready to pick ideas (from 
outside) then one could speak of the role of ideas. This perspective is 
confused, for it is unclear to who change should be attributed. Is it to the 
idea?, to  the  promoters of ideas?, to the ability (itself) of building coalitions?, 
building ideas?, or to the receptor of ideas (the “open-minded” individual)? 
Moreover, this view freezes ideas and ignores the fact that by the time they 
get “picked up” and gain ground in public life, they would have undergone 
considerable mutilation and transformation. It is unclear why and how ideas 
are “picked up” and how an individual becomes open-minded. Indeed, this is a 
generic failure in constructivism because it assumes a given agency 
(attributed to ideas of an individual) while it lacks a theory of agency 
constitution (Chechel 1998). Most importantly, it does not ask how ideas 
themselves become possible and how they change.  
 
To understand the role of ideas it is apt to consult Althusser’s (1971) account 
of ideology (and hence of ideas). Althusser’s account has been criticized 
because it invokes, first, the Cartesian dichotomy of subject/object, or 
agent/structure and second, structural determinism. Let us first consider the 
structure of ideology. Ideology is composed of two things:  ideo+logy. Both 
(ideo+logy) are derived from Greek origins. “Logy” is derived from logia and 
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logos which means speech, story, narrative. The former means light (eido: I 
see) in Greek. When the two words are combined they compose a metonym, 
as it refers to a society of “ideas” (not any particular idea). Stories and 
narratives are constructions; by the same token, ideology (ideas+logos) is the 
outcome of a discursive formation. Notice that Althusser spoke of ideology as 
“practice”, i.e., performative (see Hall 1985). Consequentially, ideas, stories, 
narratives and so on, are the property of discourse and neither ideology nor 
ideas can be deterministic, fixed, or the product of an individual. Butler’s 
revision of Althusser’s concept of interpellation rises from discursive 
understandings consistent with the account of ideology as discourse made 
above. She argues, that to become a subject-position does not require the 
subject to be hailed by others, but to derive its own subjectivity “from the 
structure of the address as both linguistic vulnerability and exercise.” (Butler 
1997: 30) This account of interpellation and what Weldes (1999: 98) called 
“cultural raw materials” are constituted within the domain of discourse.  
 
Ideas should not be attributed to anything mysterious or related to a knowing 
subject and a thing to be known, as phenomenologists contend. Ideas can 
only appear in statements, which are composed of relations. Thus, ideas 
operate within a social discursive matrix. For instance, Debrix’s (2008) 
interestingly shows how the post-Cold War media and elite discourses of 
“tabloid realism” and “tabloid geopolitics” invested in imaginative and 
figurative visualizations of political realities as a truthful description of the 
world as it is. What distinguishes this discursive “tabloid” is the constitution of 
relations between the imagery of fear, danger, destruction and the world.  
 
So far, I have considered the positivist and constructivist account of change 
and disentangled their limitations. The following section explores the 
discourse mechanisms of change.  
 
Discourse and Change 
Mearsheimer asks: “What is the mechanism that governs the rise and fall of 
discourses?” (1994-5: 42-3) That is to say, how change occurs. To begin with, 
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it is instructive to call on the dictionary to find the meaning of the word 
‘change.’ The Oxford Dictionary (ed. Pearsall 2001) defines the noun change 
as, “an act or process through which something becomes different”, whereas 
the verb: “make or become different”, “use another instead of” or “move from 
one to another”. Then change is about making difference. We should 
underline the temporalized and spatialized status of difference embedded in 
words like: become, an/other, and move. Difference/change is something 
concerned with the future and something to become. While asking, what has 
changed? We already presuppose that something has changed and therefore 
the aim is to trace this difference and change retrospectively (ex post facto). 
Subsequently, the “difference” between the present (or something in the 
present) and the past is taken-for-granted because “difference” is essential in 
the relationship between the present and past, otherwise neither can be 
signified.  
 
Derrida (1982: 1-28) show a curious interest in the concept of difference. He 
coined the concept “différance” to signify both time (temporal, deferral) and 
space (spacing, separating) as a conceptualization and meaning construction. 
Firstly, the sense of time is typified in the deferral of meaning by reference to 
an unending chain of other signifiers (i.e., no possible totality of meaning). 
The deferral is about linking signifiers with other signifiers to establish new 
relations. Secondly, the spatial turn separates elements from each other by 
establishing order, hierarchy, binary, style of and inference, that is, a 
constitution of “othering.”  
 
One could charge the deferral process with linguistic determinism. After all, 
signifiers to which one may defer and regress to, are limited (words are 
numerable), entailing that the possible relations are numerable, and also 
signifiers are already fixed in a relation with other signifiers in the language as 
Saussure argues (1960 in Jørgensen & Phillips: 10-11). Placing the 
relationships within space and time renders them as essentially unfixed and 
contingent on the space and time (spatial-historical). Moreover, considering 
language as a system of relations is a contingent enterprise. Bearing on 
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Heidegger (1962), we are always-already thrown in a world of signification. In 
other words, we are in a world of language and relations, and we are always-
already in language. There are three elements to note: (1) by always being 
already ahead of ourselves the past demonstrates a historical perspective in 
everything, (2) the fact of our being in time suggests that the present 
accumulates meaning, which makes (the social) “being” possible. Hence, 
there is no priori, and “being” is conditional on the understanding of being 
now, which involves understanding of the past in terms of the present being. 
Finally (3), the future aspect in “being and becoming” implies that meaning is 
something to be discovered and constituted in time and space, not given. 
Because knowing and being are always situated “within” a particular historical 
situation, not outside it, knowing is always limited and contingent (Gadamer 
2004: 291-306).  
 
Discourse operationalizes language. There are both linguistic and material 
activities that create representations (not reflection) of reality, which do not 
exhaust all possible interpretations and links. These links are contestable and 
deferred (Derrida 1982). Thus meanings, links and relations are 
indeterminate, unfinished and never ultimately fixed (Laclau and Mouffe 
2001). Therefore, there are invariable struggles and dynamism within and 
between discourses about meanings, concepts and definitions that make 
difference and change. Moreover, discourse is not a totality of statements; 
there is always more that could be said, linked, arranged, deduced, 
substituted and excluded. Discourse draws on, and interacts with, other 
discourses and therefore interdiscursivity and intertextuality are unavoidable. 
Text and discourse refer to, and presupposes other texts and discourses; still, 
referentiality occurs inside the language (Riffaterre 1981). When two texts (or 
more) of different rules of formation encounter one another, their rules of 
formation interact and produce a new text that combines, excludes, revises 
and transforms their original rules of formation. In short, we are talking about 
discursive “defférance” (temporal and spatial) that includes difference and 
change relationships.  
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As mentioned earlier, when we speak of “difference and change” we assume 
that change has occurred, consequently we acknowledge (implicitly) a certain 
time and place of change, i.e. when the change took place, and exactly in 
what part. First, by bearing on the definition of discourse, we locate change 
within the rules of formations that govern the relationship. Second, to speak of 
change requires the delineation of a beginning.  
 
Institutions, discourse and beginnings are interconnected. It is impossible to 
circumscribe the beginnings of discourse because every concept draws on a 
chain of other concepts (Derrida 1982: 11). Therefore, we should always put 
the “re-” prefix before every concept we use, for what we do is re-constructing 
and re-making on the basis of other concepts. This shows how unstable and 
contingent is the re-making; it is always in suspense, waiting for something 
else “to come”. More to the point, change is evident in différence: by replacing 
signifiers by others, this is not a synonymic replacement but a relational one, 
which leads to postponement of the first meaning. Différance does not 
obliterate the initial meaning or relations but replaces and defers them. In 
other words, it removes the relationship and meaning from the menu of 
alternatives and possibilities by altering relationships and order. As Derrida 
puts it: “If the displaced presentation remains definitively and implacably 
postponed, it is not that a certain present remains absent or hidden. Rather, 
différance maintains our relationship with that which we necessarily 
misconstrue, and which exceeds the alternative of presences and absence.” 
(Derrida 1982: 20) Différance as displacement and referentiality is evident in 
the Palestinian discourse, as we shall see later in chapter 6.  
 
Institutions prepare discourse “order of laws”; they provide the place for 
discourse (Foucault 1984: 109). This does not mean that institutions are 
extra-discursive; to the contrary, a lot of discursive-acts have to be made for 
institutions to evolve.  Hence, institutions disarm discourse, “ ‘and if discourse 
may sometimes have some power, nevertheless, it is from us [institutions] and 
us alone that it gets it.” (Ibid.) We can understand Foucault’s fear of 
beginnings, because in the beginnings, in the laws of formations, power hides 
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itself behind something else whilst constructing arbitrary infrastructure of 
exclusion, prohibition, divisions, ranking, valorization, and so forth.  
  
Paul Pierson (2004) dedicates a whole book to theorizing on institutions’ 
development and change, yet without defining the term institution. The 
definition is necessary because it determines the nature of change, and forces 
the author to tell us exactly where, how and what change he is talking about. 
The book speaks of institutions as objects or things plus individuals who act 
intentionally and rationally. Moreover, change is ascribed to something 
external to institutions such as critical junctions, “losers”, “marginal groups 
tinker with institutions”, “institutional entrepreneurs” (Clemens 1997; Clemens 
& Cook 1999; Thelen 2003; Schickler 2001; Pierson 2004: ch.5). Each of 
these category is taken as self-evident and unproblematic.  
 
Institutions lay down the codes and relations, and they establish subject-
positions that could be occupied by various individuals. Institutions exist 
materially in the particular type of power, functions, codes, and procedures 
they exercise. Institutions discipline, educate, socialize, train and change 
individuals “from within” in order to fit into institutional system in particular, and 
in the social sphere in general (Foucault 1970; 1977). As a result, looking at 
individuals as a source of change leads nowhere because individuals are 
themselves the subject of transformation and constitution.  
 
Laclau and Mouffe criticized Foucault’s treatment of institutions as non-
discursive (2001: 107, see also ch.3 footnote 14). This is an inaccurate 
reading of Foucault. If we understand institutions and codes as the web of 
relations, then “these relations cannot be the very web of the text ⎯they are 
not by nature foreign to discourse. They can certainly be qualified as 
‘prediscursive’,” and he adds a caveat: “but only if one admits that the 
perdiscursive is still discursive, that is, they do not specify a thought, or a 
consciousness, or a group of representations … they define the rules that are 
embodied as a particular practice by discourse.” (Foucault 1972: 85). The 
“prediscursive” (rules of formation, relations) are the product of discursive 
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activity, however, they become partially and temporarily fixed. They function 
as rules, reference points and guidelines for further discursive formation. 
Seeing the prediscursive or non-discursive as partially fixed points opens the 
space for Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation.  
 
The practice of articulation constitutes privileged signs called nodal points. 
Other signs are ordered around nodal points, and derive meanings. Discourse 
involves partial fixation of meaning around certain nodal points. Consequently, 
the possibilities for something to be constructed as a meaningful object is 
reduced and delimited, this is because meaning is derived from its 
relationship with the nodal point it is attached and deferred to. Since discourse 
does not exhaust all possible signs, there are signs whose meaning is 
undetermined. These signs are called elements. Laclau and Mouffe argue that 
discourse aims to transform the identity of these elements into objects of 
discourse and attach meaning to them by (partially) relating them to certain 
nodal points. At the same time, nodal points themselves are not fully fixed; 
they are subject to the competing discourses that aim to fix their meaning in 
different ways. Accordingly, within every discourse, society and identity there 
is a continuous dynamic struggle over the meaning, which transforms 
elements into moments of discourse, and redefines the meaning of nodal 
points. This is what makes discourse alive, and always in a state of evolving 
and becoming. Laclau and Mouffe did not see the expulsion ability of 
discourse to transforms moments of discourse into back into elements or 
silences, and disqualifies them as objects of discourse.  
 
Above, I established that ideas, individuals, subjects and objects7 are indeed 
the objects of statements (discourse), and accordingly, change should be 
attributed to rules that make statements possible in the first place. Discourse 
constitutes its objects and transforms them constantly (Foucault 1972: 36). 
Objects and subjects are never stable; change can be minute, impossible to 
                                            
7 I refer to subjects as subject-positions and “objects” as objects of discourse.  
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see, slow and gradual to the extent that this transformation goes unnoticed 
immediately because we live “within” the moment of a restricted horizon 
(Gadamer 2004). Therefore, it unfolds or becomes visible over time. For 
example, even without any “critical juncture”, it is impossible to find the same 
discourse after a period of time. A host of rules, protocols, theorization, 
concepts, etc. are called in and projected on an event so that it could be 
constructed as “critical” and a “juncture”. Consequently, the sort of “critical 
junctures” we draw, are ex-post projections, which are not determined by the 
event itself, but imposed on it.   
 
Of course, this is implies recognition that events can be discovered and told in 
many different ways, not a denial of their occurrence. According to White 
argues “eventness” comes out of “emploting” events into particular narrative, 
that is, how particular happenings were singled out, structured and sequenced 
in order to produce a meaningful story. This process begins with a “poetic” 
and linguistic endeavor (White 1975: 30-31). Events “are real not because 
they occurred but because, first, they were remembered and, second, they 
are capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence.” (White 
1980: 20) 
 
Along with “critical junctures” (after being constituted as such) emerge new 
objects (elements) that do not mean anything on their own until the rules of 
discourse modulate their relationships and links. That is, after such elements 
have been described, recorded, classified, differentiated, labeled, judged, 
quantified, and so forth. More to the point, discursive rules mediate to 
constitute the possibility for objects to appear as new meaningful objects.  
 
To say change occurs when a critical event takes place requires an 
examination of how discourse engages with the event and how “change” is 
constituted (i.e., problematize change). Foucault’s (1972: 189) archaeological 
approach disintegrates the “event” and divides it into four analytical levels: (1) 
the level of statements (their rules of formations, relations, appearance, 
disappearance); (2) the level of objects (appearance, articulation, concepts); 
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(3) the derivation of new rules of formation from the existing ones and (4) the 
level of substitution of discursive formation with another (“appearance and 
disappearance of a positivity”). Accordingly, the analysis must show how the 
relations between different rules of formations and elements are transformed. 
When we talk of change and transformation, it does not mean that elements 
of discourse have changed their characteristics, rather a transformation and 
change in the relations that govern their existence as discursive elements 
occurred (Ibid: 191).  
 
Laclau and Mouffe elaborated Foucault’s concept of enunciation. They have 
developed what they call the articulatory practice8 that involves antagonism.9 
Antagonism is unavoidable because meaning cannot be stabilized forever. 
Political identity, or any form of a quasi-unity, becomes (temporarily) possible, 
hegemonic or prevailing interpretations produce links and differentiations 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Laclau 1996). Antagonism constitutes and 
destabilizes at the same time. Derrida discovered antagonism within the 
binary relations that consists of both exclusion and dependence. Antagonism 
is a discursive construction according to the logic of equivalence. For 
example, through the logic of equivalence the black population in South Africa 
(during the apartheid regime) constructed links that binds all “blacks” as being 
unified against “white racism”, “white oppression”, which established the two 
antagonistic binary, black=friend whilst white=enemy. The signifier “white” 
functions as constitutive outside of the “black” (see Howarth 1997).  
 
The fixation of meaning entails exclusions (logic of difference) of other 
possibilities (Mouffe 1996: 10-11). Because stabilization involves making 
                                            
8 Articulation or enunciation involves constituting relations between various discursive entities, 
as a result of articulation become linked to certain nodal points.  
9 Antagonism should not be confused with contradiction, and neither entails the other. For 
example, there can be a relation of logical contradiction but no antagonism follows. 
Antagonism emerges when “the presence of the ‘Other’ prevents me from being totally 
myself.” (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 125) 
  41 
choices, equivalence and differentiation, antagonism and undecidability are 
not going to be swept away. The two logics (equivalence and difference) work 
simultaneously and against one another. The logic of difference deconstructs 
articulations in existing chains of equivalence, and as a result, new relations, 
possibilities and signifiers emerge, i.e. change and transformation.  
 
To repeat, discourse accepts the fact that there are objects outside discourse. 
What is not uttered remains outside the realm of the social meaning. What is 
not yet put into words is, silence. Butler argues that, “One exists not only by 
virtue of being recognized, but in a prior sense, by being recognizable.” 
(Butler 1997: 5) Following her argument, we could say that silence exists; 
because it is recognizable by the very fact we acknowledge the gaps and 
lapses. Yet, silence has no rules of formation, or indeed, these rules are 
inaccessible and therefore they cannot be analyzed. Silence is a statement 
that is not yet put into words; it is “differend” according to Lyotard (1983). 
Differend calls for new rules of formation, relationships and linkages in order 
to transform itself into the realm of discourse. Silence exists only in the 
absence of the rules of formations, and new rules of formations or new 
relationships are formulated, silence enters the discursive field and ceases to 
be silence.  
 
Lyotard’s main cry against political concepts is pivoted on their inability to put 
differend into language. Therefore, politics and language need to find a new 
terminology to speak of the unspoken. What Lyotard did not explore is the 
ability of politics and language to turn the spoken and the speaking subject 
into a differend, an absence and discontinuity. More precisely, he did not 
explore the ability of politics and language to eliminate the speaking and 
speakable. Of course, this is not mere academic jargon; it is a reality that 
shapes the lives of millions as typified in the case of the Palestinian refugees 
in the Oslo Peace Process. 
 
Rorty argues that change occurs when vocabulary changes. Vocabulary 
re/produces other vocabulary. He puts it like this, for example: “revolutionary 
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achievements … occur when somebody realizes that two or more of our 
vocabularies are interfering with each other, and proceeds to invent a new 
vocabulary to replace both.” (Rorty 1989: 12) Put differently, change in 
language, or new language may result in concrete change. Rorty’s argument 
is still on the level of semantics. It is possible that two words or more produce 
new words that may replace original words altogether, and yet change may 
not follow. The important thing here is not the arrival of new words per se, but 
the rules of derivation that made new words possible, i.e., the level of 
semiotics (relations).  
 
Interestingly, Butler (1997) goes beyond semantics and shows the double 
force of language: it enacts and performs the constitution of subject, and the 
same language threatens its existence. Discourse has the power to constitute, 
re-constitute and de-constitute. Transformation occurs when the rules of 
formulation that govern statements, the relationships between statements, 
(old and new) are changed and enable the silence to become language and 
vice versa. Therefore, transformation and change is not tantamount to a cut 
off from the past, or previous concepts, ideas and subjects. Rather, it means 
that relationships that govern their discursive existence have transformed. As 
for change, “it is not a change of content ... nor it is a change of theoretical 
form ... It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they 
govern each other...” (Foucault 1980: 112, emphasis added) 
 
It is worth summing up the six interdependent mechanisms that induce 
difference and change thus far. First, linguistic articulation formulates 
meanings and relations, which are unstable, contingent and contestable which 
leads to a continuous slippage of meaning. Second, text and discourse are 
essentially inter-textual and inter-discursive. By the former I mean that any 
discourse depends on citations and reference to other texts, narratives and 
authors, whereas the latter is about borrowing from other discourses (of 
different rules of formations). For example, while discussing drugs or health 
care a series of notions from medicine, law, psychology, politics, moral 
values, religion, and so on, come to mind. All of this involves interaction 
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between diverse rules of formation of these various discourses, which may 
generate new rules or transform existing ones.  
 
Third, there is a change within the institutions and our selves. Fourth, 
following Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of articulation, there are elements whose 
meanings are undetermined and therefore the ongoing struggle transforms 
element into discursive moments and vice versa. Transforming elements to 
moments supplies discourse with new meanings that have never been 
available before. Consider for instance, how vague an idea the Palestinian 
statehood was until developed further in the political debates and became a 
key moment with specific goals and boundaries, state on 22 percent of 
Palestine; then it became a nodal point ordering and connecting other 
concepts and ideas about citizenship, occupation, self-determination, and so 
forth.  
 
Five, hegemony and antagonism are unavoidable in discourse; they work in 
different directions. Antagonism contests and destabilizes chains of 
equivalence, which in turn deconstructs existing meanings and subjects and 
opens up the possibility of new meanings to evolve. Hence, hegemony is a 
matter of degree and contingent a situation. Finally, as mentioned elsewhere, 
discourse and language are not everything and indeed there is a lot outside 
them. Francois Lyotard called these things a “différend” as they lack 
governing rules of formation and not yet put into words, they are silence. To 
transform silence into discourse requires new rules of formation, or an 
adjustment of existing ones. On the other hand, the discursive endeavor can 
also de-articulate and turn what elements of discourse into a silence.  
 
 
Discourse and the Inevitability of Metaphor   
The dichotomous division of language into literal and rhetorical is 
inconclusive. The division is arbitrary and inadequate because of the 
“impossibility” of objective relations between various elements (Laclau & 
Mouffe 2010: 110). Understanding is dependent on the words we use and 
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every word is defined and understood in terms of other words. John Locke 
was one of the champions of this division. He made the case for the literal 
language like this: “Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in 
it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with 
those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.” (Lock 
1961 cited in De Man 1984: 197) Ironically, this short passage is replete with 
similar rhetorical and figurative language (“like the fair sex”; eloquence is like 
a woman, inferior to man and should be removed from serious male affairs) it 
aims to repudiate. What Locke tried to do was to carry meaning by invoking or 
drawing on particular links and relations already established in metaphorical 
expressions (e.g., “fair sex”, “eloquence”). Meaning depends on the power of 
the metaphor and directions it points to.  Besides that, the two words, literal 
and rhetoric, are themselves metaphors.  
 
Metaphor and metonym are not mere aesthetical elements in the language, 
but constitutive concepts of thoughts and actions. Although they have the 
same objective (understanding, referential relations, constituting meaning and 
practical entailments), they operate in different ways. Metaphor makes it 
possible to understand one thing in terms of another, whereas metonym 
makes one thing stand for another (Lakoff & Johnsen 2003: 5, 38, 158). 
 
When Nietzsche asked: “What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms”, he was concerned with the constitutive 
nature of the concepts embodied in metaphors, metonyms and 
anthropomorphisms. By this way of thinking, an acceptance of these concepts 
is an acknowledgment of the referential relations within the metaphor. In 
practice, we figure and endorse consistent metaphorical entailments and 
relations as self-evident and truthful. Metaphor and metonym are common in 
daily life,10 they are more significant and far more important in politics, not 
only because they are able to hide certain features, but also to highlight and 
                                            
10 For examples, see Lakoff and Johnsen (2003). 
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specify with certainty the (supposedly) ‘right’ way to go and what policy to 
follow.  
 
Discourse is rich with metaphors. “Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are not 
forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of 
social relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the 
social is constituted.” (Laclau & Mouffe 2001: 110) It is analytically useful to 
distinguish between two interdependent levels of metaphoric language. 
Firstly, the conceptual metaphor establishes abstract links between various 
conceptual fields (e.g. peace-building). Secondly, the conceptual expression 
is more specific and derives linkages and relations from the conceptual 
metaphor in the actual expressions (building, destroy, reinforce, preserve) 
(Drulak 2008). Metaphorical expressions construct figurative depiction of the 
relationships, however, this relationship is context specific and not universal. 
Therefore, analysts should have an adequate understanding of situational 
terrain and language.  
 
Metaphor and metonym is an arena for power-relations; they are functional, 
productive (construct links, relations, exclusions) and they exercise power, in 
the positive sense of power. Carver convincingly shows how metaphors, 
through a loop of projections (projection and recursive re-projection), create a 
“metaphorical other” along the lines of dichotomous binary (Carver 2008: 
151). Although these projections seem to be coming from outside, they are, in 
fact, an internal conception of the outside (Davis 1999 in Carver 2008). 
Approaching metaphor in this way, not only blurs the dividing lines (e.g., 
between outside/inside, human/non-human, man/machine, us/them) but also 
reveals latent power at the pseudo-division lines. As such, metaphor is a 
carrier, a transporter that carries and transports meaning and power. As far as 
Israel/Palestine is concerned, we should watch for the powerful metaphors 
that have been strategically inserted to produce difference, and thus power-
relations and practical political entailments.   
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All language is metaphorical (Shapiro 1985-6; De Man 1984) in the sense that 
it carries, moves, travels and translates meaning (meta phorein means to 
carry, transport in Greek).  Therefore, we cannot suspend the power of the 
figurative language, the meaning it carries within its folds and the “violence 
which we do to things” by constructing them metaphorically. Most political 
concepts become metaphorically embedded in speech and writing about 
politics enables us to see certain directions and courses of action. The 
method of “echoing”11 is so pervasive in academia, think-tank, political actors, 
media and religious institutions. Echoing enhances the “rhetorical capital” of 
particular concepts that makes the entailments loaded within them widely 
acceptable, if not self-evident truths.  
 
Doing Discourse Analysis  
The lack of a specific set of criteria or ready-made recipes for doing discourse 
analysis is often a source of confusion for analysts. How to implement 
discourse analysis is tightly dependent on the underlying theoretical 
framework, research questions and available research material. For the 
purposes of this research, two conditions must always be satisfied: first the 
whole research must dovetail with the objective of interpretation. Second, the 
selection of material and analysis techniques must be consistent with 
interpretation in a way that helps to answer the research questions. 
 
George and Bennett12 (2005: 18) describe the case study as, “a well-defined 
aspect of an historical episode that the investigator selects for analysis, rather 
                                            
11 Echoing refers to the way in which particular concepts are disseminated by the repetition of 
the same arguments, justifications and description of the world or a particular case; this is 
common in academia and media. For example, many authors reproduce certain descriptions 
mixed with scar quotes or rephrasing of others’ descriptions to support the case they are 
making. Echoing helps fix the meaning around these concepts and disseminates them (see 
Bialasiewicz et al. 2007: 413). 
12 The methodology of case studies explored by George and Bennett (2005) is exclusively 
positivist. Despite titling the book “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
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than a historical event in itself.” This definition concurs with the selected case. 
The question of Palestine is an historical event extended over a long period of 
time, and it has variant aspects that could only be studied and problematized. 
Moreover, the Palestinian struggle is already imagined through different geo-
temporal episodes, which are useful analytical divisions.  
 
The case study approach serves the underlying theory of discourse analysis 
of context specificity and de-universalization. While critics claim that discourse 
research findings are ungeneralizable, discourse analysts consider that 
contextuality, specificity, problematized case, commitment to critique of 
exclusionary practices and de-universalization are what interpretation is all 
about. Thus, a research based on a focused case study concurs with these 
objectives (Howarth 2005).  
 
This study is concerned with the Palestinian political discourse after an-Nakba 
whilst focusing on its internal transformations. We chose this period because 
the whole Palestinian political scene has been deeply altered since then. 
Furthermore, the selected case and the type of questions we raised give 
primacy to politics. Indeed, the research problem and case (Palestine) are 
very politicized subjects. The case is context-based; politically significant and 
exclusionary politics are rampant. Palestinianism is rife with the politics of 
identity, dynamic shifts and changes (variation) and therefore it may serve as 
an exemplar of hyper-politicized case studies.  
 
Questioning transformation and change in the case of Palestine serves as a 
vehicle to conduct comparative research “within” the case itself. To see how 
transformation occurred requires comparing the case before and after the 
transformation, and how different conditions gave rise to different possibilities. 
The comparison should comply with the meta-theory of interpretation (contra 
positivist and quantitative analysis).  
                                            
Sciences”, with plural form of “science”, they exclude non-positivist theory (p. 18-9). Hence, 
their criteria are unfit for this research.  
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Selecting Research Material  
 
Because discourse is concerned with details it needs to engage with a wide 
range of research materials. This is especially useful to address the selection 
bias and reliability by using different resources and horizons (Milliken 1999). 
David Howarth (2005) provided a practical typology of possible data for 
discourse analysis. The data may be divided into two categories: linguistic 
and non-linguistic.13 Each category is divided into two sub-categories: 
reactive14 and non-reactive; each category has pros and cons which require 
attention. 
 
First, linguistic-non-reactive data involves documents and text; most of the 
academic research is based on this category.  Material selection criteria are 
the same as those for selecting the case study: compatibility with the meta-
theory, and that they help to answer the research question. Since this 
dissertation is concerned with the political discourse, the selected data should 
come from official authority, politicians’ writings and statements, and 
documents from key institutions that played a role in the Palestine question.  
 
Second, linguistic-reactive data such as interviews help to generate firsthand 
material. The interviewee must be an official figure or played significant roles 
in the decision-making process. I benefited from existing interviews, though I 
did not conduct interviews myself for two reasons. First, the analysis is 
concerned with the already much known discourse on the subject. In other 
words, I do not wish to generate new material tailored specifically for this 
research or studying hidden materials because our goal is to examine 
available and known material. Second, I already have enough firsthand 
material. 
                                            
13 The division is an analytical one; the whole data is viewed discursively and within the 
meaningful system (see Howarth 2005: 335-6). 
14 Reactive entails an inner subjectivity for its immediate production.  
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Third, the researcher’s observation and judgment constitute reactive-non-
linguistic data. Undoubtedly, personal judgment is always embedded in 
research. Finally, the non-reactive-non-linguistic is a very useful source of 
data for it requires exploring non-conventional material as meaningful objects 
of discourse. For example, investigating certain images or the institutional set 
up of PLO, PA, and other Palestinian factions at different stages provides 
valuable materials that are impossible to find in documents. Here, one should 
evaluate the embodiment of the discursive articulation in material objects. 
Furthermore, investigating the operating environment of the PLO at different 
periods and places (e.g., in Kuwait, Jordan until 1971; Lebanon until 1982; 
Tunisia until 1993; West Bank and Gaza after 1993) provides additional 
primary material.   
 
Based within the typology of research sources above and of course research 
questions, this study is founded on a rich corpus of primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources include: literature, autobiographies, accounts 
written by involved political actors, newspapers, school textbooks, documents 
from the diplomatic record of negotiations including all ‘Palestine Papers’. I 
see discourse as something already in the public domain; therefore secret or 
hidden sources are outside the focus of this analysis. 
 
Analyzing the Material  
 
There are at least two ways to approach discourse: the poststructuralist way 
or the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) way; they differ mainly in their 
techniques. CDA gives primacy to the linguistic analysis and gets closer to the 
grammar of language. (see Fairclough 1992; Barker and Galasinski 2001; 
Blommaert 2005). Taylor (2004) argues persuasively that CDA provides 
detailed examination of relationship between language and policy-making and 
power-relations. Therefore, CDA suits critical policy analysis well and provides 
insights about policy shifts. However, the difficulty with CDA is the over-
detailed output. Therefore, it is a suitable method for carrying out an intensive 
analysis of a very limited number of documents, but it is hard to utilize it to 
  50 
examine a large corpus of research materials because the output of analysis 
would be beyond the limitations of the research time and size. The CDA 
approach is therefore inappropriate for this study. Instead of going through a 
grammatical examination, I benefit from genealogy and metaphor 
methodology to uncover meanings and entailments. This does not mean that 
we will not use CDA techniques; to the contrary, these techniques will be used 
when convenient.   
 
Additionally, the theoretical approach of this study is less concerned with the 
grammar; rather it seeks to reveal the embedded logics and rules of 
formation. Therefore, the analysis benefits from poststructuralist techniques. 
Jennifer Milliken (1999: 242-3) identified four poststructuralist analytical 
techniques. The first emphasizes relationships between discursive objects; 
deconstruction (which characterizes Derrida’s work) questions the binary 
power-relations in language between two elements. The second technique is 
juxtaposition (e.g., Campbell 1998; Debrix 2008) this method destabilizes 
accepted narratives or the supposedly common-sense knowledge by 
highlighting erasures and exclusions of orthodox narratives. Juxtaposition 
shows how accepted interpretations are essentially contingent and political. 
The third method, “subjugated knowledge” considers how suppressed 
discourses resist dominant ones (e.g., Doty 1996). This is closely related to 
Laclau’s (2000) concept of the “logic of politics” when hegemony (or meaning 
fixation) becomes impossible, due to resistance.  Finally, the genealogical 
method examines the rules of formation of a particular historical positivity. 
 
The central analytical concept envisages Palestine and the Palestinians as a 
system of discourse. The technique of genealogy orients the analysis, but it 
also benefits from the other methods mentioned above as these techniques 
are compatible with discourse meta-theory and complement each another. 
Critical analytical lenses are built-into the genealogical approach. The critical 
aspect exposes forms of exclusions and constraints, while genealogy denotes 
the formation of discursive structures that makes the possible, including 
exclusions and limitations. The genealogical turn will investigate the rules of 
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formation, performance, subject-positions and regularities of the Palestinian 
discourse; while simultaneously, the critical turn will investigate forms of 
exclusions, social ordering, classification and language/power.  
 
I will approach the concept of Palestinianism on two levels: the first, via the 
grammar of discourse at the theoretical level, which involves explaining 
relationships between theoretical discourse and constitution and 
transformation within the Palestinian discourse. The second level delves into 
the Palestinian discourse itself on the political, historical, institutional, 
economical and cultural levels since 1948. 
 
Contextuality  
 
According to Schmitt, “[A]ll political concepts, images, and terms have a 
polemical meaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a 
concrete situation; […] they turn into empty and ghostlike abstractions when 
this situation disappears (Schmitt 1996: 31). This is especially true for 
nationbuilding amid conflict. The empirical case of this dissertation, the 
Palestinian discourse, has no ontological stability; it is simply an historically 
contingent, unfixed, and contextual system of discourse. Thus the empirical 
case becomes meaningful when it is situated in a particular context, and 
related concepts become politically significant depending on the social 
function they perform.  
 
For this reason, Gadamer’s (2004: 291-306) idea of “situation” and “fusion of 
horizons” is very relevant. Gadamer points out that we live “within” a particular 
situation not outside it; hence, our understanding and interpretive endeavour 
are restricted by the conditions and the limitations of this situation.15 Because 
we are historical and live within the limitation of the present our knowledge of 
ourselves is always incomplete. Form this viewpoint follows the idea of 
horizon. Horizon is the “range of vision that can be seen from a vantage point” 
                                            
15 Foucault made a similar remark (see Foucault & Chomsky 2006).   
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(Ibid. 301). Since we are historical and live within a limited situation then our 
horizon (vision) is necessarily restricted.  
 
Engaging in a task of interpretation always requires a beginning. Delineating a 
beginning is the first prejudice inasmuch as other possible beginnings and 
traces are discounted and restricted. The limitations that spring from being 
within a situation, and from the selection of a beginning seem an inevitable 
methodological dilemma. The integration of the idea of “fusion of horizons” 
into the methodology of discourse analysis helps resolve this dilemma. In 
hermeneutics, “fusion of horizons” is meant to guide us to discovering the 
correct or truthful and objective meaning. Expanding the horizon by inviting 
other horizons (e.g., past, present, inter-discursive analysis) into the situation 
and experience enrich the interpretive vision. It is no secret that the material 
on such a hyper-political subject (Palestine) is abundant, however, its 
accessibility can be a real challenge. And here the “fusion of horizons” has a 
lot to offer. Where material is lacking in one horizon one may find equivalents 
in other horizons; where one source is enigmatic others often elucidate.    
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 2  
An Analytical Perspective on the Palestinian Discourse 
 
 
 
Palestinianism  
 
Samih Farsoun, a renowned Palestinian sociologist, describes Palestinians as 
the 
descendants of an extensive mixing of local and regional peoples, including the 
Canaanites, Philistines, Hebrews, Samaritans, Hellenic Greeks, Romans, 
Nabatean Arabs, tribal nomadic Arabs, some Europeans from the Crusades, 
some Turks, and other minorities; after the Islamic conquests of the seventh 
century, however, they became overwhelmingly Arabs. Thus, this mixed-stock 
of people has developed an Arab-Islamic culture for at least fourteen centuries… 
(Farsoun 2004: 4) 
 
Palestine is a place and concept of continued interpretation and 
representation. Its subjects and objects have constantly replaced one another, 
coexisted, merged with one another, or discontinued. Its boundaries existed 
only in rudimentary, but shifting imaginations. Contradictory and competing 
claims and narratives have constructed, again and again, their own Palestine 
for a period of time and disappeared, leaving behind their traces, a new 
beginning to begin. Then, if the place called Palestine (or anything else) and 
its subjects (inhabitants: whoever dwell and dwelled in the place) are 
discontinuities and reproductions, how could a Palestinian discourse possibly 
be imagined? 
 
Because Palestine is an interpretation (Said 1992), discontinued historical 
layers, continued emergences and disappearances (of civilizations, traditions, 
habits, languages, religions, landscape, geographical borders) it must to be 
understood discursively. This way (ideally) liberates us (the researchers) from 
the burden of our personal baggage, or at least, may render what we take as 
self-evident and facile, a problematic and difficult gesture.  
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This research does not intend to make historical claims or truths, so to speak, 
rather to cut through the “history proper” (allegedly continued and 
harmonious) and analyze a singular “positivity.” Here I find Foucault’s 
understanding of positivity (as an emergence and transformation of a 
particular discursive system) a very useful point of departure into the empirical 
case: the historical positivity that began after al-Nakba in 1948.  
 
Until the end of the 19th century, the place (with very vague (non-) borderlines) 
was called Palestine, and the majority of its inhabitants called themselves 
Palestinians. Despite the deceptive homogenizing term, Palestinianism masks 
and unmasks historical, cultural, traditional and religious differences. The term 
‘Palestinian’ is paradoxical because in a sense it associates things in terms of 
similarities and differences simultaneously, and it is understood as such by its 
subjects. Therefore, this research conceives Palestinianism16 metaphorically 
as a site for differentiation and similitude. Both, differentiation and similitude 
are not only dependent on each other but also conform to a discursive 
system. If we accept Palestinianism as a metaphor, we should admit its 
entailments and directions.  
 
In the late 19th century, a new discourse (Zionism) emerged to challenge, 
replace, and disperse the Palestinian discourse of that time. Each discourse 
constructed and configured the place differently. Hence, a discursive struggle 
emerged over the construction of Palestine and its very meaning. Even so, 
neither discourse remained stable; each has its own transformations, 
disappearance, ignorance, denial, internalization and reciprocation. 
Apparently, the struggle is both over and within discourse, “discourse is the 
thing for which and by which there is struggle, discourse is the power which is 
to be seized.” (Foucault 1984: 110) 
 
                                            
16 Palestinainism and Palestinian discourse are used interchangeably.  
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Subsequently the Palestinian discourse entered a new phase of politicization 
to encounter Zionism, which constructed Palestine and the Palestinians in a 
way diametrically opposed to how the Palestinians conceive themselves, their 
space (Palestine) and encounter ever since. Fifty years later, Palestinianism 
emerged as a displaced discourse that lost its physical links with the land, and 
hence its focus shifted (collecting memories, fighting disappearance by 
producing appearance, reconstructing their identity, the image of the place 
they belong to and the other). In short, the Palestinian discourse rules of 
formation have transformed, as we shall see in Chapter 3.  
 
Palestinianism is a contingent, historical and social construction. I will review, 
interpret and scrutinize the rules of its construction, the relations and links it 
has established and the justifications and legitimizations it rests on. 
Palestinianism is not the outcome of the interaction between a subject called 
‘Palestinian’ plus an object called ‘Palestine,’ rather it speaks of Palestine and 
Palestinians (difference and similitude) and constitutes the relationships 
between them. Palestinianism and the Zionist discourse17 subjected one 
another and therefore constructed antagonistically. The latter persistently 
negated the existence of Palestinianism altogether. To be sure, Zionism is the 
mechanism that de-articulates the relations between the land of Palestine and 
Palestinians. Moreover, it constructed the land and the people differently at 
various stages. For instance, the land was configured as a, “land without 
people” at some point. This categorization inspired a host of laws and 
regulations, ethical (?) justifications, policies and institutions to deal with the 
“non-people” (e.g., “transfer”), inhabiting the land (e.g., “The Absentees’ 
Property Law”, re-labelling, renaming, and linking almost every spot on the 
land with a biblical narrative).   
 
It was not possible for the Palestinians to negate the Zionist discourse, in 
contrast they have to acknowledge it, deal with it, resist it, accommodate it, 
                                            
17 I recognize the divergent discourses within Zionism; however, I use Zionist as a unifying 
term for simplicity reasons.   
  56 
and reproduce themselves. Palestinianism as system of discourse makes it 
possible to see a resemblance in the Palestinians’ reality despite the 
dispersion of the subject called Palestine temporally and spatially.  
 
This does not aspire to unify the Palestinian discourse in one category. In fact, 
there are different Palestinian conceptualizations. Nevertheless, they have a 
similar function. Palestinianism is the interaction between rules of formation 
that made the emergence of the political object and subject (Palestine) at 
different periods of time, even when it appears in different shapes and 
contents, to be a reality. The Palestinian dispersion, division, multiplicity of 
structures, location, politics, laws, geopolitics, and so on, are the facts of the 
discourse. Palestinianism is composed and regulated by a variety of 
heterogeneous elements. The Palestinians have been interacting with a web 
of rules and concepts around them, for example, the construction of Palestine 
as nationhood in line with the Eurocentric concept of nation-state, the PLO’s 
recurring appeal to the English School concept of “international society” (al-
mujtama‘ al-dawli) as a legitimizer, interaction with the economic of the legal 
arguments, international law, emergence of politics of financial aid and its 
transformations, detaching for the Arabs (during Oslo Peace Process) and 
functioning within the Arab League (since the failure of Camp David II in 1999-
2000), politics of negotiations, emergence of politics of solidarity (after 2000), 
politics of interaction and socializing with UN bodies (recent) and so on.  
 
This research is guided by the following conceptual assumptions:  
 
Firstly, this study considers the Palestinian political discourse as a social 
phenomenon of complex and multi-layered clusters of different discursive 
regimes and practices. Positive, visible and invisible, productive forces 
(internal and external power relations) animated these regimes and produced 
change, transformation and constitution in Foucauldian terms. 
 
Secondly, the transformation of the Palestinian discourse is not a mere 
consequence of what has been done to Palestine and the Palestinians in a 
passive sense. On the contrary, the very existence of the Palestinian 
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discourse inevitably demonstrates the positive and constitutive nature of 
discourse: a constituent of Palestine and Palestinians’ reality today. 
Additionally, contrary to most mainstream research on the question of 
Palestine, this study is founded on the Palestinians’ participation in shaping 
their reality and how they interpreted and acted at different stages since 1948. 
However, the existing literature has valuable contributions, and hence, I wish 
to see this research as an opening up of new avenues for similar research 
and questions. My objectives here are academic. However, it is not possible 
to separate academia from politics and hence a consequential political 
interpretation of this study may be establishing the Palestinian discourse as a 
subject of an independent academic inquiry.  
 
Thirdly, the Palestinian discourse interacts with a wide range of discursive 
systems (e.g., judicial, UN resolutions, laws of war, liberalism, realism, 
economy, religions, history); it is interactive and part of a whole, international 
and local discourse. Accordingly, each of these horizons should be taken into 
consideration. 
 
Finally, I consider language as the locus and the political space for the 
constitution of reality, transformation, development and change. Making an 
account of a first-order question that tells us about the frameworks 
construction within which reality becomes a ‘social reality.’ What is the 
Palestinian discourse? How did it emerge, and how was it sustained and 
regulated?  are among the essential questions to deliberate on. Answering 
these questions is dependent on determining the discursive framings of these 
issues and their political effects (i.e., defining the rules of formation).  
 
The Language of Politics vs. The Politics of Language18  
Above I argued for a metaphorical Palestiniansim that is about both the 
general and particular, and difference and similitude. The Palestinian question 
                                            
18 The terms “language of politics” and “politics of language” is borrowed from William 
Connolly (1984: 139). 
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is far from being an isolated phenomenon; rather it has been at the center of 
international and regional politics. Subsequently, it should be located within 
the overall context and history. The politics of Palestinianism is immersed 
within the general language of politics. Its very formation, imaginations, 
purposes, vocabularies, and economics of justification and legitimization are 
intertwined with political language. Thus, there are two interrelated 
discourses: one is the discourse/language of politics; the second is about the 
politics of the former (see Connolly 1983). The language of politics concerns 
the political concepts we-live-by. Such concepts constitute our imaginative 
horizons and the articulation of the interpretations of the world around us. This 
language is found in a wide range of political philosophy and theory, 
international relations theories, international law, UN resolutions, and so forth. 
In practice, these concepts enable the thinking about politics in certain ways 
rather than others. In addition, they establish systems of linguistic articulation 
and chains of equivalence and difference.  
 
Thus, the politics of language constructs the “empty signifiers” that organize 
the overall rules of formation in general, and introduce political abstract 
concepts that guide and govern the expressible: they constitute the 
“standards and priorities of political life” (Connolly 1984: 151). More to the 
point, the rules that enable and give directions for establishing a set of 
enunciations are encoded within the cultural and political environment. Once 
the discourse of politics is established it acquires rhetorical capital that makes 
it adoptable. For example, concepts like self-determination, sovereignty, 
nationhood, democratic peace, among others, are now appealing concepts in 
their own right (Ish-Shalom, 2006; 2008). And however unsettled, contested 
and unsatisfactory the meaning of such concepts, people refer to them to 
make politically binding decisions in practice (Connelly 1984; 1983). This level 
of political discourse exercises its own systems of exclusion and prohibition. 
  
As far as the Palestinian discourse is concerned, the political concepts we-
live-by have tangible sequential effects which cut deep in the Palestinian 
social life, institutions, economy, education, urban and rural development, 
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communication, technology. Palestinianism draws on and imagines itself and 
its ‘others’ on the basis of the available political language. In other words, the 
Palestinian language/discourse is located within the already existing political 
concepts that provide principles and criteria for self-imagination and the 
possibility of being. Therefore, what Palestinians could speak of is based, to 
some extent, on the language of politics. As a result, we are essentially talking 
of the relation between the language of politics and the politics of language. 
The former refers to what can and cannot be said in a particular context. Yet, 
we should bear in mind that neither the language of politics nor the politics of 
language are deterministic; both are in the realm of the discursive constitution. 
 
In Heideggerian terms, the Palestinian struggle finds itself “always-already” in 
a world disposed with political concepts, meaningful practices and things. This 
world is already governed by historical and contingent “social logics” which 
are also dependent on the rule of discursive formation (Laclau 2000: 282). 
Laclau argues that the “political logic” is the practice that constitutes and 
disrupts the social logic. It constitutes the type of relations between various 
discursive elements. Perhaps the only difference between the concept of 
“logic” and the “rules of formation” is the degree of specificity. Foucault spoke 
in general terms, whereas Laclau was more specific and concerned with the 
primacy of politics. Laclau missed out the rule of political logics in the process 
of socialization and internalization of hegemonic social logics. For example, 
the Palestinian leadership internalized the logics of politics as much as they 
resisted them. Indeed, much of what the Palestinians refused to accept at the 
beginning, they accepted later, in the name of being politically realistic.  
 
Palestinianism is a hyper-politicized case; therefore, it suits discourse 
analysis. After all, discourse is the site of power-relations and the production 
of political identities, which are inherently “antagonistic” (Mouffe 1996; Laclau 
& Mouffe 2001). Thus, the Palestinian discourse has been in continuous shifts 
not only because of what Israel has done unto them (external causes), but 
also because of how they perceived, constructed, participated in, and 
internalized the language of politics (which includes force). For example, the 
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politics of language is clear within styles, figures of speech, modes and 
mechanisms of communication between the occupied and occupier, between 
PLO/PA and Israel, and within the internal Palestinian politics. Such style of 
communication has acquired unprecedented characteristics since the 
beginning of Oslo Process, as I shall explain later.   
 
How can peace and war be imagined and conceptualized is found in the 
language and theory of politics. Western thought on peace/unpeace is 
widespread; and indeed it reshaped the face of the world into nation-state 
structure. Oliver Richmond (2008) called this paradigm the orthodox peace: a 
composition of realist and liberalist interpretations. What I mean by the realist-
liberalist peace is a mixture of ideas elicited from realist and liberal realms of 
philosophy to construct an interpretation of what could be called as ‘peace’ 
and ‘unpeace.’ Thus it is a regularity of peace/unpeace signifiers juxtaposed 
and linked with material (territory, authority, material power balance) and 
ideational signs elicited from liberal thinking (democracy, rule of law, free-
market, human rights, good governance). 19 As result of the operationalization 
of the realist-liberalist peace paradigm on the Question of Palestine, its key 
concepts have infiltrated into the Palestinian political discourse, especially 
since the beginning of Oslo Process.
                                            
19 I have examined the realist-liberalist peace in details in Badarin (2011) 
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 3  
Since “That Day” and Beyond 
  
 
Since that Day 
The usual translation of the an-Nakba as a ‘catastrophe, calamity and 
disaster’ conceals the metaphorical loaded meaning in the Arabic word. 
According to the Arabic dictionary, the noun an-Nakba is derived from the 
verb nakaba that means ‘incline’ or ‘slant’. The verb is also derived from the 
noun mankab, which signifies the joint between the upper-arm-bone and 
shoulder of humans and all the joints between the limbs and torso of an 
animal. The verb nakaba conveys a malfunctioning in the mankab (joint) or 
manakib (joints), which makes a human or animal lean to one side (see Ateeh 
2004: 950). The etymological sense of an-Nakba designates an ill-fitting link 
between the limbs and torso and it is a common curse in Palestinian mundane 
parlance. However, since 1948 it has been used exclusively to articulate the 
loss of the Palestine and broken links between the absolute majority of 
Palestinians20 and their lands, homes and memories in the aftermath of 1948 
events. By this way of thinking, An-Nakba continues to this day. 
 
The metaphor loaded in an-Nakba explains the Palestinian discourse 
conditions of production since 1948. In general, two themes characterized this 
discourse: the first signifies the broken joints between the Palestinians and 
their homeland, while the second considers the ‘struggle’ the way to restore 
and heal these joints by rediscovering the ‘self,’ the ‘other’ and the 
‘homeland.’ An-Nakba, as a concept, is not a mere static representation of 
                                            
20 In 1947-8 between 700.000-800.000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homes while 
about 100.000 people remained in what is called now “Israel proper”. That means that about 
90 per cent of the Palestinians were forced to leave their homes in the territory that became 
Israel in May 1948.  
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what happened in 1948, but rather a continued reinterpretation and 
re/representation of social acts and developments that emerged since then in 
the light of the discourse that constituted an-Nakba, and the discourse it has 
constituted.   
 
All in all, this chapter establishes a genealogical overview of the building 
blocks of the Palestinian political interpretations of an-Nakba to understand 
how streams of power-relations added to the Palestinians’ plight and 
confusion. We engage here with some ‘known’ historical facts while reading 
history genealogically from today’s perspective in order to interpret the current 
discourse of the occupation after 1967 and beyond. And indeed, since 1993, 
the same representative structure, which was built in exile, migrated 
altogether to the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
An-Nakba’s metaphorical meaning serves as an analytical vehicle for this and 
the next chapter in particular, and the whole dissertation in general. I begin by 
analyzing the articulation of the broken joints; the next chapter examines the 
Palestinian constructed ways and solutions in an attempt to heal the joints.  
 
 
Broken Joints 
The events of 1948 were represented through various murky expressions in 
the Palestinian discourse. Ghassan Kanafani, one of the most distinguished 
Palestinian refugee novelists, described that time as “ominous days,” “hazy 
moments” and “merciless nightmare” (1961: 20; 26; 40). These expressions 
carry the Palestinians’ traumatic feelings and their perception of the moments 
during which the joints between themselves and their land, homes and 
families had petered out. The time and moments of the an-Nakba were 
pronounced as exceptionally ominous and merciless which remains imprinted 
in the Palestinian physical (e.g., ruined villages, homelessness, broken 
families, dispersion) and psychological existence. Consequently, “that time” 
has become a benchmark and reference point for the Palestinian present. It is 
a threshold that simultaneously separates and connects the social order in-
and-out Palestine and before-and-after an-Nakba. The present, or the ‘after’, 
is described and understood in relation to “that day” by saying: “that had 
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happened after a month from the slaughter,” “that day” has become “a sign of 
the big time signs”. It is “that time” when the Palestinians bade “farewell” to 
the oranges and left the “orange trees to the Jews”, and “when we [the fleeing 
Palestinians] got to Sidon [in Lebanon], we have become refugees.” (Kanafani 
[1958] 1963: 75-76)  
 
This disconnection between land and people is both temporal and spatial. 
Firstly, any reference to the past has to be reckoned from “that day” or “that 
time”, and secondly, their present refugee status is also counted from “that 
day”, or “the moment”, when the Palestinians “got to Sidon”, that is, exile. 
Once they had landed on a land that they deemed not to be theirs, they 
became aware of the fact that their identity had been contested and 
transformed from that “moment.” Thirdly, those who were forced to leave 
Palestine recognized immediately their new identity as “Palestinian refugees” 
because the physical links and immediacy to their land, homes and families 
had all discontinued. In “Men in the Sun” (1963), Kanafani explains neatly how 
the Palestinian society, that had become a refugee society, was coloured by 
pain, loss, defeat, shame, cowardice, maltreatment, alienation, and the acute 
experience of an ambiguous and uncertain future. The refugees’ 
characterization of the UNRAW’s services as “a shot of morphine” (cited in 
Bruhns 1955: 133) succinctly articulate their feelings of pain and suffering.  
 
In 1951, the Refugee Convention laid down criteria for a refugee as someone 
who is “not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence … is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.” (See article 1, A/2) According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), a refugee is also someone who has “well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion” (UNHCR 2010). The terms of the 
Refugee Convention were universalized in 1967 (UNHCR 2011) with the 
exception of three categories: (1) those who committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, (2) those who receive assistance or protection form 
agencies of the UN other than UNHCR and (3) those who have a status 
equivalent to nationals in their country of asylum (see UNHCR 2010, Article 
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1/C, D, E). The UNHCR’s introduction (2010: 4) singles out the Palestinian 
case and puts it on a par with categories 1 and 3; it states: “the Convention 
also does not apply … to refugees from Palestine who fall under the auspices 
of” UNRWA.21 Although these individuals are refugees according to the 
Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, their “refugeeness” was de-
universalized, which implies that they are unlike other refugees. This de-
categorization of the refugees in-and-out the conventions eschewed the 
possibility of an international intervention to address rights of Palestinian 
refugees to return and compensation (according to refugee conventions or by 
enforcing the UN resolution number 194), exclusion from international 
protection and sustenance, and reducing the amount of financial resources 
(Nafee Al-Hassan N.D.; Bartholoeusz 2010).22  
 
The UNRWA laid down the criteria for the registration as a “Palestinian 
refugee” as 
 
persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 
1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a 
result of the 1948 conflict. Palestine Refugees, and descendants of Palestine 
refugee males, including legally adopted children, are eligible to register for 
UNRWA services. The Agency accepts new applications from persons who wish 
to be registered as Palestine Refugees. (Cited in Bartholomeusz 2010: 452) 
 
Be that as it may, since 1948 a weighty portion of the Palestinian population 
began to inhabit different geo-political sites and as a result they became the 
subject of regional and international institutions depending where they ended 
                                            
21 UNRWA is the acronym for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East established in accordance to UNGA res. 302 (IV) to deliver 
assistance to Palestine Refugees on 8 December 1949.  
22 The UNRWA is a temporary subsidiary Agency whose mandate is determined from the 
General Assembly. It is funded by voluntary donations and its budget often falls short of 
funds. Its services are contingent on the consent and approval of host governments. These 
services are limited to humanitarian sustenance (e.g., education, health, social services, 
women and children protection). Unlike the UNHCR, UNRWA has no legal mandate of 
providing international protection to the refugees or seeking durable solution (see  
Bartholomeusz 2010). 
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up living. This phenomenon has prêt-à-porter theoretical abstractions within 
the political language to characterize instances of forced immigration and a 
guiding legal and relief precepts to deal with the situation. According to this 
language, the subjects are refugees who are entitled to a set of rights. They 
interpellated by, and exposed to, a set of refugee and humanitarian 
institutions, regulations, conventions, programmes, and so on. Therefore, this 
group of people was given the title of “the Palestine refugees” in the official 
discourse of the UN and other humanitarian organizations. The first UN 
resolution 212 (III) on “the Palestine refugees,” and 194 of 11 December 1948 
ventured into a series of terminology, international laws and norms in order to 
“regulate” the social, humanitarian and legal status of these individuals. In this 
regard, as al-Husseini (2010: 9) noted, the UNRWA developed a “disciplinary-
type ‘refugee regime’” composed of norms and regulations to govern the 
relationship between itself and the refugees.  
 
Most related UN reports and resolutions were entitled “… Palestine Refugees” 
and called for “relief,” “aid” and “assistance” to assuage the refugees “critical 
situation.” Initially, for the UN, the exiled Palestinians constituted an 
humanitarian incident and an urgent “problem of the relief.” In the name of 
“the Palestine refugees problem” financial speculations, budgetary questions 
and funds were raised. Resolution 212 (III) elaborated a system of institutions, 
positions and codes.23 It also encouraged other organizations (e.g., The Red 
Cross, The World Health Organization) to get involved, in order regulate the 
life of the “refugees”. Resolution 194 called for the “rehabilitation”, “return”, 
“repatriation”, and “resettlement” of “the Palestine refugees”. The “relief” 
mission was transformed into a permanent mission and new kinds of 
apparatus were distributed. Among these administrative and technical 
apparatus were the Director of the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees and the 
                                            
23 For example, an “ad hoc advisory committee”, “Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions” were established and a “Director of United Nation Relief for Palestine 
Refugees” was appointed. A “relief plan”, “regulations for administration and supervision” 
were drafted. 
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UNRWA with its army of sub-institutions, personnel, experts, monitoring 
groups, data collection and registration, social researchers, philanthropists, 
symbols, schools, medical and social services which were established and 
marked by the UNRWA flag and blue color. As a result, the Palestinians who 
became implicated in this institutional network became “refugees” whose fate 
and daily life have since then been governed by a congregation of non-
Palestinian institutions. 
 
In other words, this web of institutions, regulations and resolutions constituted 
the infrastructure of the refugee subject-position; and since these individuals 
have been the subject of this infrastructure, they were (and still) constructed 
as refugees, which materialized in the social reality through diverse 
regulations, symbols, deeds, terminology, spatial environment, identity and so 
forth. Although UNRWA was meant to be an apolitical organization, the 
Palestinian refugees regarded it as a “legal justification for their right to return” 
and the ration card became a symbol of a, “physical link with Palestine” (al-
Husseini 2000: 52). 
 
Palestinians in exile identified themselves with the “refugee” category (laji’), 
which become their principal social identity and a reality they resented the 
most. Deep feelings of loss, alienation, helplessness, need, cowardice, the 
memories of the past and homeland, the return to the homeland, and the fear 
of being “melted in” were the currency of the Palestinian everyday discourse. 
This shared language and feelings fostered and underpinned a sense of a 
distinctive Palestinian character. And in the meantime, the differences 
(however subtle and minute) between Palestinian refugees and the people of 
the hosting Arab countries became perfectly recognizable for them. As the 
years went by, the refugees carved for themselves a place in the new 
environment while opposing assimilation and resettlement.  
 
Consider, for example Kanafani’s metaphorical characterization of the 
situation back then:  “they have tried to melt me like a piece of sugar in a cup, 
however, I still exist notwithstanding everything.” (Kanafani [1962] 1963: 17) 
And, indeed, Palestinians in exile melted in a different way: they assimilated 
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into one (albeit heterogeneous) group called the Palestinian refugees. Such 
new conditions and environment have reflexively added a particularist 
nationalistic layer on the Palestinians, in contrast with their previous 
identification with the broader Arab and Islamic entity, yet without erasure of 
the Arab and Islamic traces. However, this particular character, “Palestinian 
personality” (Al-Hassan 1977: 164) was always felt to be a constant under a 
constant threat. For instance, education, which is a key source that shapes 
identity and worldviews, of the Palestinians (everywhere) has become a non-
Palestinian enterprise that produced systematic ambiguities and omissions, 
and “the most serious and yet natural omission concerns identity [of the 
Palestinian] itself” (Abu-Lughod 1973: 96).24  
 
Since “that day”, what used to be referred to as ‘Palestine’, has been divided 
or replaced with phrases like “occupied land” and the “remaining land”,25 
                                            
24 The “burden” of educating the Palestinian young generation after an-Nakba was assumed 
by non-Palestinian institutions — namely by the Arab regimes and UNRWA. Ibrahim Abu-
Lughod (1973: 96) analysis of the Palestinian education systems in exile demonstrates 
systematic ambiguities and omissions in the curriculums. As he puts it: the Palestinian 
student “was in no position to identify the major outlines of Palestinian history prior to or 
during the Mandate period; he would not be able to identify the specific importance of 
Palestine to Palestinians or the Arab people in general; he would remain ignorant of the social 
and economic life of the Palestinians prior to 1948; and he would remain unaware of the type 
and nature of the struggle which the Palestinian people waged to prevent the usurpation of 
Palestine … their attempts to preserve themselves as a community, and the outbreak of the 
Palestine revolution with specific objectives would remain a mystery if the Palestinians were 
to rely on the orientation and values of the educational system which prepared their offspring 
for the future … Perhaps the most serious and yet natural omission concerns identity itself. 
For the curriculum viewed Palestine as an Arab country, and therefore its liberation as an 
Arab problem … the Palestinian, Arab though he may be, became ipso facto a Jordanian, 
Syrian or Lebanese, etc. He was to learn the facts of his social, cultural and political history 
and environment in terms of this ‘country’.”  
25 Before 1967 the occupied land used to refer to what is now called Israel proper that 
constitutes about 78% of the area of the historical Palestine. After the June 1967, Israel 
occupied the rest of Palestine (the 22%) what is called since then the West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and Gaza Strip or the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
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where the “Mandelbaum gate creates a stone barrier between the occupied 
and remaining land” (Kanafani [1958] 1963: 23-24). Additional social 
classifications were inspired by and derived from such spatial categorization. 
The Palestinians who remained in the “occupied land” (so-called Israel 
proper) have become, without prior consent, Arab-Israeli “citizens” 26 in theory. 
They were governed by military laws and until this day they are not equal 
citizens of any sort (see Pappé 2011). Meanwhile, the residents of the 
“remained land” were officially annexed to either Jordan or Egypt (at least 
administratively in the case of Gaza).  
 
Before an-Nakba’s dust settled, a struggle ensued over the political status of 
the “remained land.” That space was labeled the West Bank27 of the Jordan 
River and Gaza Strip in order to represent the annexation of the West to East 
Bank as natural and logical. In addition to the annexation, the Royal decree 
omitted the word “Palestine” from the official documents and replaced it with 
the “West Bank” (Sahliyeh 1988: 10). The competition between the Hashemite 
Monarch, Egypt and All-Palestine Government (APG) paralyzed the first 
Palestinian government (Shlaim 1990; 2009) at a very critical time and, 
perhaps, delayed the establishment of a “Palestinian Entity” (Shemesh 1984). 
The story of the APG and the “Palestinian Entity” is telling, therefore it is worth 
examining them, respectively.  
 
Palestine and the Palestinians’ experience evolved from within three circles: 
internal, regional (Arab regimes and Zionism) and international (cf. Sayigh 
                                            
26 See Endorsement of the Israeli Citizenship Law 1952. 
27 The PLO internalized the Israeli-made “1967 line” which coincided with earlier imperialist 
British plans.  In 1940, the British High Commissioner adopted the Land Transfer 
Regulations, which divided Palestine into three Zones: Zone A where land transfer is limited 
to Palestinian Arabs (about 16.680 km2), Zone B (8.348 km2) where land transferred from 
Palestinians to Jews; and the Zone outside A and B (1.292 km2) which could be freely 
transferred. The West Bank and Gaza fell entirely in Zone A according to this division and 
annexed map (Doc. 3369). 
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1997: 9; Al-Hout 2011: 182). But here, too, and for various reasons, the 
conditions of each circle had transformed radically after an-Nakba. At first, the 
Palestinian social, political and geographical reality acquired new and 
unfamiliar forms. The majority of the Palestinians became refugees and far 
from home, their historical, social and familial fabric was interrupted and their 
leadership disappeared. On the regional level, the Zionist entity became in 
charge of its own state (Israel), the Arab regimes were unable to fight 
successfully on the side of the Palestinians (while some regimes had already 
their secret understanding with the Zionist leaders), and the maltreatment of 
exiled Palestinians became indubitable.  
 
Finally, the international stage had also transformed: the British mandate had 
terminated, there was a rise in American power and its appetite for overseas 
intervention, the Cold War politics, the emergence of the UN and set of 
international regulations and norms about refugees, human rights, occupation, 
and specific UN resolutions aimed at determining the status of Palestine and 
the Palestinians. No doubt that the three circles overlapped even before 1948, 
however, since then almost every Palestinian individual had to deal directly 
with these circles, without being filtered through the Palestinian leadership. 
For example, most of the Palestinian refugees had to deal with the UNRWA, 
with the apparatus of the host governments or Israel. 
 
No wonder, then, An-Nakba de-articulated Palestine and the Palestinians, and 
enforced new discursive reconstructions and new concepts in a relatively 
short period of time. This included the reconstruction of the people’s identity 
(“refugees,” “Arab Israeli citizens,” “the Arabs of…,” “West Bankers,” 
“Jordanians”) and geographical re-representation (“West Bank,” “Gaza,” 
“Israel,” “occupied land,” “remaining land”). Indeed, Palestine had ceased to 
be geographically seen as an “imagined totality” as I will elaborate later in 
Chapter 9. A number of institutions (UN resolution, UNRWA, relief agencies) 
appeared in order to “govern” and draw the relationship between these new 
discursive variables. Out of this spatial and demographic transformation, de-
articulation, re-articulation and representation of Palestine and its citizens 
became a pressing need for the Palestinians.  
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Order of Fragmentation 
For quite a long time the Palestinian leadership have failed to build a proto-
state political institutions during the British “Mandate” (or occupation?) period, 
and when they managed to create political parties and forums, the elitist-
familial leadership style was incompetent and exhausted with personal 
rivalries (Khalidi 2001; 2006; Sayigh 1997). In 1922, the League of Nations 
delegated the “Administration of Palestine” according to the (in)famous 
Mandate Resolution. The Resolution mentioned “Palestine” 45 times, “Jewish” 
11 times, Jewish “national homeland” 4 times, “Jewish People” twice; yet it 
utterly omitted any direct mention of the Palestinians, Muslims and Christians, 
who at that time represented about 90 percent of the population of Palestine 
(Abu-Lughod, J. 1987). The 90 percent were categorized not only in a 
secondary and negative sense as “non-Jewish communities in Palestine” or 
“other sections of the population”, but also as non-people who may enjoy “civil 
and religious rights” merely —exclusion of the political rights (see also Khalidi 
1997: 22-3, 2006). To the League of Nations and Britain, “Palestine” had no 
“people” but an abstract “other communities” represented negatively as “non”-
X. This imagination meant that Palestine was the place to be filled with X: 
People. From this perspective, one could say that the Mandate Resolution is 
the most realistic and performative interpretation of the dubious early Zionist 
claim: People without a land people to the land without a people. Small 
wonder, then, to find terms like, “co-operation,” “advising,” “interest of,” 
“facilitate,” “arrange with,” and so on, were used selectively to regulate the 
style of the relationship between the Jewish Agency and the Mandate 
government in Palestine.    
 
The United Nations continued to operate by the same or a similar language of 
the League of Nations with regard to the Palestinian national identity. The 
adjective, Palestinian, was rarely used as a descriptive modality of the native 
inhabitants. Instead, they were represented by other modalities (e.g., Arabs, 
communities) juxtaposed with the noun “Palestine” (e.g., “Arab people”, 
“people of Palestine”, “communities in Palestine”, “Palestine refugees”). On 
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very rare occasions the UN documents used the adjective “Palestinian”28 until 
late 1974. Since 1948, the UN resolutions were concerned with the Armistice 
Agreement of 1949 and the relations between the Arab states and Israel. 
Issues related to the Palestinians were addressed indirectly through the Arab 
states, in doing so, the UN avoided to deal with the reality of the conflict as 
being on Palestine and directly with the Palestinians and to get away with a 
more serious fact: the negation of the Palestinian agency and “peopleness.” It 
is worth noting with that regard, that what later became an “international 
legitimacy” in the Palestinian political dictionary emerged out of a total 
indifference to the very existence of the Palestinian people as we shall see in 
Chapter 6. 
 
After an-Nakba the geography and demography of Palestine were re-
managed anew. Firstly, geographically Palestine was reinterpreted into: 
occupied land that became Israel and the remaining land now called the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza. Similarly, the population of 
Palestine (whether classified as people or not) was divided into four 
categories: Jewish citizens of Israel were labeled the Zionists, the enemy, or 
the occupier; Palestinians in the “occupied land” or Israel were: refugees and 
the residents of the “remained land”.29 The sovereignty was also divided along 
the lines of these categories. Sovereignty over the first three groups was 
resolved quickly (the Israeli government sovereign over the Jewish and 
Palestinians residents of Israel, and the hosting (Arab) governments have 
become sovereign over the refugees). The Palestinians who become Israeli 
citizens meant different things to their new state and to their own people 
(Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza and exile). For those who see 
themselves part of the “Israeli-Jewish state” they meant a composition of 
                                            
28 The term “Palestinian population” was used in UN General Assembly res. 106 (S-1) Special 
Committee on Palestine, 15 May 1947.  
29 In 1948 between 700.000-800.000 Palestinians were forced to leave their homes while 
about 100.000 people remained in what is now called Israel proper. That means about 90% of 
the Palestinians where forced to leave their Palestine. 
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negative entities: Arabs, enemy, a security and demography problem or a fifth 
column (see Pappé 2011). However, for the Palestinians they meant “the 
Arabs of Israel,” “the Arabs of 1948,” “Israeli Arabs,” “Palestinians in Israel,” 
“Palestinians/Arabs of inside.” The image and identity of the Palestinian-Israeli 
citizens has been an unresolved matter (Pappé 2012). They were classified in 
exclusionary ways, neither fully Israelis nor fully Palestinians, but “the Arabs 
of …” or “the Palestinians of …”30, though this attitude has changed in the last 
decade or two (See Pappé 2011; Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2011). 
 
Sovereignty over the last group of Palestinians (residents of the West Bank 
and Gaza) was met with abundant external rivalry between different Arab 
states (especially Jordan) and internal rivalry between the familial-elitist 
leadership inherited from the pre-an-Nakba order, headed by Haj Amin Al-
Husseini and the new one headed by Al-Shuqayri. As a result, the Palestinian 
leadership came to the Arab League in a weak, divided and competitive state, 
which made it easier for the League to create deep interventions and 
hegemony over the Palestinian political order after an-Nakba.  
 
A representative instance that intervention is Arab Leagues’ patronizing self-
claimed right to appoint the Palestinian representative to the League; and 
then, in June 1948, it rearranged the leadership of the Arab Higher Committee 
(AHC). In July 1948, the League imposed its Civil Administration on Gaza with 
a mandate restricted to civil administrative issues without political or military 
power. The League had overall power over the AHC and Civil Administration 
because both were politically and financially dependent on it. But for political 
                                            
30 The designation of the Palestinians who became Israeli citizens did not come from this 
bearer of these titles rather enforced by others. According to survey conduced by Mada al-
Carmel research center in Haifa about 66 per cent of the participants defined themselves as 
“Palestinians in Israel.” While other groups of Arabs in Israel such as Druze or Bedouin prefer 
to define themselves as “Arabs in Israel” rather than Palestinians, which resonates with the 
history of Palestine as an integral part of the Arab world before Skyes-Picot Agreement (see 
Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury 2011: 10-11). 
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reasons, the League (via Egypt) needed to emphasize the “visibility” of the 
Palestinian character in the diplomatic arenas (Heikal 1996; Shemesh 1984), 
yet only a “visibility” short of an independent political leverage outside the 
frame of the Arab regimes. The upgrade of AHC evolved from within internal 
Arab regimes rivalries, needs, and antagonism, public appeasement and 
while keeping the Palestine issue under control (cf. Shlaim 1990: 40; Alazaaer 
n.d.).  
 
The Civil Administration was upgraded to the All-Palestine Government (APG) 
with objectives, structure and leadership that did not differ much from the 
former. Both were dependent on the Arab regimes and with a declared aim to 
establish an “Arab Palestinian state over entire Palestine” on “democratic 
bases.” Since an-Nakba, the armed struggle mustered a strong resonance 
throughout the sentiments of the Arab and Palestinian public, then it was clear 
to the Arab regimes that bestowing a monopoly over armed struggle and 
finances, would attenuate the APG power to mobilize the Arab public.  
 
The APG’s grand strategy was clear despite its ineffectiveness and lack of 
representation. It endorsed the common political language of the time: self-
determination, independent state over entire Palestine, and establishing a 
government on democratic bases (Darwazi: 24 cited in Alazaaer n.d.: 41). 
However, in reality, APG was not functioning democratically, for example, 
none of its leaders was elected, its leadership was based on familialist 
support, and its constituent assembly was from the notables. Ironically, APG 
declared itself as (almost) “a sovereign” government over the entire Palestine 
though it had no administration, no presence on the ground, it was financially 
and militarily dependent on the Arab regimes, and above all unpopular. The 
Arab League did not share the vision of the APG, and in hindsight one could 
say that the Arab states lacked a vision for the future of Palestine with the 
exception of King Abdullah of Jordan who was in favour of partitioning 
Palestine to maximize his territorial sovereignty by annexing the West Bank to 
his Kingdom (Shlaim 1990: 38-43). The Hashemite Monarch responded by 
convening the notables of the West Bank in Amman and then in Jericho in 
order to stifle the APG. After all, he was the actual sovereign on the ground.  
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Pan-Arabism, al-Qawmiyya and Nationalism 
The Arab world experienced two key strands of political ideologies between 
1952-70: Pan-Arabism (al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya) led by Egypt, and 
regionalism (i’qlimiyya) led by Iraq (Ba‘th). The former advocated an 
overarching Arab unity and expansive revolutionary and nationalistic spirit, 
whereas the latter embraced a realist-statist worldview complemented by a 
federal Arab unity (Shemesh 1984: 95-96). Such an ideological division in the 
broader Arab political context swept all the way through Palestinian politics. 
The Palestinian groups (later transformed into political movements) were 
colored by predominant political ideologies in the Arab world besides 
Marxism. Pan-Arabism and Marxism were the main themes that divided the 
worldviews of the Palestinian groups, until the rise of the so-called “Political 
Islam” in Palestine.31 Pan-Arabism embraced a “revolutionary and 
nationalistic” objectives including Arab unity “from the Ocean to the Gulf” and 
a confrontation with imperialism and colonialism. 
 
Pan-Arabism was a weighty source that helped crystallize the Palestinian self-
representation, therefore the focus on pan-Arabism, Arab Unity, in the early 
Palestinian political discourse. For instance, until 1968 the Palestinians 
refrained from using word “national” (watani); instead, they used figures of 
speech to signify their belonging to the wider Arab entity (qawmi), which 
saved them from the charge of separatism.  
 
As the APG proved to be neither satisfactory to the Arab regimes nor to 
Palestinians the search for “al-kayan al-falastini” remained an unfinished 
matter until the rise of the PLO in 1964. The word “kayan” (in Arabic) signifies 
existence or being. After an-Nakba the existence and being of the 
Palestinians were disturbed and replaced by another one over the same place 
where once the “Palestinians existence” existed. Drawing on this background, 
the pursuit of the Palestinian entity was meant to create a “political 
                                            
31 This is a dubious term because Islam has been always political. 
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representation” of the Palestinians as a people. The representation issue was 
the dominator of the Palestinian Entity (Shemesh 1984). Al-Shuqayri stated in 
the first Palestinian National Council (PNC) speech in 1964 that the 
expression “al-kayan al-falastini” is a strange expression, but the “special 
disaster of Palestine” and destruction of the Palestinian entity justifies it. 
Therefore, establishing this “entity” was “inevitable” in order to resume “the life 
of the Palestinian people” and to assume a “full responsibility to liberate their 
homeland and achieve self-determination”. 
 
In 1964, the APG was revitalized anew into the PLO by the same Arab 
regimes, the same leadership-style and Arab hegemony. In fact, the 
Palestinian presence in the preparations that preceded the PLO was 
marginal. For example, Ahmad Al-Shuqayri (the only Palestinian in the 
meetings) was present as an “expert” at meetings and his proposals were 
rejected after being met with adamant objections (Ibid. 117). The four-year 
(1959-63) period of preparation out of which the PLO emerged was a critical 
period in the internal Arab states relations. First of all, it was a period of 
ideological rivalry between the revolutionary (pan-Arabism) camp, and the 
regionalist statist camp. Secondly, amid this rivalry and antagonism, there 
were enough obstacles for any binding decision regarding the Palestinian 
question in general and a Palestinian Entity in particular to be taken, for the 
rule was that only unanimous decisions in the Arab League Council were 
binding for all states (Arab League Charter, art.7). Thirdly, the Arab states had 
limited options for the question of Palestine other than diplomacy, or they did 
not want to go beyond that option.  
 
Fourthly, the political environment in the countries of “confrontation” (Egypt, 
Syria Jordan and Lebanon where most of the Palestinian refugees live) was 
unstable, deeply influenced by the previous colonizers, and in state-building 
phases (between 1950-1960). Finally, the “confrontational” states had their 
implicit or explicit connections and understanding with the Zionist Agency 
(Sayigh 1997: 11).  
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We should not also forget that the Arab world was a site for the proxy Cold 
War politics and wars. Some Arab regimes were in alliances with the Soviets, 
especially Egypt in the 1960s. Through mainly Egyptian efforts, the Soviets 
agreed to support Fateh (Heikal 1996), however, this support was not genuine 
or off the limits for the question of Palestine itself was an uncontroversial 
issue between the world superpowers.  
 
According to Al-Shuqayri the Palestinians were excluded from the diplomatic 
tracks because they “were not embodied in their cause,” but overwhelmingly 
represented by others (Al-Shuqayri, PNC Speech 1964). The Palestine 
question was therefore treated as an Arab-Israeli matter in the international 
diplomatic arenas (especially in the UN), with the implication that this matter 
had to be solved between the Arab regimes and Israel without much for the 
Palestinians to say. The struggle over the right to represent the Palestinians 
between Arab regimes and the PLO continued and it took 10 years (1964-74) 
before the latter garnered political recognition as “sole representative of the 
Palestinian people.”  
 
To reverse this imagery of the conflict (an Arab-Israeli conflict, not a 
Palestinian-Israeli one), Egypt came up with the idea of establishing a 
Palestinian Entity in 1959 to represent the Palestinians as a people (Shemesh 
1984). In other words, such representation would construe a different 
interpretation of the conflict as a conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. 
In being so, this entity would be the answer to the “dangerous and dreadful” 
question asked in international forums for 16 years: Where is this people that 
international forums talk of its cause?” as Al-Shuqayri put it back in 1964. In 
hindsight, however, obviously this re-framing had also negative impacts on 
the question of Palestine in making it possible for Arab states to free 
themselves from the question of Palestine and pursue separate peace with 
Israel. 
 
The nascent Palestinian Entity, back then, found itself in conflicting and 
contradictory relationships with its context. It was designed, managed by and 
subordinated to the Arab regimes (especially Egypt) and their sensitivities 
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(especially Jordan). On the other hand, it should satisfy the political 
calculations that require some sort of observable official Palestinian 
representation. Subsequently, it was necessary for any Palestinian entity to 
see the light to internalize two Jordanian conditions: (1) only after the 
complete liberation of Palestine, the Palestinians shall decide their destiny, 
and (2) liberation can only be achieved through Arab states’ assistance and 
participation in the “liberation battle” (Shemesh 1984: 119). The two 
conditions entailed that this Entity would not enjoy any “territorial sovereignty” 
over any part of Palestine in the foreseeable future. Al-Shuqayri expressed 
the PLO’s acceptance of these requirements: he declared that “the 
emergence of the Palestinian entity in Jerusalem does not aim to separate the 
West Bank form the Hashemite Kingdom, but we aim to liberate our usurped 
homeland in the west of the West Bank; we have no goals in the West Bank, 
our goals lie in the west of the West Bank” (Al-Shuqayri 1964). The first 
condition was literally inserted in article 4 of the Palestinian Qawmi Charter of 
1964,32 which unambiguously discounts the territorial sovereignty over any 
part of Palestine as pronounced in article number 24.  
 
In the main, the fine details of the PLO design were drafted to concur with the 
Arab regimes’ concerns. Retrospectively this implies that the details of the 
Palestinian representation and image were subordinated and tailored to the 
size of the Arab regimes political reckonings at that time. Firstly, the system of 
appointment was embraced in practice to comprise the PNC at odds with the 
PLO Basic Law, which endorsed the principle of “direct election of the PNC 
members” (article 5). Secondly, the PNC members were appointed according 
to the needs and satisfaction of Jordan. Thirdly, the Jordanian-affiliated 
members constituted 65 percent of the members (i.e., the majority) (Shemesh 
1984: 127-28). 
 
Although, the PLO is meant to answer the question of representation, neither 
the PLO’s Charter nor its Basic Law (of 1964) gave it the right to represent the 
                                            
32Art. 4: “The People of Palestine decides its destiny after the liberation of its homeland” 
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Palestinians. Instead representativeness was conceded to the Executive 
Committee as stated in article number 16/a of the Basic Law. The Executive 
Committee was given the highest power (article 15). The composition of the 
Executive Committee was divided along the political divisions of Arab politics 
(mainly, Jordan, Egypt and Syria). The Arab League appointed Al-Shuqayri, 
and he appointed himself the chairman of the Executive Committee, also he 
appointed the rest of the members (Ibid. 125).  
 
The Executive Committee is the nucleus of the PLO and each Palestinian 
movement is represented in it in away or another (before the rise of Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad, which remain outside the PLO). However, the majority 
of the members were from the independents; the Chairman of the PLO has 
the mandate to appoint independent members. This structure (almost) 
guaranteed the predominance of chairman views (Arafat in this case). The 
problem is not with the person “Arafat,” but rather with the inherited PLO 
structure and Basic Law that grants Executive Committee the higher power 
and system of member-selection. While combined together, the two 
conditions underpin the power of the PLO’s Chairman subject-position, Arafat. 
For at least two decades since 1968, the structure of the Executive 
Committee constituted a subject of contention between various Palestinian 
organizations after the factions took over the PLO, in particular between Fatah 
and PFLP (Habash 2009). This discussion will be elaborated further towards 
the end of this chapter. 
 
The Qawmi Charter is the first authoritative document speaking in the name of 
the Palestinians after an-Nakba and a touchstone for subsequent texts. 
Therefore it deserves adequate examination. First of all, the Qawmi Charter is 
in the main a reflection of pan-Arabism politics and the hegemonic power-
relations between the Arab regimes and the PLO. The Charter’s theme 
combines al-qawmiyya, Arab unity and a revolutionary spirit. The first two 
articles of the Charter define Palestine geographically on the basis of the 
borders laid down by the British mandate. The articles define Palestine as “an 
Arab homeland” bound up with “all Arab countries through al-qawmiyya al-
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‘arabiyya.” While article eight stresses the idea of nurturing new Palestinian 
generations on “the Arab revolutionary manner is a qawmi duty.”  
 
The Charter states: 
 
We, the Arab Palestinian people, ... who believed in its Arabism and right to 
extract its homeland and realize its freedom and dignity, it has determined to 
gather its forces and mobilize all of its efforts and capabilities in order to 
continue its struggle and move forward on the path of Holy War (al-jihad al-
muqqadas) until the final and complete victory is realized.  
 
We, the Arab Palestinian people, based on our right of self-defense and 
regaining the usurped homeland entirely —a right is endorsed by international 
conventions and norms–especially, the UN Charter and implementation of the 
human rights principles.  
 
Because we recognize the nature of the international political relations, in its 
various dimensions and goals, … and for the sake of the honor of the Palestinian 
individual and his right to free and dignified life… We, the Palestinian Arab 
people, dictate and declare this Palestinian qawmi Charter and swear to realize 
it. (Emphasis added) 
 
The Charter begins with a declarative statement affirming the Palestinian self-
image as a “people” through a dual process of similitude and differentiation: 
they are Arabs, but also a distinctive sort of Arabs. So, pan-Arabism is a 
general identity whereas Palestinianism is a particular one. The “Palestinian 
identity” is framed according to spatial and temporal factors (not ethnical or 
religious): Article six and seven states: “the Palestinians are the Arab citizens 
who used to live normally in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled 
or remained, and any child of an Arab-Palestinian father before this date, 
weather out or inside Palestine, is a Palestinian.” Also “the Jews from a 
Palestinian origin are considered Palestinians …”33 
 
Identification with pan-Arabism (the general identity) echoed the predominant 
political theme of the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world. The double identity 
and allegiance were justified as a necessary step for achieving Arab unity as 
follows: “the Palestinian people must maintain their Palestinian character” 
                                            
33 This definition remained to be so until the Charter was amended in 1998. 
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(article 11) to effectively partake in the achievement of Arab unity. 
Furthermore, any Palestinian movement aspired or pursued some sort of self-
reliance and autonomous action was regarded as an outlier and separatist 
(Cobban 1984). To avoid the charge of “separatism” the PLO argued that 
“Arab unity and Palestine liberation are complementary goals, one leads to 
the other,” and the whole “destiny of the Arab people, and its existence 
depends on the destiny of Palestine” (article 12). However, the argument 
continues, the PLO came as an expression of a distinctive Palestinian 
character is meant to be temporary because the permanent Palestinian 
political order would be determined “[once] liberation is completed” (article 
10). I underlined the two words in the last sentence to make an early subtext 
to an argument that will be made in Chapter 6 with regard to the provisional 
thinking that guided much of the Palestinian politics since 1948.  
 
The Charter is rich with modalities to express affinity and attachment to the 
designated objectives. Tropes such as “we the Palestinian Arab people, 
believe, swear, declare” are perfect representative examples. Yet this high 
modality is not with out structural ironies and contradictions: the PLO spoke 
declaratively in the name of the entire Palestinian people, never mind the 
hegemony of the Arab regimes. The Charter identified the losses of the 
Palestinians (or the broken links with): homeland, freedom dignity and honor. 
The broken links and structure of the Palestinian society were reconstituted 
through three slogans: “national unity,” “al-qawmiyya mobilization” and 
“liberation” (article 10). 
 
The Charter laid down the first stone in the long process of the linguistic 
construction of Palestinian rights, which evolved around three main principles  
(statehood in the West Bank and Gaza, self-determination and right of return), 
as I shall explain later in details. So “regaining” the connection between the 
“Arab-Palestinian people” and their “homeland,” “honour and dignity” is a 
“right” and a “national and sacred goal” (article 13). First, the PLO drew on 
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mobilizing concepts of “honour and dignity”34 (al-sharaf wa al-karama) in the 
Palestinian society. While bearing on the same ideas the Palestinian factions 
(not yet members of the PLO) echoed the relationship between recovering 
“the homeland” and the “dignity” (al-‘asifa Communiqué no. 1, 1965).  
 
Land has a special status in Palestinian culture. Owning and holding on land 
is a source of dignity, homage and privilege for the individual, family and the 
social group one belongs to. Losing it is dishonorable to the individual and 
his/her family. In fact, the loss of land comes next to the socially unacceptable 
sexual practices (e.g., premarital intercourse, rape) typified in the common 
proverb before an-Nakba: “al-’ard walaa al-‘ard” (losing land but not being 
raped) (Khalaf 1981). All of this shows how deep and intimate the Palestinian 
attachment to their land and therefore the powerful feelings of shame among 
the refugees who were forced to leave their land behind. 
 
Secondly, the Charter drew on common international norms (e.g., self-
defense, human rights, the UN Charter, self-determination) in order to justify 
its “right” to regain the “usurped homeland entirely,” and establish legitimacy 
for itself. Yet, it ignored the fact that the UN and the League of Nations before 
it, have been full-heartedly behind the partition of Palestine and the 
establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine in accordance with the 
Mandate resolution and UN resolution 181, which were indifferent to their 
exorbitant effects on the entire Palestinian society.  
 
One of the curious ironies of the Charter is the clarity in which it represents 
the “right” to retrieve the Palestinian losses and the same time the perfect 
ambiguity with regard to the means to realize this right. Namely, how would 
the struggle be waged? What is the nature of the struggle? What is the sort of 
al-jihad al-muqqadas? This is to ask but a few questions. In fact, the Charter 
codifies the Palestinian reliance on the Arab regimes and represents 
Palestine liberations as an Arab national (qawmi) duty as stated in article 13.  
                                            
34 On the power of “honor and dignity” see Hobbes 1661, Leviathan, Ch. X and Bowman 
2006, Honor: A History.  
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The PLO expressed a high degree of affinity to the declared rights (“who 
believe in its right to…”); however, such modality entails ambivalence and 
uncertainty about the possibility to attain the declared objectives.  
 
It is therefore right to conclude this section in arguing that the PLO’s setup 
answered the needs of the Arab states more than the Palestinian questions. 
From the beginning the constructed “Palestinian right” was tailored according 
to the Arab political conditions rather than Palestinian needs or aspirations. 
This explains the dramatic shifts in the Palestinian “rights” definition and the 
methods to achieve them every now and then, without going back the 
beholders of these rights, the Palestinian people. The PLO preferred top-
down “legitimacy” from the Arab regimes and later from international 
resolutions. The PLO Charter (of 1964 and 1968) avowed respect for key 
liberal concepts such as freedom, liberation, equality, no discrimination, 
human rights, respect of religious freedom, etc., which were (and still are) 
alien to the Arab League Charter.  
 
The Organization of Organizations  
Although it appears as Khalidi (1997: 186) argues that the period that followed 
an-Nakba until the mid-1960s represents a “hiatus in [the political] 
manifestation” of the Palestinian identity. Yet, it is not a period of 
disappearance or disorder, but rather an informative and preparatory, and 
perhaps a necessary hiatus,35 which produced the nucleus of the Palestinian 
core political movements such as the Arab National Movement (ANM, later 
PFLP) and Fatah. The dynamic ideological differences, which often took an 
antagonist form, between various Palestinian movements over and within key 
discursive concepts (e.g., the meaning of Palestine, liberation, state, 
Palestinian rights, armed struggle, peace, refugees, relations with other 
regimes and so forth) contested and opened new possibilities for questioning 
                                            
35 Given the hegemony of Arab unity slogans and limitations put against any possible 
Palestinians political independence, it was maybe necessary to re-organize and construct the 
Palestinian movements in secrecy. 
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the existing internal order of each concept and its relationships with other 
concepts and statements (i.e. the discursive associative field). The analysis of 
these possibilities will be available systematically in the body of this and the 
next chapter. However, now, the discussion will analyze the interpretative 
framework of the Palestinian organizations. To make such an interpretation 
possible one needs to adopt a three-level scrutiny: (1) how each organization 
represented the context and environment of emergence and operation, (2) 
how it represented itself (3) and its Other/s. 
 
Firstly, how each Palestinian organization understood the context and 
environment in which it found itself in is informed by situational orientations 
and precepts. For many decades, the two key nodal points, wataniyya (local 
or territorial nationalism) and al-wihda al-‘arabiyya (pan-Arabism), were in 
circulation through the Arab discourse as a source of resistance to the 
Ottoman “other” and an orientation for the Arab awakening (al-sahwa al-
‘arabiyya). Palestine has been pan-Arabism’s touchstone. It was located at 
the heart of the putative Arab unity as typified in the slogan of the time: “Arab 
unity is the road to the liberation of Palestine.” The entire question of 
Palestine was deemed to be integral to the overall Arab-Israeli conflict and an 
Arab nationalist concern (Heikal 1996). At the time, the process of de-
colonization was fresh to most countries of the region (countries of exile for 
the Palestinians) therefore each Arab country was pursuing a “separate” 
statebuilding in contradiction to pan-Arab sentiments. Generally and 
summarily speaking, the Arab states’ political mood could be characterized by 
ambivalence, internal rivalry and looking inwardly, subsequently the question 
of Palestine was secondary to these regimes unless it served their political 
purposes and internal rhetoric. Unlike the pre-an-Nakba leadership, the new 
leadership was very much disillusioned by the Arab regimes. Al-Qaddumi 
perfectly underlines this point: “In the past, the Palestinian cause was robbed 
by Arab claims and counterclaims, in the middle of the which Palestinian 
opinion was lost.” (1988: 6) 
 
In parallel to the PLO development, two other Palestinian organizations, the 
Arab National Movement (ANM) and Fatah, were in the making. They shared 
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and diverged on various aspects. The ANM and Fatah emerged out of a 
similar experience of an-Nakba and exile. The former was founded in a 
relatively short period after an-Nakba in 1951. However, the latter’s formation 
began almost a decade after 1948. Pan-Arabism remained a key reference 
point for the PLO and ANM; they also concocted a new dependency 
relationship between pan-Arabism, Arab unity and Palestine liberation. The 
PLO articulated Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine “two complementary 
goals, each prepares for the attainment of the other.” (PLO Charter 1964: 
article 12) Order was not an issue; it did not matter whether Arab unity or 
liberation would happen first. On the other hand, the ANM “believed that there 
is a dialectic relationship between the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity … 
the Zionist project was an imperialist one that targets the whole Arab nation 
including Palestine. Therefore, we need to develop a comprehensive project 
for Arab unity that takes the liberation of Palestine as priority…” (Habash 
2009: 38, emphasis added). This interpretation of the Arabism-liberation 
relationship placates the Arab regimes, Arab people and Palestinians, and 
leaves a vast space for every group to make its pragmatic interpretation. 
Furthermore, the position of the PLO remained ambiguous on both (liberation 
and Arab unity), which indeed reflects the position of the Arab regimes and 
the PLO situation while being caught up “in-between” Arab and Palestinian 
issues. Therefore, everything remained in the state of non-action, neither unity 
nor liberation. 
 
A decade after an-Nakba, Fatah was burgeoning in Kuwait. The young 
founders, then the leaders, of Fatah were very cautious and skeptical of the 
Arab regimes and PLO. Fatah had reversed the slogan and argued that, “the 
Arab unity can be realized after liberating Palestine, not the opposite” (Khalaf 
1981: 34). This was a novelty in the Palestinian thinking that changed the 
direction and focus of the action. With this mode of thinking, the reality of the 
Palestinians and Arab states was interpreted opposite to the traditional 
Palestinian viewpoint, which considered Palestine part of “an Arab Alliance”  
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(Haj Amin al-Husseini 1999: 334).36 According to Salah Khalaf (one of key 
founders of Fatah and best known as Abu-Iyad) Fatah’s founders, “at least 
knew what was harmful for the Palestinian cause; our estimate was that our 
people could expect nothing from the existing Arab regimes … and we 
believed that the Palestinians should essentially depend on themselves.” 
(1981: 19, 20) Fatah portrayed the Arab regimes to be on the side of Israel 
and “facilitating and helping enforcing the status quo, that is the establishment 
of the state of Israel” (Ibid. 31). To cut the story short, it took the ANM about 
two decades to come to the same conclusion and re-configure itself into a 
particularist Palestinian movement (Habash 2009). 
 
The ANM distrusted the Arab regimes as well, however, the general style of 
President Gamal Abdel Nassir, the most charismatic President of Egypt, 
politics concurred with the movement’s worldview. As Sayigh argues, the 
ANM “commitment to Nas[s]ir, his philosophy on political, social, and 
economic issues, and his regional agenda was to be the determining 
influence on the ideology and behavior of the ANM for over a decade.” 
(Sayigh 1997: 75)  Fatah also found itself increasingly in closer relations with 
Nassir’s regime soon after June 1967 War. So the latter’s friendly reception of 
Fatah granted it further legitimacy, visibility and primacy over other 
organizations (Heikal 1996: 19). President Nassir represented for the 
Palestinians (and Arabs in general) “the man of liberation”, though this image 
was dashed after the 1967 War (Habash 2009: 72). At this stage, the 
particularist thinking prevailed. 
 
Despite the convergence between the “revolutionary” Palestinian leadership 
(which steered the PLO) and the Arab regimes since 1968, tension and 
suspicions lingered. One of the acute dilemmas was over who has the right to 
represent and speak in the name of the Palestinians, each side claimed that 
right to itself. Since 1968, the PLO has been adamant on its right to represent 
the Palestinians and protect the ability to represent. A couple of instances 
                                            
36 The ANM shared Haj Amin al-Husseini’s interpretation of the region’s reality. 
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would make the point quicker. Habash argued that, “The independence of the 
Palestinian decision-making … is indispensable for our struggle and a 
condition for the existence of our revolution which we must protect against all 
odds.” He continues and defines “The forces that threaten the Palestinian 
decision at this stage are primarily the Arab reactionary regimes… The 
independence of Palestinian decision-making means the independence of the 
PLO from these regimes.” (Habash 1979: 134, emphasis added)  Similarly, al-
Qaddumi explained that “[s]ome regimes do not like the fact that the PLO is 
the sole, legitimate representative, but no Arab state has the right to speak for 
the Palestinians.” He also represented the “independent representation” as “a 
right, there must be an independent delegation on an equal basis” (Al-
Qaddumi 1985: 5; 11).  
 
 
Secondly, interpretation of a particular social context is tightly related to self-
image. How the Palestinians perceived themselves is informed by the kind of 
image and judgment they made about a particular situation and about the 
“others,” be it the Arab regimes or Zionism, and what representations the 
other made about them. Interpretation is co-constitutive and always situational 
(see Gadamer 2004).  
 
In the main, Marxism and pan-Arabism shaped the ANM ideological bases. 
Since its formation in in 1951-52, the movement adopted a three-word slogan: 
“unity, liberation, and revenge;” the word “revenge” was substituted later by 
“recovering Palestine” (istirja‘ falastin). It devised a strict discipline, hierarchy 
and secrecy which also accepted both Palestinian and non-Palestinian 
members into its ranks. Several branches operating in different Arab countries 
constitute the movement’s structure, however, there was no Palestinian 
branch. This systematic negligence sprang from the movement’s 
philosophical orientation, which envisages the liberation of Palestine as a 
consequence of Arab unity and termination of imperialism. When Arab unity 
seemed unforthcoming, especially after the collapse of what could be 
considered as a laboratory test of Egyptian-Syrian unity in 1961 and the 
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“disappointment” after 1967 war, the ANM re-thought the location of struggle 
for Palestine within the broader regional formula (Habash 2009: 25-50).  
 
All in all, in December 1967 a particular Palestinian branch was composed 
when other left-wing movements merged together and formed a new entity 
called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). 37 Because 
rivalry and ideological differences between these sub-groups were not worked 
out, in a short time (in 1969) some these groups withdrew from PFLP and 
formed the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) led by 
Nayef Hawatmeh. Furthermore, the “hardline” left broke up with PFLP and 
DFLP and formed their new organizations: PLFP-General Command, 
Palestine (PLFP-GA) Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and Fida. The last 
three groups were adamantly “rejectionist” of the PLO policies.  In short, the 
ANM hatched several Palestinian organizations in a very short period of time. 
 
Fatah had a different experience than the ANM. Almost all Fatah’s organizers 
were young, enthusiastic and eager to act; they came from the “refugees” 
community and understood early the necessity to create an organization to 
facilitate their collective action and lead the struggle for liberation. The 
activists represented two styles for the putative organization. The first took 
cues from the APG and pushed for declaring a Palestinian government in 
exile. The second view, however, had a different and a very popular 
interpretation of the Arab conditions, that is, “existing Arab reality would never 
allow even the establishment of a Palestinian organization, and so there was 
no alternative for the Palestinians but to go underground and adopt absolute 
secrecy in their organization, until it could impose itself on that reality and 
force recognition.” (al-Wazir cited in Sayigh 1997: 83-84) Unlike the ANM, 
Fatah made no distinction between “conservative and progressive” regimes, 
rather it was very “wary of all [Arab] regimes, conservative and progressive 
alike” and believed that “the armed struggle wroth this name, it should be 
                                            
37 Heroes of Return and Ahmad Jibril- Palestine Liberation Front 
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prepared, organized and waged by the Palestinians to the end.” (Khalaf 1981: 
23) 
 
The rationale of Fatah was political and revenge was off the agenda. From the 
beginning, it represented itself as the “movement” of the Palestinians and 
therefore a particularist one. Though the ANM and Fatah shared the same 
goal of liberating Palestine, their focus differed greatly. The latter looked from 
a narrower, but focused, angle into Palestine whereas the former approached 
the struggle for liberation through a regional and grand design prism, 
therefore Palestine was one among other objectives (supposedly) sought by 
the ANM. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the ANM project was far 
too ambitious. It tried at the beginning to reconcile the irreconcilable: a 
committed to the liberation of Palestine, armed struggle, Nassir’s regime and 
Arab unity without working out the contradictions between these aims. After 
all, the Egyptian regime curbed armed attacks, Egypt was tied up with the 
Armistice Agreement and it had no solution to the Palestinian question. 
Dreams of Arab unity were at odds with existing political context then, a 
context entrenched with ideological competition and foreign interventions. 
Such conclusion became inescapable, especially after the collapse of the 
Egyptian-Syrian unity, which spurred the ANM to rethink its focus and re-
orientate its lens towards Palestine (Habash 2009: 71).  
 
At this stage, the inherited thinking from the pre-an-Nakba order that ties the 
Palestine liberation with Arab unity and grand design calculations waned and 
opened up for the particularist view, which became hegemonic in Palestinian 
politics.  
 
Fatah emphasized the particular character of the Palestinian straggle over the 
general Arab character. This perspective was grounded on the idea that the 
Palestinians should not wait for the Arab regimes to liberate Palestine; instead 
they should take the initiative and responsibility themselves to reverse their ill-
fated conditions. Such logic was attentive to the refugees’ sentiments. The 
refugees, and Fatah’s founders in particular, perceived themselves in an 
absolutely negative way as a group of people without what other peoples 
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have (they were without homeland, passport, weapons, direction, support, 
association, respect, existence) and persecuted one: “Our people have lived, 
driven out in every country, humiliated in the lands of exile,” therefore only 
“revolution” would reverse such peculiar reality (Fatah cited in Sayigh 1997: 
88). 
 
It seemed obvious to the ANM’s and Fatah’s founders that the PLO is neither 
a representative nor an independent entity, and therefore a truly 
“independent” and “popular organization” is needed. The gap between the 
new leadership and the old one was wide enough to be bridged: each had 
different worldviews, suspicions and sometimes confrontations. Therefore, 
cooperation was not something to reckon with. As Fatah sought a new start, it 
implied disconnection from the old and defeated “sons of [upper class] 
families and traditional figures”. (Abbas cited in Ibid. 100). The PLO’s 
composition, old leadership and an Arab-making, helped to construct it as, “an 
Arab instrument and [its military wing is] part of the Arab armies. In view of our 
experiences with the Arabs and especially in 1936, and our deep lack of trust 
towards them . . . we feared that the PLO would kill or divert the awakening of 
our people” (Khalid al-Hasan cited in Ibid. 101). Hence, for Fatah, the PLO 
represented an Arab tool to control and restrict a potential Palestinian 
revolution and independent action. George Habash argued in the same vein: 
“the ANM did not join the PLO because it did not show revolutionary 
orientation due to its ties with the Arab regimes” (2009: 72).  
 
Nonetheless, all Palestinian movements declared in 24 May 1964 that they 
would not oppose the establishment of the PLO (Hamid 1975: 94). Despite 
being critical of the PLO, the ANM and Fatah appreciated the fact that the 
PLO already had what they had been striving for: certain legitimacy, real 
entity, conferences, declarations, manifestations, charter and a military wing. 
The question for Fatah became how to drag the PLO into the agenda of the 
revolution. Seeing it from this angle justified the engagement with the PLO in 
order to “transform it from inside.” On the other hand, the ANM “believed that 
the establishment of the PLO was a necessity in order to constitute a 
legitimate framework to unite the Palestinian forces.” (Habash 2009: 72)  
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Coupling the Palestinian revolution with the Arab regimes would inevitably 
lead it to an end from Fatah’s standpoint. This belief was voiced in a popular 
saying: “all revolutions born in Palestine are aborted in the Arab capitals”. 
(Khalaf 1981: 31). This spurred independent Palestinian efforts, finance, 
membership and the design of their organization/s was guided by three 
principles: Palestine liberation, armed struggle, self-organization and co-
operation with friendly Arab and international forces (Cobban 1984).  
 
 
 
In what remains of this section, I will first focus on the new avenues that 
became available to the Palestinian political institutions after the June War 
1967, or al-naksa (relapse) as the Palestinian and Arabs refer to it, and then 
move to third point on representation of the “other.” 
 
In spite of its disastrous effects, the War was an opening for the Palestinian 
organizations to make free choices which made the PLO transformation 
possible because the Arab regimes’ intervention in the Palestinian decision-
making was cut short for the first time, albeit for a short period. Be that as it 
may, the ANM, Fatah and PLO were the three primary Palestinian institutions 
that constituted the order of the Palestinian discourse after an-Nakba (until 
Political Islam became influential in Palestine). Although each had its own 
distinctive path of development, rationale and worldview, they had a similar 
raison d’etat: the liberation of Palestine.  
 
In 1968, the Palestinian-made institutions were merged into the PLO. Since 
then Fatah had become the “backbone” and the leader of the PLO (Shemesh 
2004). The diverse Palestinian movements took over the PLO and amended 
its Charter to suit their worldviews. First, the al-qawmiyya as the guiding 
theme of the Charter was substituted by al-wataniyya/watani 
(nationalism/national) and explicitly nuanced in the title of the Charter: “The 
Palestinian National Charter”. Second, the nationalist and revolutionary logic 
became the source of legitimacy and justification (instead of al-qawmiyya al-
‘arabiyya). Article seven and fifteen of the new Charter considered “The 
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Liberation of Palestine” an expression of “a national duty” for all Palestinians 
and a “qawmi duty” for the. This formulation drew the boundaries between 
what is a Palestinian (national) and what is an Arab concern (qawmi). Despite 
the “consensus on the primacy of national issues” (Shemesh 2004: 93) 
among the movements inside the PLO to cancel out difference (social class, 
religious, territorial differences) and produce a more unified national 
Palestinian front, internal antagonisms over the meaning and the content of 
the “national issues” constituted additional material for discourse that led to 
certain performativities such as, the withdrawal from the Executive 
Committee, forming the Rejection Front, internecine, and so on. 
 
Palestinian organizations merge with the PLO is an historic moment that led 
to a reconstruction of the latter into an organization of organizations. This 
fixed the internal (Palestinian organizations) and external ambiguity about the 
identity of the PLO as an institution by bringing in the “revolutionary” spirit and 
the Palestinian self-representation. Since then the PLO has been an available 
space for the production of the Palestinian political discourse. Yet, this 
discourse reproduced the PLO in a circular way.  
 
Thirdly, how the Palestinians represented the “other” (Zionism) is closely 
related to their understanding of the global and regional political atmosphere 
at the time. But indeed Zionist was (and still is) seen as a contradiction of 
what is Palestinian.  
 
The word Zionism is derived from “Zion”, the Biblical name of “the city of 
David” or Jerusalem. Zionism is a movement of “return” to, and “redemption” 
(geolat a-karka‘) of the land of “Zion” and “Eretz Yisrael”. For the Zionists, 
Zionism is a modern, “pluralistic” and “open utopia” which combines both 
ancient and modern dispositions (Gorny 1998: 245; 249). The Zionists see the 
ideology and political movement they are attached to as:  
 
drew its sustenance both from traditional roots and from the sources of rational 
and optimistic modernism in its conception of the development of society … 
Zionism, relatively to other ideologies, has succeeded in realizing most of its 
objectives, … For all these reasons, it can serve as an example of the success of 
modernism. (Ibid. 241-42) 
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Zionism juxtaposes itself with the West, modernity and rationalism, and 
represents itself as an example of a successful and triumphant movement. On 
the other hand, “everything positive from the Zionist standpoint looked 
absolutely negative from the perspective of the native Arab Palestinians.” 
(Said 1992: 84, emphasis added) For the Palestinians, Zionism is a 
“colonialist”, “imperialist”, “aggressive and expansionist” movement to which 
the Palestinians are victim (dahiyya). Victimhood entailed sacrifice and 
struggle (al-tadhiya wa al-nidal) on the part of the Palestinians to confront and 
restrain the advance of “global Zionism and imperialism” as pronounced at the 
outset of the Palestinian Charter of 1964. “From the standpoint of its victims”, 
to use Edward Said words, Zionism, “is at bottom an unchanging idea” for 
creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine (Ibid. 56, emphasis added).  
 
Zionism was born out of a context of imperialism and a Jewish problem in 
Europe. At the outset of the 20th century, it managed to garner the backing 
and support of the imperialist powers at the time. The Western appetite for 
grand design schemes (in the Middle East in particular) gave a practical 
meaning and shape to the imaginative idea of putting Zionism on the world 
map. The link between Zionism and the West spurred the Palestinians to 
associate the former with, “international colonialism” (al-isti‘mar al-‘alami). In 
1919, the First Palestinian Conference argued for “resisting Zionism and 
colonialism”. And in 1922, about three decades before the foundation of Israel 
in 1948, the Palestinian expressed in the High Arab Committee Charter their 
ultimate goal to “liberate Palestine from Zionism and colonialism.” 
 
An-Nakba was bound up with a paradoxical phenomenon that required 
conceptualization and construction in order to make sense of it, and the self 
retrospectively. The yishuv (settlement) leader, David Ben-Gurion, declared 
the birth of “the State of Israel” in May 1948. The Palestinians, however, 
resisted this name and instead called it “the Zionist entity,” “the entity” and 
“the Israeli entity” interchangeably (al-Kayan al-suhywni, al-Kayan, al-Kayan 
al-’isra’ili respectively in Arabic). Nevertheless, a certain qualitative difference 
between Zionism and Israel was maintained in the Palestinian discourse. The 
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former was considered a tool for global imperialism, while Israel was 
constructed as “the vanguard of this destructive [Zionist] movement, a pillar of 
colonialism, and a constant source of anxiety and turmoil in the Middle East in 
particular and the international community in general.” (Al-Qawmi Charter 
1964: Article 19; See also PNC 5th session 1969) 
 
The Palestinian perspective on Zionism, Israel, and the relation between 
Zionism/Israel and the West have never been stabilized; rather they continued 
to be in a process of making. Other concepts (e.g., imperialism, racism, 
colonialism, etc.) were brought into the discourse to stabilize (albeit 
temporarily) these meanings and relationships. For example, Arafat argued 
that Zionism is “an imperialist, colonialist, racist, discriminatory and 
reactionary ideology” whose “logic concurs with anti-Semitism” (Arafat, UN 
Speech 1974). Because Zionism claimed to represent the Jews and drew on 
biblical concepts to justify its raison d’être, an essentialist connection was 
constructed between the movement and Judaism, and therefore, from a 
Palestinian standpoint, “every Jewish person was perceived a Zionist and 
thus an enemy.” However, the “essential” link between Zionism and Judaism 
diminished at an early stage in 1959 (Habash 2009: 49).   
 
At the outset, Zionism was regarded as a “colonialist movement” (haraka 
isti‘mariyya) and part of the global colonialism, whereas in 1968 it was 
considered to be a “political movement organically connected with the global 
imperialism,” and therefore it is  “the enemy of all liberation and progress 
movement in the world.” This description represents Zionism as an instrument 
of Western imperialism. Seeing Zionism from an imperialism lens reduced the 
possibility of a thorough scrutiny of the movement (e.g., its operational 
system, ideas and objectives) because Zionism was made to signify an 
“identical” manifestation of rather a general phenomenon. This obscured the 
visibility of the differences between Zionist and Western imperialism. Such 
construction of Zionism governed the type of possible relations between 
Palestinians and Zionists, and the mode of resistance by taking cues from 
other instances of resistance to imperialist and colonialist projects elsewhere. 
The Palestinian leadership alignment with the people movements and 
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regimes with similar experience of colonialist and imperialist projects saved 
them the effort of justifying their acts. After all, their aims and goals are in a 
par with other liberation movements in the world fighting colonialism and 
imperialism.  
 
On the other hand, Israel was constructed as a:  
 
tool for the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for global 
imperialism … ‘Israel’ is a strategic location [for global imperialism] in the heart 
of the Arab world in order to hit and dreams of the Arab people of liberation, 
unity and progress. ‘Israel’ is a permanent source of threat for peace in the 
Middle East and world. (Palestine National Charter of 1968: article 22) 
 
The “conquest of Palestine is only a bridge to other Arab land beyond the 
boundaries of Palestine”. The Palestinian leadership used the 1967 War to fix 
this belief:  “the June war is only the first wave to leap to the head of the 
bridge leading to another Arab Land …” (PNC 4th session). The first 
construction (Zionism is a manifestation of global imperialism) inspired the 
latter construction of Israel as a “tool for Zionism”, and thus a tool for Western 
imperialism in general. In other words, Israel was perceived in a hierarchical 
dependency relationship with Zionism and then with the West. Arafat, for 
example, featured the instrumental-hierarchal image of Israel: “I regard Israel 
as a mere watch-dog doing its job in this area on the orders of its American 
master” (1981: 147). 
 
In early stage of the struggle, the Palestinians perspective on Zionism as “an 
enemy” was generally based on indirect inferences form the juxtapositions 
between Zionism with imperialism and colonialism, not out of the critical 
examination of its structures and tenets. For example, the PNC 4th (1968) 
session defined “the enemy” in “three interconnected powers: Israel, global 
Zionism and global imperialism led by the US.” Accordingly, “the focus” of “the 
Palestinian struggle” should transcend the geographical boundaries of 
Palestine to resist the trilateral enemy (Ibid.)  
  
The gradual transformations in other parts of the Palestinian discourse, and 
its rules of formation (discussed elsewhere), have spurred the PLO to rework 
its perception of Israel. The new perception of Israel as an adversary (not an 
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enemy) with whom the Palestinians have “compatible goals”; as Khalaf puts it: 
“Israel and the Palestinian people have similar and compatible goals … Israel 
wants to be master of its own fate —an independent state, secure, and at 
peace with neighbors.” (1990: 96, emphasis added)  
 
Liberation (al- tahr ir) 
Concepts of liberty and (recently) democracy are central nodal points in the 
contemporary language of politics. They have broad social significance as 
“primary goods” which human beings should enjoy (Rawls 1993: 181) and 
they are the touchstone of the Universal Declaration of Human Right (UDHR). 
Self-determination constitutes the practice and substance of a liberty that 
allows us to act according to our self-understanding (Ibid.). Individualist liberty 
and self-determination (the essence of liberalism) were extended to 
collectivities that have been constructed into discrete units such as the nation, 
people and community in contemporary political theory. Liberalism’s focus on 
individualism and the disregard of community gave rise to the communitarian 
school of thought as an advocate of the normative value of the community 
(see Sandel 1998). The principle of “self-determination of peoples” gained 
normative political ground both in theory and practice at the onset of the 
twentieth century, which marked the rise of nationalism, liberation movements 
and later decolonization.  
 
Self-determination of nations, or peoples, became an essential principle in the 
nation-state international order. With the advance of nationalism in the West 
and elsewhere, national self-determination was regarded as one of the key 
governing rules of world order. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, 
the UN Charter (see UN Charter 1945: article 1/II) and international law 
endorsed self-determination. Of course, what constitutes a “people” and the 
contents of self-determination were still evolving, and contested matters.  
 
What is now called the Middle East (or “Near East” in the American political 
jargon) has been the site for great powers’ competition leading to the demise 
of the Ottoman Empire and colonization of “its” territory. Britain colonized 
Palestine after WWI and granted the Zionist movement a foothold there, 
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which gradually culminated in the Balfour Declaration in 1917. In 1922 the 
League of Nations (which was predominantly controlled by Western states) 
formalized the British rule over Palestine and the Zionist project. The Mandate 
Resolution made it unequivocal to the Palestinians that Britain would not cut 
back on its support and commitment to the Zionist project. In response, the 
Palestinians revolted in 1936 against, “the British colonialism and the Zionist 
invasion” (Palestine Encyclopedia 1984: vol. I: 623-41).  
 
Political language about the situation provided the vocabulary through which 
Palestinian leaders conceptualized what was happening in Palestine as 
colonialism which captures two entities: colonized (the Palestinians) and 
colonizer (Britain) connected through an antagonist relationship. The logic of 
equivalence made it possible for the Palestinians to see themselves in a 
struggle for “liberation” and “self-determination” similar to other liberation 
movements at the time, i.e., a “liberationist cause similar to other liberation 
causes in the world” (al-Shuqayri 1964). The PNC echoed this understanding: 
“The Palestinian revolution is indivisible part of global liberation movements in 
the struggle against global colonialism and imperialism. Simultaneously, the 
Palestinian revolution is fighting another enemy, global Zionism, which is a 
segment of global imperialism.” (PNC 6th session 1969, Appendix 1) 
 
The logic of equivalence is more hegemonic as it helps drawing certain units 
and abstraction out of a rather complex social reality (cf. Laclau & Mouffe 
2000; Glynos & Howarth 2007). On this view, chains of equivalent 
associations were produced to insinuate relationships between Britain, the 
West and Zionism, and submerged them into one unit or subject-position: 
colonizers. At the same time “every Palestinian” was articulated as a 
“revolutionary.” This description accentuates aspects of commonalities and 
connections between Palestinians as a singular unified group and a 
revolutionary subject-position. The outcome is therefore the existence of two 
antagonistic groups: the revolutionary against the colonizer, and vice versa. 
Such construction was echoed before and after an-Nakba now and again. For 
example, the PNC sketched out the relation like this: “at this state the PNC 
considers the main contradiction to be with the Zionist enemy and colonialism, 
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and all other internal contradictions are secondary and must stop.” (PNC 5th 
session, 1st annex 1969, emphasis added) 
 
As the Palestinian re/action was constituted into a struggle (nidal) and then a 
“liberationist” (tahriri) or “revolutionary” (thawri) struggle, subsequently a 
network of categories, subject-positions, institutions, objects and subjects 
emerged as a practical incarnation of the struggle.  The “fida’i”38 subject-
position embodied the actual performance of the struggle, i.e. al-‘amal al-
fida’i. It denotes the readiness to immolate and sacrifice him/herself for sake 
of Palestine liberation. Occupying the fida’i subject-position is by far the most 
honorable position in the Palestinian revolution. Virtually, all Palestinian 
institutions after an-Nakba were branded as liberationist, “strugglist” 
(munadil), fida’i and confrontational as epitomized in their titles.39 Such 
branding granted these institutions, subject and activities a moral capital and 
attraction, and thus a powerful interpellation force.  
 
Until the late 1980s, the concept of liberation was a touchstone or nodal point 
in the Palestinian discourse with certain discursive functions. The PNC 
declared that, “the liberation of Palestine the biggest goal of the Arab 
liberation activities, and the Palestinian people are the vanguards of the 
                                            
38 The fida’i and fida’iyyun is the secular replacement of the religious subject position al-
mujahid and al-moujahidyn used to describe the Palestinian fighters before an-Nakba. 
39 For example, “liberation”, “struggle” and “front” were the central to the identity of any 
Palestinian entity after. The APG revitalized the Holy War Army (jaysh al-jihad al-muqqadas), 
the very title of the PLO denotes “Liberation”, Palestine Liberation Front (jabhat al-tahrir al-
falastini), The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (al-jabha al-sha‘biyya li-tahrir 
falastin), Palestine Liberation Army (Jaish tahrir falastin) “the vanguard of Palestine liberation 
battle” (PLO Basic Law, article 22). The nodal points liberation (tahrir) and 
confrontation/struggle (Jihad, Front, Jaish) are inserted in the titles of every organization, 
sometimes newspapers, magazines, civil institutions, etc., this reflects the locus of the 
predominant public mood and the imagined political directions of these organizations when 
they were founded in spite of the lack of the means to achieve “liberation”. The PLO Basic 
Law is rife with expressions like “liberationist mobilization”, “Palestine liberation battle”, 
“liberation stamp” (see article 3; 22; 25). 
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liberation battle.” Moreover, “liberating Palestine is considered essential and 
fateful” (PNC 2nd session 1965). Its function was to regulate, organize and 
stabilize the meaning of other moments in the discourse. First, it stabilized 
(temporarily) the meaning of Israel from the standpoint of the Palestinians as 
a “continuous imperialist aggression at odds with the right of self-
determination.” Hence, from a liberationist viewpoint, resistance and “struggle 
to liberate the homeland by all means” is warrantable (PNC, 1st session 
1964).  
 
The concept of liberation provided the raw material from which the 
Palestinians constructed the guidelines for possible practices towards 
liberation and self-determination. Namely, it warranted the struggle for 
liberation (al-nidal min ajl al-tahrir). In general, the struggle for liberation 
transpired through two types of struggle: armed or guerrilla warfare in the form 
Algerian and Vietnamese struggle against the French and Americans, or by 
non-violent means inspired by Gandhi. After an-Nakba the Palestinians 
considered the guerrilla warfare in Algeria and Vietnam as an example to 
emulate (Khalaf 1981: 32). That choice could be explained by looking at the 
demographic changes: number of the Palestinians in Palestine had been 
reduced significantly as a result of 1947-8 events. Alternatively, it could also 
be motivated by the desire to resolve the identity dissonance and stamp out 
the image of “the weak and inferior” Palestinian, especially in the Arab world, 
and restore a sense of “pride” (Khalaf cited in Shemesh 2004: 97). Indeed, 
Arafat explained how the PLO had transformed the Palestinians, “from a 
refugee people waiting in queues for charity and alms from UNRWA into a 
people fighting for freedom,” (Arafat 1982: 6, emphasis added).  
 
Apparently, the discourse put Palestine liberation and armed struggle in direct 
relationship, or more accurately, liberation stipulated the armed struggle. This 
linkage flowed unchecked at the early stages of the PLO and PNC 
statements. As the PLO “matured” and became embroiled in the mechanics of 
socialization, reference to the armed struggle has been gradually reduced 
until it disappeared from the common discourse. However, it regained its 
momentum with the emerging Islamic movements in the mid-1980s, 
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especially the Islamic Jihad and later Hamas (al-Nawaati 2002). Linking 
liberation with the armed struggle was rationalized in the light of two general 
ideological concepts: al-qawmiyya  (e.g., “Palestine liberation battle” is a 
qawmi goal (PLO Basic Law)) and the religious concept of Jihad. The first 
PNC session stated that explicitly: “al-Jihad is the holy duty of every 
Palestinian.” Ironically, neither concept is particularly specific to Palestine, 
though they have certain resonance in Palestinian society. The PLO re-
articulated the liberation-armed struggle relationship as a nationalist one and 
the religious linkages resurfaced in the discourse of the Palestinian 
movements that have Islamic characteristics. 
 
The concept of liberation drew the boundaries and the limits of the Palestinian 
discourse. It also governed and regulated the flow of relationships and 
linkages between statements in the discourse field. Therefore, transformation 
in the construction process of the concept of liberation and its internal rules of 
formations entailed systematic revisions and re-articulations of other 
concepts. The meaning of liberation has changed during the past six decades 
or so. Examination of the development in the concept of liberation will be 
adjourned to the next chapter and now the discussion will turn to the armed 
struggle. 
 
The Armed Struggle 
It is worth noting at the outset that this section is not about armed struggle per 
se, which is covered extensively in Yazid Sayigh book, Armed Struggle and 
the Search for State. However, I try in this brief analysis to focus on the 
function and locus of the “armed struggle” as a concept and practice in the 
discourse.  
 
The armed struggle is often articulated in conjunction with liberation which 
garnered abundant, “universal” moral capital, and therefore liberation 
appeared as a self-evident historical inevitability in the Palestinian discourse. 
Coupling armed struggle with liberation overshadowed the possibility of 
ruminating over the armed struggle’s meaning and content. Initially, armed 
struggle was represented as the “only way” (al-tariq al-wahid) towards 
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Palestine salvation, which in effect diminished prospects of a “political 
solution” in the discourse. Instead “the solution” to the Palestine question was 
imagined “through arms and struggle” (Al-Shuqayri 1964). Plenty of 
statements such as “the armed struggle is the only way to the liberation” and 
“there is no alternative to the armed struggle to solve the Palestinian issue” 
echoed and perpetuated one another (Habash 2009: 59). Apparently the 
articulation emphasized a missing alternative, and the declaration of the 
armed struggle to be the “only option,” other possibilities were discounted 
from the menu of possible actions and limited the probability of mediation in 
the discourse. Furthermore, this way of articulation is in itself an implicit 
justification for choosing the armed struggle. It also mutes the debate over the 
details of the armed struggle-liberation relationship, which has been an 
ambiguous and undetermined matter. 
 
Until 1967 most Palestinian movements (with the exception of Fatah) and the 
PLO conceptualized the armed struggle as a component of an overall Arab-
Israeli war, not a separate one. After all, the Arab regimes made compelling 
statements about the liberation of Palestine in every possible inflammatory 
expression (especially in the official media), and also we should not forget that 
the Palestinians had already seen themselves as “part of an Arab alliance” 
(Haj Amin Al-Husseini 1999: 334). For example, from the viewpoint of the 
West Bankers the idea of splitting the West Bank from the east bank (i.e., 
Jordan) of the Jordan River contravened the Arab unity dreams; also 
liberation of Palestine was considered to be an Arab responsibility at the time 
(Sahliyeh 1988). 
 
While drawing on its conception of the “people’s war”, Fatah embarked on a 
policy of “conscious entanglement” warfare against Israel from Syria40 in order 
to drag the “Arab masses” into a confrontation with Israel. In essence the 
argument goes like this:  
                                            
40 At that time, the Syrian regime led by Amin Hafiz argued for a declaration of war in order to 
liquidate Israel (see Heikal 1996: 17). 
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our military action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then 
become involved [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses. This 
extends the circle of conflict and compels the Arab governments either to join us 
or stand against us. (Al-Hassan 1987: 128-9 cited in Sayigh 1997: 120, emphasis 
added)  
 
To be sure, words like “become involved,” “extends” and “compels” in the 
above argument (among others, for example, Habash, Arafat, Khalaf argued 
for a similar logic) illustrate how interpellation or dragging in the Arab regimes 
and public as a fait accompli oriented Fatah’s strategic thinking. However 
ironic it may sound, there were hardly any analyses of the “masses” to inform 
the movement’s conception of them; but rather rudimentary and general 
notions informed the conception of the “masses.”   
 
Since Fatah carried out the first military attack on the first of January 1965, 41 
the PLO and the PNC began to deliberate a practical and narrower 
understanding of armed struggle. The attack accumulated significant political 
and symbolic meanings and served as a lens to make a significant judgment 
in a specific moment of the struggle history: it concluded that the 
circumstance back in 1965 were “ripe to move from preparation to actual and 
final preparation phase” in order to wage the “liberation battle” (PNC 3rd 
session, 1965). The narrower and practical configurative description of the 
struggle decreed “armed clash with Israel” and an immediate action (clash) on 
the ground that would culminate in waging “the liberation battle”. However, 
other movements, like the ANM/PFLP, understood the armed struggle in 
accordance with “the conception of war of the people” and an “escalation of 
Palestinian popular struggle” (Habash 1985: 9). 
 
The PNC emphasized that “the battle must inevitably be fought”. It was 
portrayed as “a decisive battle that determines the destiny of the whole Arab 
world” (PNC 3rd session, 1965, emphasis added). The “battle” was 
                                            
41 In fact, it was not the first armed activity against Israel by the Palestinian movements, 
however it was the first one to attract attention and significant symbolic meaning. The ANM 
carried out the first military attack on Israeli targets in Galilee in 1963 (Habash 2009: 71).  
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constructed as inevitable, fateful and a “refrain from waging the battle” is 
“synonymous to its loss, division instead of Arab unity, permanent threat, 
more territorial losses and giving up the Arab liberationist goal” (Ibid.). Such 
construction was made possible by drawing on the (supposedly) shared Arab 
dreams of unity. Waging “the decisive battle” would incarnate the Arab dream. 
Moreover, it shows how the PLO saw the struggle for liberation as indivisible 
from the broader Arab-Israeli conflict. This way of thinking is not without 
presuppositions: an implicit assumption that there nexus between the 
particular (armed struggle to liberate Palestine), Arab regimes and wider Arab 
public. No doubt that the nexus does exist, but there was no careful analysis 
of its potentials and limitations. 
 
Fatah continued to operate within the grand framework of the PLO, which is 
the liberation of Palestine. While rebuffing (at the beginning) the PLO’s 
political style (elite leadership and dependency), Fatah made a strong 
commitment to the armed struggle as the “only” mean towards liberation. 
From an early stage in 1956, Fatah’s founders organized a commando 
battalion to prove, or satisfy, their enthusiasm for action, not talk. The 
founders hastened to declare the armed struggle with little deliberation or 
formulation of a grand strategy of their own. Fatah avoided ideological and 
theoretical debates because such debates would motivate factionalism, a 
“negative phenomenon that divides”, as Khalaf explained (1981: 34).  
 
The primacy of armed struggle swept from mainly the Palestinian (negative) 
self-understanding, while manifestation and visibility of arms in the hands of 
the youngsters had stark psychological and symbolical effects that mitigated 
the weak Palestinian self-image. But it also proved to be a superb 
interpellative device for mustering attention to nascent Palestinian movements 
and enlisting new members into their ranks. For example, hijacking airplanes 
(one of the most controversial tactics) was thought of as a means to “remove 
the Palestinian cause from amnesia and present it to international public 
opinion” and “a main factor for attracting new members to PFLP.” (Habash 
2009: 108; 111) Fatah used the armed struggle in the same vein to put the 
cause of Palestine to global public opinion and recruit more people to Fatah. 
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Moreover, armed struggle was considered to be a mechanism to “transcend 
ideological discrepancies  [between various Palestinian social classes] and a 
stimulator and intermediary factor for unity” (Khalaf 1981: 33-34).   
 
The Palestinian Qawmi Charter was amended mainly because of it lacks 
emphasis on the armed struggle, so the 1968 new version of the charter came 
about to account for this omission. According to Khalaf, the Palestinian 
movements merge into the PLO structure was contingent upon the latter’s 
commitment to “the armed struggle as the only road to liberate Palestine” 
(Khalaf 1981: 63; 65). The movements succeeded in adding this condition to 
the charter because: firstly, the Arab regimes were defeated in the 1967 war 
therefore were not in a position to resist such a demand, and secondly, the 
fida’iyyun activities especially after the al-Karama battle in 1968 became very 
popular amongst the Arab populace. As a result, the “armed struggle” 
appeared in article 9 of the new Charter as a “strategy not a tactic.” And every 
the Palestinian individual was put in a specific frame of a disciplined “Arab 
revolutionary” agent who would readily partake in the “armed struggle and 
sacrifice” (See article 7; 8; 9; 10; 21). 
 
The generous discursive capital spent on the constitution of armed struggle 
was a potent vehicle used to distract way from a serious deliberation of a 
grand strategy with clear goals. Armed struggle language became a routine 
litany. According to article of the PLO Basic Law of 1968 “relations inside the 
PLO are based on commitment to … to sustain the armed revolution and 
working towards its continuity and escalation.” The concept of the armed 
struggle and related terminology swept unchallenged through mundane 
discourse especially 1968 to the extent that the catchphrase, “all authority for 
resistance” became a rule (Allush 1972). The hidden meanings of the 
catchphrase contain a deleterious psychology of superiority among the 
fida’iyyun: internal violence and pointing the gun of the armed struggle to the 
opposition were its key concrete translations. Ironically, all of that was justified 
in the name of protecting the armed struggle. And perhaps it was the biggest 
backlash of this routinization.  
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The armed struggle issue was not so straightforward. The PLO, ANM and 
Fatah perspective on the matter were any thing but consistent. Fatah 
established “the armed struggle” as a policy for “liberation” when its key 
founders were unconvinced of their abilities to liberate Palestine, anyway. The 
following instances make the point perfectly and quickly. Khalaf pointed out 
that their “goals [in the Fatah] were humble” they included: (1) “charge the 
spirit of people,” (2) “keep Israel alert,” and (3) “confuse the Israeli economy,” 
and “we [Fatah’s leaders] never believed at any moment that our actions 
would put the security of the Zionist state at risk.” Just two months after the 
1967 war, Faruq al-Qaddumi, a member of Fatah’s Central Committee 
“submitted a policy paper to Fatah’s Central Committee … proposing that we 
declare our support for the establishment of a mini-state in the West Bank and 
Gaza in event Israel would return this land [to the Palestinians].” (Khalaf 1981: 
54; 134) In such ambivalence and discrepancy between internal and made 
public views on the armed struggle (and on most political matters) situated the 
possibility for opening up, elaboration and a place for something more to be 
said.  
 
Exploring the representation of the 1967 war in the Palestinian public 
discourse helps us to further understand how the armed struggle acquired a 
primary locus in the Palestinian discourse and retrospectively it explains how 
the war became an important event in the Palestinian history, that is, a critical 
juncture. I approach this matter by looking at the representations of the 1967 
events from different angles resources such as literature, poetry, historical 
writings, political statements and so on. 
 
In 1967, a new genre of literature called, “The Palestinian Resistance 
Literature” came out to reflect on the organic interdiscursivity between the 
immediate and distant public (in the Arab and “Third World” (e.g., African 
countries, Cuba) who were resisting colonialism) and the interplay between 
public and political perceptions. Resistance literature unlike most Arabic 
literature appeared after 1967, abstained from the reflexive lamentation of the 
defeat. Rather, it was more concerned with the future (Kanafani 1968). Fadwa 
Touqan, a distinguished poet from Nablus, described Palestinian feelings 
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before and during the war as being “charged with hope, confidence and an 
assured victory;” this feeling continued during actual events of the war 
because the “reality of battles was absented for five days,” and finally in the 
sixth day a “new ominous reality” and “shock” manifested itself. Shock and 
awe did not last for long and opened up a “new phase of rejection, challenge 
and resistance began” (Touqan 1993: 11; 12; 16; 85). And indeed, the 
discourse on June 1967 war in the Arab world usually uses the term al-naksa 
to refer that war, which is loaded with the meanings to express a state of 
relapse and setback, but not a total lost of war.  
 
To most Palestinian intellectuals the 1967 defeat was not the end of war but a 
mere lost battle. Toufiq Zayyad and Mahmoud Darwish, two prominent 
Palestinian poets, put it like this when the war came to an end: 
 
O my country, we did not float on handful of water 
Therefore, we will not now get drowned in handful of water 
You [Israelis] build for the now 
And for tomorrow we [Palestinians] high up the building  
I am deeper than the sea  
And higher than the sky lamps 
Inside us there is a breath 
Longer than this expanded horizon in the heart of the doom 
 
Mahmoud Darwish said: 
 
I lost a nice dream 
I lost the sting of the lilies  
And may be the night was too long 
On the gardens fence  
However, I did not lose the way  
Cited in Kanafani 1968: 61-62 
 
The representation of the 1967 war in politics coincided with the aesthetical 
representation. According to Habash “the 1967 defeat constituted a great 
disappointment for our hopes and dreams … we lost a battle but not the war.” 
Fatah echoed the same terminology as well, “the end of hope” (2009: 50). The 
Palestinian organizations understood the war as a possibility that “opened 
new horizons” (Khalaf 1981: 59) for Palestinian resistance movements to 
grow and develop (e.g., possibility to operate along the Jordan River, 
acquiring new passports, amassing weapon, etc.). Or as Arafat explained: 
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“Yes, the military defeat in 1967 was devastating, a disaster, but we had 
already firmly resolved to liberate our homeland. Our young men hastened to 
collect the arms that had been abandoned on the field battle in order to resist 
again.” (Arafat 1982: 7-8, emphasis added) 
 
Furthermore, the war “opened a new horizon” for a reinterpretation of the Arab 
world’s reality, and thus re-orienting the focus and strategy of the Palestinian 
movements. This was clear in the case of the AMN:  
 
We understood well the need to focus on the Palestinian issue if we wish to 
reach specific outcomes ... The armed struggle must be pivoted on the 
Palestinians themselves; they must organize their battle on the basis of a long-
term popular liberation war, following the token of Algerian, South Yemeni and 
Vietnamese experience (Habash 2009: 73-74). 
 
Additionally, it reduced the gap between Fatah and the Arab regimes, which 
encouraged Fatah to sacrifice its independence and ask for financial and 
military support from these regimes, especially Egypt (Heikal 1996: 19). The 
struggle in general and armed struggle in particular were very appealing 
notions for their resonance with the public mood after 1967.  Armed struggle 
was the best slogan to rally the Palestinians around, to placate public opinion 
and recruit more people to fida’i activities.  
 
After 1967, the pre-made image of the (supposedly) upcoming confrontation 
style was transformed. The singular form of “decisive and fateful battle” was 
given up both in aesthetical (e.g., poetry, literature, art) and political 
discourse, and instead the struggle was constituted as “a long, persistent and 
determined battle … will drain the resources … and gradually uncover its 
[Israel’s] fake image,”  “waves of armed struggle,” “the struggle will continue, 
escalate and expand until the final victory is achieved,” and “the strategy of 
the Palestinian revolution adopts the long-term war,” the armed struggle to be 
“reinforced by other forms of struggle.” (PNC 4th session, emphasis added) 
“The battle” and “decisive battle” disappeared from the Palestinian lexicon.  
 
A new style of ranking and temporizing had surfaced. The linkage between 
liberation and armed struggle continued, however, the latter began to be 
qualified, ordered and bound up with other political principles. The “armed 
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struggle for the purpose of liberating our usurped homeland will not be 
accomplished unless it completely concurs and dovetails with the political 
actions that would complete it.” (Ibid., emphasis added)  
 
The previous statement expresses a particular order in which the armed 
struggle no longer appears as the “only means” or first on the agenda. To the 
contrary, it needs to be assessed according to the political rationale and 
calculation. Or indeed, it began to be seen as only one component of the 
overall struggle. For example, it was argued in the PNC 6th session that “the 
method of revolution is a struggle in all forms and at the face of it the armed 
struggle.” As the orienting system had been put in place, the location and 
typology of every component became a variable that might occupy any place 
in the system. Therefore, the system of ordering constituted the possibility to 
reposition the discursive variable within statements. Articulating the armed 
struggle as a priority (ranks high, etc.) placed it in a comparative relationship 
with other forms of struggle and therefore excluded the opportunity of uttering 
it as “the only means for the liberation” or “a strategy” any more. Furthermore, 
subjecting the armed struggle to a comparative mechanism contradicts article 
9 of the Palestinian National Charter, which considers it a “strategy, not a 
tactic.” It is hard to imagine a subordination of “strategy” to other components.  
 
Such comparative relationships were governed by political calculations. 
Consequently, the PLO’s Executive Committee took over the leadership of the 
“military administrative department” from Liberation Army (PNC 4th session 
1968, General Decisions no. 1).42 And in effect, more power was 
concentrated at the Executive Committee, which entails that means of 
liberation have become a subject of political reckonings. As the political 
rationale moved on, the position of armed struggle in the system moved with it 
                                            
42 Before 1967 war, the Palestinian Liberation Army led the “Army Department” (PNC 3rd 
session 1966, Military Decisions no. 10). 
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until it was finally dropped to pave the way for “realism” and “peaceful 
settlements.”  
 
As a result, reference to the “practice” of armed struggle was omitted. Instead, 
the armed struggle was articulated as a residual “right” that may (or may not) 
be “taken into consideration.” And finally, when the PLO had finally endorsed 
the “political solution” as a formal policy in late 1980s, the position of armed 
struggle in the political discourse changed. Statements such as confrontation 
of “the Israeli threats” or “the Zionist occupation” replaced the liberation-armed 
struggle nexus. In 1983, the PNC issued a resolution to make this point: 
“taking into consideration the importance of military preparation [i.e. not 
number one] to confront the Israeli threats [i.e., not liberation];” “the right of 
our people to practice the armed struggle to confront the Zionist occupation.” 
(PNC 17th; 18th sessions, emphasis added)  
 
Temporizing has two effects: it defers to the final intended goal and prioritizes 
certain goals or steps over others. Under the title “The Scientific Orientation 
for Guiding the Struggle,” a new “practical and comprehensive plan for the 
Palestinian liberation activity” divided the struggle into “long term” and a 
“series of interim short plans,” and “to put an interim strategy” (PNC 4th 
session 1970). First of all, this entails that “the ultimate extermination of the 
enemy” and the liberation of Palestine are deferred and second it is 
something contingent upon progress in the interim and short-term plans. The 
title that Khalaf chose for his article, “Lowering the Sword” in 1990 is 
especially telling. It announces the official end of the armed struggle and 
signals a beginning of a new era of “peace negotiations.”   
 
In the light of the above historical analysis of the genealogy of the basic 
conditions of the Palestinian discourse, it is useful at this stage to situate two 
more important things: one is the subject-position of Arafat which obtained 
very essential space in the Palestinian politics after 1948. While the second 
has to do with the context of the politics in and over the West Bank and Gaza, 
which is now, for good or bad, the spatial center of the Palestinian 
representative politics.   
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Arafat’s Subject-Position and Consensus  
The quota system was laid down to regulate power relations between the 
different organizations that joined the PLO. Also it was considered to be a 
vehicle to ensure the continuation of the armed struggle, the nucleus of the 
PLO structural reformation in 1968. The quest for “national unity,” “rule by 
consensus” and a “truly democratic organization” suggested such a quota 
system (Khalaf 1981). However, the quota structure functioned in the opposite 
direction. First, it was a system of appointment where the Fatah movement 
acquired the lion’s share. Second, the “independents” category was also 
given a large quota —similar to Fatah’s (Hamid 1975: 99-100) and they were 
appointed through direct and indirect intervention of the Executive Committee 
Chief, Arafat. Arafat managed to encumber opposition groups and continued 
to accumulate additional power into his position through arbitrary “expansion” 
of the independents’ category in various PLO apparatus (e.g., PNC, the 
Central Council) by recruiting additional members (Ghanem 2010).  
 
In practice, the so-called “independents” were chosen on the basis of their 
allegiance to Arafat’s line, while the independents in the executive committee 
“were chosen by Arafat alone.” In so doing, the system perpetuated the 
hegemony of Fatah’s line in the PLO’s apparatus and served as a methodical 
mechanism for power concentration in certain positions. Fatah (among other 
movements) met attempts to reform the quota system with adamant 
resistance by arguing that such attempts would put the “national unity” and 
“consensus rule” in jeopardy. Furthermore, certain Arab regimes such as 
Syria favored this structure and intervened forcefully to thwart endeavors of 
reformation (Ghanem 2010: 73; Habash 2009: 157). 
 
Consensus on political issues is at odds with the “antagonistic dimensions” of 
pluralist politics. It is quite unlikely to reach consensus without exclusion, even 
a consensus on the democratic rules means an exclusion of non-democratic 
ones (Mouffe 1996: 9). On the one hand, consensus encouraged autocratic 
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mechanisms in order to constitute such consensus by muting opposition 
through different means (e.g., control of central institutions, buying loyalty43) 
and increasing the supporters’ pool. On the other, extensive outnumbering of 
opponents inflicted a reflexive self-suspicion and intimidation because 
opposition would appear to contradict the general well being and national 
unity. 
 
In addition to the quota system, the roots of structural power distribution go 
back to the initial setup of the PLO. For example, the PLO Basic Law 
stimulates “direct election of the PNC by the Palestinian people” (article 5), 
which has never been fulfilled, and at the same time it concentrates power 
inside the Executive Committee. The gist of the Basic Law gives prominence 
to Executive Committee and diminishes other institutions. This is especially 
evident in articles 16, 17 and 18, which distribute layers of power and 
authority inside the Executive Committee. Article 16, for instance, grants the 
Executive Committee the power to “represent the Palestinian people,” 
“supervising the formations of the PLO,” “initiation of guidelines and special 
decisions relevant to the PLO’s activities,” “implement the PLO’s financial 
policy and preparing its budget.” Meanwhile, article 18 tasks it to “form new 
apparatus which includes: military department, National Funds Affairs, 
Political and Media Affairs, Research Centers, Pubic Relations Department, ... 
the domain of every department will be governed by a special structure put by 
the Executive Committee.” And Article 19 authorizes the Committee to “liaise 
and coordinate with all organizations, unions and Arab and international 
institutions.” 
 
 
Politics in/over the West Bank and Gaza 
The Palestinians’ chances to articulate their political interests in the West 
Bank and Gaza were restricted from the beginning. Since 1967, if not 
                                            
43 For a thorough analysis see Chapter 3 in Ghanem 2010. 
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before,44 Jordan and Israel were vying for the control of that part of Palestine: 
Jordan, and then Israel, imposed new structural changes to serve their 
interests.  
 
In the main, three central ideological strands, nationalism, Marxism and Islam, 
were crystallizing in addition to the rising star of the PLO in the West Bank 
and Gaza, especially after 1968 (Sahliyeh 1988). Each of these entities had 
different interests and different rules and power techniques. At the same time, 
the rooted contradictions and competitions among these entities and 
ideologies found their way into the internal relations of the Palestinians of the 
West Bank and Gaza. Inconsequence of this complex mixture of competing 
entities, ideologies and interests increased tension and dynamism in the 
society, which opened it up for socio-politico-economic changes and furthered 
political fragmentation and sense of vulnerability. This encouraged the 
Palestinians to look outside for guidance and assurance;45 some looked to 
Jordan, PLO, Israel, Islam, pan-Arabism and Marxism.  
 
In practice, however, this translated into various amateurish choices, usually 
taken and abandoned abruptly, from within the West Bank. For example, 
some envisaged a “transitional” alliance with Jordan while others sought a 
Palestinian state or autonomy in the in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange 
for peace with Israel. The PLO denounced these choices and declared them 
to be “deviant,” “defeatist” and “treason” endeavors. Ironically as the time 
went by, the PLO re-articulated the same choices at different stages and with 
almost the same criteria.46  
                                            
44 Based on archival research, Pappé argues that Israel was preparing to take over the West 
Bank and Gaza before 1967 (see Pappé 2012).  
45 For a thorough analysis see Chapter 3 in Ghanem 2010. 
46 The independent state choice proposed a 5-year transitional period and after that Israel 
would withdraw from WBG, during that time the Palestinians in WBG would prove their 
commitment to security arrangements (Sahliyeh 1988: ch.3). These criteria were inscribed in 
Oslo Accords. Moreover, the PLO singed an agreement with Jordan in 1985 with aim of 
establishing a confederation between the WBG and Jordan. 
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The internal politics and social life in Palestine were not a priority for the PLO 
because it was more concerned with building a proto-state structure in 
Lebanon. Early on Said underlined the misgivings of the such policy: “the 
connection between those achievements [in South Lebanon] and freeing the 
occupied territories from Israeli military occupation was not reflected upon 
enough, was not therefore a central project.” (Said 1983: 7) 
 
While in mid-1980s, this policy was reversed 180 degrees: the West Bank and 
Gaza became the touchstone of the PLO attention and politics as idea of a 
Palestinian state on a small part of Palestinian matured enough. Headings like 
“the Occupied Homeland Affairs,” the “Occupied Homeland” began to appear 
on the agenda of the PNC discussions. And when the intifada broke out in 
December 1987, the PLO adopted the motto: “no voice loader then the voice 
of the intifada.”47 This signifies how the PLO focus has been channeled to the 
West Bank and Gaza since then. 
 
Before proceeding to discuss the Palestinian-made scenarios for solving the 
question of Palestine it may be useful to recap the main points made in this 
chapter. The general aim of chapter is to highlight the situation and conditions 
of the Palestinian political discourse after an-Nakba. The first section shows 
how an-Nakba became a touchstone in the Palestinian spatial and temporal 
awareness. Then I focus on the metaphor in the word an-Nakba: broken 
physical links between Palestine and the Palestinians. In the third section, the 
discussion moves to investigate the organizing system of the Palestinian 
discourse that includes: ‘self,’ ‘other,’ and context interpretative conditions. 
The main argument is that Palestine has ceased to be imagined as a 
geographic and demographic ‘totality,’ rather a mixture of contingent 
                                            
47 “No Voice Loader than then Voice of the Intifada” was the slogan and the opening header 
of every flyer disseminated during the first Intifada in 1987. 
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components and divisions. I argued that an-Nakba de-articulated Palestine 
and thereafter a new discursive reconstruction emerged.  
 
Several orienting political concepts developed out of the new situation. In this 
regard, I examined the concept of liberation (al-tahrir) and the armed struggle 
and the nexus between then in the Palestinian discourse after 1948. I 
concluded that both concepts started to recede as the PLO began to consider 
diplomatic options until they disappeared completely and gave way to the 
notion of “political settlement” through negotiations. The analysis ended with a 
contextualization of two recurrent notions: Arafat subject-position and the 
politics in–and-over the West Bank and Gaza. 
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 4  
A Solution: Remaking the Joints 
 
 
 
Provisional Horizons 
The Palestinians have perceived their present (which now belongs to the 
past) as a provisional phase. A wide range of everyday patterns such as 
economy, infrastructure, political decisions, organizations, laws and 
institutions were considered temporary arrangements. For example, the APG, 
first Palestinian institution after 1948, called its Basic Law “temporary” 
(mu’aqqat). And even ordinary people shared this rationale, for instance, the 
refugees and the “internally displaced” considered (and perhaps still see) their 
exile a temporary condition and anticipated a return to their original villages 
(Sabbagh-Khoury 2011). The set of rules that have organized the Palestinian 
political vision is an accumulation of an unstable, indeterminate and narrow 
political horizon. While a rationale of long-term planning was lacking and 
therefore the Palestinian re/actions were often incoherent, conflicting and 
short-lived.  
 
Living within an interpretation of the present as a provisional state spurred a 
chain of orientations and inferences that helped the construction of the ‘self,’ 
‘other/s,’ relationships, context and choices according to this allegorical image 
of reality. From this vantage point, the loss of Palestine was construed as 
provisional loss and thus to regain it, was inevitable at some point in the 
future. Moreover, self-other representation and the relationships between 
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them (i.e., identity48) were constructed with temporal nuances that inferred 
possibilities of change and reformation. 
 
No doubt that such a basic interpretation has significant concrete entailments. 
Firstly, the Palestinian dispersion (al-shatat al-falastini) and living-style had 
been regularized by the idea that an-Nakba would come to an end when the 
exiled Palestinians returned to their homes. Nevertheless, to undo the 
contingent present (dispersion and exile in this case) the refugees must return 
(al-‘awda) to Palestine, this “necessitates an armed struggle.” The title of 
Kanafani’s novel, Return to Haifa, (1970) captures this conceptual thread. At 
the end of the novel, Abu Khalid (the novel’s key character and a Palestinian 
refugee from Haifa) conceded to the Jewish family that occupies his house to 
continue to live in it “temporarily”, because “that thing [return] would require a 
war to be realized.”   
 
Palestinian politics have been caught up in a thinking mechanism that 
produces temporary, interim and provisional outcomes. It is a self-fulfilling 
mechanism that proved useful in justifying why a certain path was or was not 
taken. The capricious political oscillations and dramatic shifts between 
liberation, democratic state, Ten-Point Programme, confederation with Jordan 
and two-state solution were all represented as “provisional” moves. The 
provisional mode of thinking is deeply present in Palestinian life, especially 
since the Oslo Project was put into motion.49 Palestinian calculations have 
been contingent upon the hope that the future might be better, but still highly 
uncertain and unpredictable —not because it is impossible to predict, but 
rather because self-determination and sovereignty are unfulfilled in the 
prediction equation. Undoubtedly, the future remains uncertain, however, the 
inability to exercise prediction exacerbates the feeling of uncertainty and 
                                            
48 The representation of the ‘self’, ‘other’ and relationship between ‘self/other’ informs identity 
building. Meaning and identity are the outcome of contingent construction of links (not pre-
existing) between ‘self’ and the ‘other’ (cf. Campbell 1998: 23).  
49 Provisional thinking is also evident in daily projects like infrastructure projects, NGOs 
services, etc. 
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everything therefore becomes, to use the literal expressions that the 
Palestinian leadership has been echoing, “temporary”, “provisional” and 
“interim”.  
 
Two things are inferred when we refer to a subject (e.g., policy or a situation) 
as a temporary: first, there is dissatisfaction with the current status of the 
subject, and second, it implies a certain timeframe, a beginning and an end to 
the designated temporary phase.  In any case, the timeframe was virtually 
never articulated in the Palestinian discourse. Leaving the timeframe of what 
was pronounced “temporary” undetermined, blurs the boundaries between the 
provisional and permanent and facilitates the transition from one policy to 
another without discernible contradictions. Indeed, it provided self-comfort, 
expedient justification and a weapon against opponents. And on the other 
hand, leadership “mistakes” or “concessions” were constructed temporary 
ones and followed by the usual litany: “atamassuk bi al-thawabt al-wataniyya” 
(adhering to the national consonants in English). The aim of this formulation is 
indeed rhetorical and serves the internal consumption to help the leadership 
argue that the “ultimate” goals were not given up. I will be discussing this 
further in another place later. 
 
From the Palestinian perspective, Zionism and the birth of Israel represented 
an existential problem and never a completed reality. Israel, as matter of fact, 
situates on the Palestinian existence (kayan) therefore the struggle has been 
on the same space of existence. The “same space” is an essential component 
of the Palestinian and Zionist identities and neither Palestinianism nor Zionism 
would have been possible without the geographic space called, Palestine. 50 
How to manage that space (the lost home for Palestinians and the gained 
home for Zionists) in conjunction with its new facts (demography, power 
                                            
50 Palestinianism in the contemporary sense would not have been possible because identity 
making unfolds through space and time. Undoubtedly, had Zionism not colonized Palestine 
and the Arab world not been dissected by Sykes-Picot Agreement, a different identification 
might have been adopted. 
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relations, difference and competing narratives) has been the concern of 
Palestinian politics. Managing the space, which is intimately related to the 
Palestinian identity (see Khalidi 1997), is what sustains the link between the 
space (Palestine) and the people (the Palestinians).  
 
Political and “referential” logics provided vocabulary for possible modes of 
management. The first mode suggests administering Mandatory Palestine 
after liberation. This entailed the expulsion of the Zionists, and in this case 
only the “native” Palestinians (inclusive of Palestinian Jews) would achieve 
self-determination Palestine. However, referral to democracy and other liberal 
political concept inspired the construction of the democratic state over entire 
Palestine for all, Arab-Palestinians and Jews, as a possible solution. The 
second mode suggests a partial management of Palestine by establishing a 
Palestinian state on any “liberated” part; this has been developed into what is 
known now as the two-state solution in the late 1980s. In either mode, 
liberation continued to be a key nodal point and a driving force in the 
Palestinian discourse. Liberation of course meant different things at different 
stages. The relations between liberation and the vocabulary that constitutes 
its contents were replaced, changed or dropped.  
 
Before turning the discussion to the concept of liberation in the Palestinian 
discourse, a brief reminder about discourse, political representation and 
language is apt here. Language is an important space for the constitution of 
power-relations and meaningful political acts, and therefore examining 
statements of certain politicians is a key method of finding the discursive 
“rules of formation.” However, it does not matter who these politicians are, the 
analysis focus goes beyond individualities and intentions to the subject-
position from which they speak. As such, while looking at statements 
associated with particular individual names I concerned with the kind of 
authority and representativeness with which they speak.  
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Liberation as Restoration of the Past  
Defining the context of events before the an-Nakba as colonialism while 
maintaining no distinction between Zionism and colonialism (Zionism is 
perceived as an “organic part of colonialism”) enabled the Palestinians to 
extrapolate analogies between themselves and other national movements. 
The fine disparities between them, Zionism and colonialism, were obscured 
by this representation and continued to be under-studied. The same analogy 
informed the imagined solution as: liberating Palestine and resisting the 
colonialists (Zionists) until they recoil.  
 
Fatah’s founders (among other Palestinian movements’ leaders) represented 
themselves as embracing democratic principles and being the voice of the 
public. When they joined the PLO in 1968, the democratic elements migrated 
into the Palestinian collective organizations (e.g., PLO, PNC) and later they 
were transformed into moments in the linguistic game articulating 
liberation. Introducing democratic terminology into the definition of liberation 
suggested a re-evaluation and re-imagination of the liberationist means, that 
is, the armed struggle.  
 
Democracy is sensitive to the nuances and details of any group; therefore a 
new space was opened up to signify the difference between Judaism and 
Zionism. Initially, the Palestinian representatives considered only “the Jews 
from a Palestinian origin” to be Palestinians (PLO Qawmi Charter 1964), 
however, in 1968 this perspective was replaced by another which considered 
Jews who were living in Palestine “since the beginning of the Zionist invasion 
of Palestine” as Palestinians (PLO National Charter 1968). This distinction is 
compatible with Palestinianism as it is an inclusive pluralist dominator, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
The democratic moments and the distinction made between Judaism and 
Zionism, discussed in Chapter 3, contributed to the reconstruction of liberation 
as a rejection of Zionism, not the Jews, in Palestine. And at the same time, it 
provided a framework to reconfigure the concept of liberation in the form of an 
inclusive state: a democratic state for all, over entire Palestine. Accordingly, 
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the contents off “liberation” were equivalent to: (1) “termination of the [Zionist] 
entity in Palestine”, (2) “return of the Palestinian people to their homeland” 
and (3) establishing a Palestinian democratic state over the entire Palestinian 
soil sans all forms of racist discrimination and religious bigotism”  (PNC 6th 
session 1969, appendix 1). As “the Palestinian democratic state” filtered 
through the common language, a more complex liberal and statist political 
language ran through the representation of the struggle.  
 
New discursive elements were integrated into the content of liberation and 
soon previous terminology that used to define “struggle” as being against 
colonialism and imperialism (including Zionism) were gradually abandoned. 
The regularity of juxtaposing “liberation,” “struggle,” “democratic state for all,” 
“equality of rights and obligations,” “coexistence,” “no discrimination” 
increased significantly. Indeed, these terminologies and their metaphorical 
entailments — that is, what is beyond what they are saying, guided decision-
makers’ imaginative (or “strategic”) thinking. The meaning of the “armed 
struggle” (which was articulated as a means of liberation) has transformed 
into a means to achieve the assumed liberal principles. The PNC declared 
that, “the Palestinian struggle aims to liberate the entire Palestine [and to 
establish] a society where all citizens coexist with equal rights and obligations 
(PNC 7th session 1970, Appendix 1).  
 
Since September 1969, the chain of equivalence that juxtaposes old 
conceptions (liberationist struggle, state over entire Palestine and armed 
struggle) with new ones imported from the liberal political language 
(democratic state, democratic and liberal concepts) regulated the way of 
thinking about the solution. Establishing an inclusive and democratic state 
over entire Palestine evolved as “the strategic goal” (Khalaf 1981: 67-68). In 
1971, “the Democratic Palestinian State” had become a topic and headline for 
the PNC discussions (PNC 8th session 1971). Absorbing liberal political 
language into the Palestinian discourse destabilized previous meanings of 
liberation, statehood and armed struggle. Instead, liberation, state and armed 
struggle were reconstructed to accord with the embedded package of new 
relationships between them and democracy/liberalism. As such, the 
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interdiscursive (between old and migrating discourses) match and mismatch 
reproduced the meaning of struggle and liberation afresh. For example, the 
wording of the “armed struggle was re-formed in order to take out certain 
elements incoherent with the tenants of democracy: “the armed struggle is not 
an ethnic or a sectarian struggle against the Jews,” but to liberate Palestine 
from of “the Zionist colonialism” (Ibid.). 
  
Yet, discourse is not contradiction free. The overall conflicting relationship 
between the means (armed struggle) and the ends (democratic/liberal values) 
remained unexamined, the Palestinian political representative bodies hardly 
pondered the contradiction.  
 
Along with this transformation and the appearance of a different chain of 
equivalence, new concepts appeared while others were de-articulated or 
disappeared altogether. What was remarkable in 1970 was the introduction of 
the concept of “conflict” and “Israel” in place of colonialism and Zionism to the 
discourse. The word “Israel” was never (or rarely) used before without 
qualifications and euphemisms such as “the entity” or  “Zionist entity” (al-
kayan al-suhywni) to signify Israel and convey a rejection, negation and 
minimization of the de-facto reality of Israel. Describing the situation as a 
conflict enacted the possibilities for different solutions, which were ruled out 
when the situation was configured as a colonialist conquest. Firstly, with the 
latter representation, the armed struggle was considered to be “the only road 
to liberate Palestine”. Whereas in representing the situation as a “conflict with 
Israel”, armed struggle became “the only solution for the current conflict 
between us [Palestinians] and Israel” (Ibid.). Secondly, the twofold relation 
within the “armed struggle” itself (armed plus struggle) was broken and de-
articulated51 into other combinations like “popular struggle”, “people 
revolutionary war is the main road to liberate Palestine”, “popular 
                                            
51 Reference to the armed struggle decreased significantly after 1968 (1973 4 times, 1981 1 
time) until it disappeared in official discourse.  
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revolutionary war” (PNC 7th session 1970) and “long-term popular war” (PNC 
8th, exceptional session 1970).  
 
Liberation as Establishing a Palestinian State over any “Liberated” 
Part 
The six years between 1967 and 1973 was a period of reflection, reform and 
redistribution of Palestinian institutions, apparatus, policies, justifications and 
conceptions of reality. The precipitous transition to “liberation as a democratic 
state over the entire Palestine” left little time to mediate on the moves (e.g., 
policies, decisions, regulations and reforms) that followed this transition. 
Hence deeming these moves “temporary” and “interim” was the primary 
justification (PNC 8th session 1971), even a new committee called the “interim 
plan committee” was established to handle “interim” arrangements even a 
new committee called the “interim plan committee” was established to handle 
“interim” arrangements that paved the way for the (supposedly) temporary 
phase (PNC 11th session 1973). In June 1974, the “Interim Political Plan”, 
Ten-point Programme, or the Temporary Political Programme (al-barnamij al-
siyyasi al-marhali, barnamij al-nuqat al-‘ashr) became the official policy of the 
PLO.  
 
The idea of a Palestinian self-governing body on a small area of Palestine52 
was already available in the general political discourse about Israel-Palestine, 
and it was on the menu of what could be said about the conflict. To be sure, 
two UN resolutions (res. 181 and 242) underscored the establishment of that 
“self-governing body” over specific geographical boundaries as an 
international law requirement. This idea enjoyed (in theory53) the support of 
                                            
52 The UNSC resolution 181, the Partition Plan, allocated about 43 percent of the total area of 
Mandatory Palestine to a Palestinian self-governing body. Whereas, resolution 242 allocated 
the land that Israel occupied in the course of 1967 War, which constitutes about 22 percent of 
Palestine.  
53 The US support for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza is 
theoretical and was not followed in practice. In fact, the US blocked the establishment of a 
Palestinian state in 2011 by raising its veto power in the Security Council 2011 and voted 
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the superpowers and international institutions, and most Arab regimes (mainly 
Egypt) entertained it as well. For example, President Nassir quipped Fatah’s 
“unrealistic” position on Rogers Plan; he said: “a mini-state in the West Bank 
and Gaza is better than nothing”. (Khalaf 1981: 78). The PLO factions 
rejected the Rogers’ proposal categorically, while the PNC declared such an 
effort to be a “suspicious call to initiate a fake Palestinian entity”. The PNC 
represented the proposed self-government in West Bank and Gaza like this: 
 
The truth of such [proposed] fake [Palestinian] entity would resemble in its 
reality an Israeli colony, which would liquidate the Palestinian cause completely 
in favor of Israel’s interest. Simultaneously, it would be only a temporary period 
to enable the Zionists to evacuate the Palestinian land occupied after 5 June 
[1967] from its Arab residents. It is the beginning to annex [the occupied land in 
1967] to the Israeli entity and establish a collaborating Arab administration … 
the PNC untimely denounces the idea of a fake Palestinian entity … and any 
form of international protection. The PNC declares that any Arab-Palestinian or 
non-Palestinian individual or group calling for, or supporting this collaborating 
entity and international protection is an enemy of the Arab-Palestinians and the 
Arab nation. (PNC 4th session 1968, emphasis added) 
 
 
The PNC also urged the PLO to 
 
firmly resist all peaceful and surrender solutions, and rejection of all 
agreements, resolutions and plans that contradict the right of the Palestinian 
people to the entirety of its homeland. [Rejection of] the UN resolutions, 
Security Council Resolution on 22 November 1967, the Soviet Plan and other 
similar plans. (PNC 5th session 1969, emphasis added) 
 
The terminology received from political theory, international relations, UN 
resolutions and diplomatic initiatives swept through the Palestinian discourse. 
Consequently, a significant discursive effort was dedicated to deliberate these 
terminologies: their meanings, entailments, whether to accept it or not and so 
forth, until they melted into each other. It is hard today to imagine what a 
Palestinian discourse would be like without these inputs. The above citations 
illustrate the point. What is more important than PLO’s rejection (and later 
acceptance) of resolution 242 was the interpretative process that ensued, 
which involved reference to various intertwined relations, laws, rules, technical 
                                            
against the recognition of the Palestine as an observing member of the UN General Assembly 
in 2012. 
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terms and international political institutions to construct a stance on the 
examined subject, be it the UN resolutions or diplomatic initiatives. I will 
discuss this referential device in more details in Chapter 6. 
 
The terminological matrix that constituted the framework of a “settlement” (al-
taswiya), a Palestinian state rather than parts of Palestine, introduced a novel 
and competing possibility (whether it was rejected or accepted) in parallel to 
the democratic state over entire Palestine or Palestine liberation. One of the 
conclusions drawn out of this competition was the “distinction [made] between 
[accepting] a settlement and giving up” (Khalaf 1981: 132). Key figures in 
Fatah’s Central Committee contemplated a “settlement” that would lead to a 
“mini-state [duwayla] in the West Bank and Gaza in event Israel returns this 
land”. It is worth mentioning that this point was made in a policy report 
“explaining the strategy and the tactic Fatah should adopt … the report was 
met by stark objection and it was therefore maintained in archive awaiting 
better day” (Ibid. 134). Then, the idea of a “mini-state” was out there pending 
an “event” which could be interpreted as a suitable time that opens up the 
possibility to interpellate54 people to it, or where people derive their own 
subjectivity and attachment to the idea of a “mini-state”. 
 
The interactions and deliberations on the imagined and proposed solutions, 
and political initiatives for resolving the conflict helped to construct new 
divisions, groups and framings according to the political position of the subject 
on these solutions at different periods —i.e. manufacturing subjectivities. First, 
anyone who did not support an all-out “revolution” to liberate the entire 
Palestine was represented as a “deviant and defeatist” (PNC 5th session, 
1969) and put into the “reactionary” camp (al-raj‘iyyun) (PNC 6th, 1969). In a 
few years, gradual linguistic shifts helped erasing the word “entire” (Palestine) 
and substituted it by the phrase: “any liberated part of …”  
 
                                            
54 On the concept of interpellation see Althussur (1971: 174-82), also see Weldes (1999: 103-
07) and Butler  (1997). 
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Although the interim programme was approved unanimously, differences over 
its interpretation soon appeared. Given the transitional and provisional 
interpretative horizons of the Palestinian leadership, the “partitioning of 
Palestine” was perceived as, “a necessary transitional phase which will usher 
the establishment of a unified democratic state one day.” (Al-Hout 1977: 11, 
emphasis added) On this account, some interpreted the interim programme to 
be only a ladder to continue the struggle from within a liberated land, but 
never an end in itself. According to Habash (2009: 130) the “PFLP accepted 
the establishment of national Palestinian authority over every liberated part of 
the Palestinian land and continuation of the liberation battle from there.” 
Certain interpretations of the regional and international context put the whole 
idea of stage-by-stage policy in doubt. Habash explained, “We are still living in 
a stage characterized by a clear imbalance of power to the advantage of the 
enemy. This means, a priori, that it is impossible to wrest even a minimum 
legitimate Palestinian national right, let alone achieve the implementation of 
the a stage-by-stage strategic program for Palestinian national struggle.” 
(Habash 1985: 9, emphasis added) However, for other groups the interim 
programme was an end in itself and they welcomed it as, “a great 
achievement”, “national programme, the programme of return, the right to self-
determination and the independent state.” (Hawatmeh 1979b: 136; see also 
Khalaf 1979: 138).  
 
The period between 1967 and 1973 witnessed two contradictory events. On 
the one hand, the popularity of Palestinian movements increased significantly 
after the al-Karama battle, and on the other hand, an “existential threat” was 
looming in 1970. King Hussein of Jordan was about to “put and end to the 
existence of the Palestinian resistance” (Habash 2009: 102) and “erase 
Palestine from the map and language”. (Khalaf 1981: 71-72). The competition 
between King Hussein and the PLO over the representation of the 
Palestinians and the fate of the West Bank consumed much of the PLO’s 
energy. Jordan was declared a United Kingdom and assumed the right to 
negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Verbal attacks on the Jordanian 
regime augmented the tension between the PLO and the Jordanian regime 
and its army. Besides that, a special organization called “the Black 
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September” and a policy called “the Ghost War” were put in motion to carry 
out revenge activities against the Hashemite regime and destabilize it. Many 
groups in the PLO admitted that spurring a “coup d’état in Jordan was the 
goal”. (Habash 2009: 102). Nonetheless, the phase that would follow when 
the imagined coup remained amorphous and under-articulated. The Ajloun 
battle between the Fida’iyyun and Jordan’s Army in 1971 represented “the 
end of the Palestinian movement expansion era” (Khalaf 1981: 71-72).  
“There was no refuge for the resistance … it is necessary to establish a state 
even on one inch” (Ibid. 136, emphasis added). The phrase, “even on one 
inch”, reveals the depth of internal tension between grand hopes and 
immediate ones.  
 
What made the PLO embrace the interim programme? The facile, and 
perhaps an axiomatic answer to this question appears, by espousing the 
interim programme with immediate past events. Drawing a causal relationship 
between the Egyptian-Israeli war in October 1973 and the Ten-Point 
Programme may appear self-evident. Before going any further, it is worthwhile 
examining how the war was constructed as a critical event. The theme of the 
PNC 12th session in 1974 represented the “October War” as an “historical 
event in the life of the Arab nation and Palestinian people”, it “moved the 
Middle East issue … from no-war-no-peace status”, UNSC resolution 338 that 
“confirms resolution 242”, and made it possible to ask for an international 
conference in Geneva. Habash depicted the war as “a psychological victory” 
(Habash 2009: 133). The construction of the “October War”55 as a significant 
watershed coincided with the already well-founded and elaborated 
infrastructure of the provisional mode of thinking, and with a period of 
internally undecided political platforms and objectives. Accordingly, the war 
was seen to “put an end to the politics of everything or nothing”, “taking partial 
decisions” and “adjust the goals according to reality” (Khalaf 1981: 130). In 
                                            
55 In the Arab world, including Palestinians, the war that broke out between Egypt and Israel 
in October 1973 is designate as “October War”, whereas Israel calls it “Yom Kippur War”; and 
Western academia adopted the Israeli version.  
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practice this was the first building block leading to the Oslo Process, which 
transformed the “end of everything or nothing” into a strategy entitled, “getting 
rid of occupation gradually”. (Abu-Alaa 2006: 26). 
 
Shortly after the declaration of the Ten-point Programme concerted Arab and 
international venues were opened up for the Palestinian movement. The Arab 
regimes (via the Arab League) recognized the PLO as the sole representative 
of the Palestinian people; the UN did the same and went even further to 
recognize the Palestinians as a “people”. In November 1974, Arafat was given 
the chance to speak from the UN General Assembly’s podium before the 
largest international conglomeration. Indeed, he was transformed from being 
a “terrorist” to being a symbol of the Palestinian people and its cause. This 
accumulation and elevation of the PLO, recognition of the Palestinian people 
self-determination and the invitation to speak in international forums was 
considered to be a significant achievement by the Palestinians: “we have 
reached our goals … we are no longer outlawed terrorist gangs and killers.” 
(Khalaf 1981: 134) In effect, a long and detailed process of socialization and 
assimilation commenced inside the Palestinian movement. The PLO 
embarked on revising and reconsidering its position within the framework of 
the 1974 “achievements” as follows: 
  
Neither the traditional ‘No’ ... is revolutionary and an answer, nor ‘Yes’ is a 
form of betrayal. To the contrary, rejection could be a method for escape [taking 
decisive decisions] … our ancestors’ rejection of the offers [for solving the 
Israel-Palestine conflict] … helped the Zionist project … Why did not the 
Palestinians accept a temporary solution as the Zionists did? (Khalaf 1981: 133, 
emphasis added) 
 
The year 1974 could be described as the year that opened up the PLO’s 
socialization process in line with the precepts of international politics, relations 
and foreign policies. For the first time, the PLO was recognized by the UN as 
the sole representative of the Palestinian people, a UN recognition of the 
Palestinians as a people, affirmation of the Palestinian right to self-
determination, and previous UNSC resolution with regard to Palestine, among 
them the resolution number 194 (the right of return). Arafat made a speech on 
the UN podium. The process of socialization was put in motion and began to 
bear fruit since then. It ushered gradual internalization, learning and 
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incorporation of the UN, political and legal discourse into the PLO’s 
worldviews, which filtered all the way through into the Palestinian political 
discourse until the UN resolutions became the rules of the game and the 
framework of the PLO’s politics, often referred to as “al-shar‘iyya al-dawliyya” 
(international legitimacy in English).  
 
 
The transition from one-state to, “a state on any liberated part” was justified as 
being a temporary and interim “phase”, yet without any imaginable timeline. 
This gloss-over falsely entails forthcoming phases albeit implicit and un-
deliberated. Although the Ten-point Programme was deemed to be 
provisional, it was actually the accumulation of a fragmented and 
contradictory discursive formulation that had stretched over half a decade. It 
produced new grounding rules and regulations that still influence the 
Palestinian discursive flow.  
 
The Ten-point Programme invalidated and replaced the rule of “everything or 
nothing” and the rejection of a “political settlement” born out of political 
pragmatism logic. Liberation, which used to be considered as an indivisible 
objective, was divided according to the imperatives of the acclaimed “political 
realism”. As such, a whole set of new political concepts and terminology were 
incorporated into the Palestinian discourse.  
 
Politics is said to be the art of the possible, however, certain framing of a 
particular matter is what construes it as possible or impossible, let alone 
political or apolitical. What the PLO once constructed as a possible (e.g., 
liberating the entire Palestine, terminating Zionism, rejection of UN 
resolutions, etc.) was reconstructed as impossible and unrealistic. For 
example, the PLO vindicated the rejection of resolution 242 as the following: 
resolution 242 means: (1) “a de-facto recognition of Israel”, (2)  “relinquishes 
the fundamental right of the Arab-Palestinian people to its entire homeland”, 
(3) “commitment to Israel’s security form the Arab states”, (4) “an introduction 
to curb the fida’iyyun activities”, (5) “terminates the Palestinian revolution”, (6) 
“establishing a demographic and geographical barrier that divides the east 
  129 
and west Arab world”, (7) “increases the power of imperialism” and (8) “stabs 
the armed Palestinian struggle” (cf. PNC 4th  1968; 5th 1969).  
 
However, when the interim logic became the rule, the PLO “reject[ed] to deal 
with” resolution 242. Namely, it did not reject the resolution itself. Moreover, 
the “ultimate rejection and resistance of … negotiation with the imperialist-
occupier and the Zionist enemy” (PNC 8th special session 1970) was also 
replaced by an implicit endorsement of negotiation with Israel. The PNC 
declared that, “no Arab state or leader is allowed to negotiate on behalf of the 
Palestinian people and its sole and true representative, the PLO”. Hence, the 
issue concerned who was “allowed [and not allowed] to negotiate” (PNC 12th 
session Ten-point Programme 1974). Remarkably, 1974 led to a proliferation 
of ambiguity in the Palestinian discourse. Expressions used to articulate the 
PLO’s stance since 1974 were undecided, amenable and more flexible 
compared with the vocabulary of the 1950s and 1960s.  
 
The Egyptian-Israeli bilateral “peace” gestures (e.g., Sadat visit) in the late 
1970s, which culminated in the signing of the Camp David Accords, were an 
important interpretative period for the Palestinians and occupied ample space 
in the Palestinian discourse at the time. The overwhelming majority of 
Palestinians categorically denounced that Egyptian-Israeli agreement. Camp 
David was constructed as an existential threat that aimed “to liquidate the 
Palestinian cause and end the role of the PLO”, (Khalaf 1979: 140) and “a 
new enslavement of the Palestinian people. It requires us to renounce the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian cause” (Arafat 1979: 198), “conspiracy” (Habash 
1979: 134), “defeatist move” (Hawatemh 1979a: 193), “the most dangerous of 
these conspiracies” (Fatah Central Committee 1978),  “the most dangerous 
link in the chain of the hostile conspiracy that has been unfolding since 1948”, 
“Camp David agreement constitutes a total surrender by Sadat”, “self-
government sanctions the Zionist enemy’s aim of turning the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip into a colony subject to perpetual occupation.” (PLO Executive 
Committee 1979: 177-78) and so forth. Therefore, such a threat compelled, “a 
cohesive Palestinian stand in confronting the Camp David conspiracy” 
(Habash 1979: 134) and to wage a “struggle against Camp David 
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Agreements”, “thwarting the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and self-government plan 
is the most immediate task on the agenda …” (DFLP 1979: 200, emphasis 
added).   
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 5  
The Rise of the Two-States Solution 
 
 
Examining the construction of the “Camp David’s threat” from the Palestinian 
perspective shows two things: firstly, the logic of negotiation and 
rapprochement was not denounced per se. In fact, the PLO was very keen on 
negotiation under the cover of an international conference. Secondly, what 
was a concern for the Palestinians is the fact that Camp David excluded them 
(the PLO) and offered only “a deformed autonomous rule, and nothing more” 
(Khalaf 1979: 145). The “shock” of Anwar al-Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977 
re-united the PLO again (i.e. The Rejection Front was dissolved) and the 
“Steadfastness Front for restraining and boycotting Egypt” was formed. 
Ironically, this shock offered no incentive to rethink the politics of phases 
mentioned earlier; on the contrary, it revalidated this political vision. The 
Steadfastness Front called for a “clear policy” which includes: a Palestinian 
state, right to return and Israeli withdrawal from the land occupied in 1967 
(Habash 2009: 152-59). 
 
A “Palestinian National Authority” (which is less than a state) was proposed as 
the governing body during the interim and transitional phase. Accordingly, the 
National Authority intercepted the content of liberation and armed struggle. 
The Ten-point Programme argued that, “the PLO struggles by all means and 
at the top of it, the armed struggle to liberate the Palestinian land and 
establish the fighting and independent National Authority of the people on 
every liberated part of the Palestinian land.” (Ten-point Programme 1974, 
emphasis added)  Words like “liquidating”, “exterminating”, “the Zionist entity”, 
“liberating the entire Palestine” were discontinued. The National Authority, 
“after being established”, would be responsible “for unifying confrontation 
countries” (tawhid duwal al-muwajaha) to pursue the struggle towards the 
entire liberation of Palestine (Ibid. article 8). The introduction of the 
Palestinian National Authority entailed that the struggle, firstly, should wait 
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until that Authority was instituted. Hence, this authority and the “liberated part” 
(on which the authority would be founded) would be gained through 
negotiation, or at least not through the armed struggle. In other words, the 
armed struggle was neutralizing. Secondly, liberation was no longer the 
(direct) objective of the struggle; the “complete liberation” and the “democratic 
Palestinian state” would wait for another phase. Instead, the struggle had to 
be directed towards “unifying confrontation countries.” 
 
In a step towards performing the “temporary” measures and putting the 
National Authority into reality, three remarkable things took place. Firstly, the 
PLO began to classify Palestine temporally into “occupied land of 1948” vis-à-
vis “occupied land of 1967”. Secondly, it naturalized itself with international 
law language, which provided a reservoir of referential concepts (e.g., “the 
Palestinian inviolable national rights”, “realization of our firm rights endorsed 
by the UN since 1974, especially resolution 3236” (PNC 13th session 1977)). 
Finally, it reconsidered the representation of “Israelis” (not Zionism or the 
Jews). Before 1977 almost every Israeli was condemned as “an enemy 
regardless of his/her ideological beliefs”. (Khalaf 1981: 22). In 1977, 
Mahmoud Abbas, a member of PLO Executive Committee and current 
President of the PLO and PA, motivated by the maxim “know your enemy” 
conducted a research on Israel’s demographic character. He concluded that 
at least 50 percent of Israel’s citizens are oriental Jews (i.e., those who used 
to live in Arab countries and moved to Israel later). He therefore imagined a 
possibility of building a “dialogue” with this category in order “to reach peace” 
(Abbas 1994: 25-26).  
 
In the PNC’s 13th session (1977), “contacting and coordinating with the 
democratic, progressive Jewish forces” was admitted in principle and 
performed in reality. The inability of the Palestinian leadership before an-
Nakba to attract (at least) some of the Jewish individuals into the Palestinian 
movement was considered to be a “failure” (Khalaf 1981: 29). In 1984 
“contacts with Jewish forces” became a key subject for discussion on the 
agenda (PNC 17th session). Since then, the taboo of contacting Israelis was 
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fully repudiated. The development in the representation of Zionism, Jews and 
Israel, explained in Chapter 4, also played a significant role.  
 
 
The Liberation Decline and Rise of the Two-state Solution 
We may be more understandable if we say: a safe haven, no matter how small it 
might be, or an embassy, where any Palestinian could resort to if s/he is hurt or 
threatened. This is the primary aspiration for every Palestinian … On the second 
day, after celebrating the establishment of a state in the liberated territories of 
the West Bank and Gaza we will begin distributing Identity Cards. It is possible 
that many Palestinians would decide not live in the new state for practical 
reasons. However, they could live in another Arab country without stress and 
complexities! … And if they feel threatened for some reason or another they 
could return to Palestine [or more precisely the Palestinian state in the West 
Bank and Gaza], there would be no discrimination against them.  
 
… there would not be any Palestinian sabotage activities (nashatat takhribiyya 
falastiniyya) when we have a state to lead and protect, and extremism would 
disappear from our ranks and even from the ranks of the ‘Rejection Front’ ... 
(Khalaf 1981: 213-14, emphasis added) 
 
So wrote Salah Khalaf more than a decade before the official inauguration 
peace process in the Madrid Conference in 1991. The ostensible circulation of 
psychological vulnerability coupled with the fervent pursuit of a state or statist 
institutions (embassy, ID cards, passport, etc.) as an assertion and 
performance of a Palestinian identity in the form of hard documents (that can 
be shown to others) are not a novelty in the Palestinian everyday life. Indeed, 
these facts have been unfolding since an-Nakab, if not before. However, what 
is new in Khalaf’s argument is: firstly, the loaded proposition that construes 
the Palestinian state the ultimate answer to Palestinian vulnerabilities and 
needs. Secondly, he espouses these needs with a defined territorial 
dimension that accedes with resolution 242, which the PLO continued to resist  
(publically?) until 1988. Thirdly, the argument implies a shift from, or a 
reinterpretation of, the Ten-point Programme into what has been called later a 
two-state solution. Fourthly, his argument implicitly considers the two-state 
solution without fulfilling the return of the refugees. Fifthly, he literally 
internalizes and adopts the Israeli narrative of Palestinian activities (often 
signified as a “struggle,” nidal) and refers to these acts as a “Palestinian 
sabotage activities.” The exact terminology has been in use in the Israeli 
Arabic radio and Hebrew media: “Pe’ulat Khabala Festetina’it” in Hebrew. 
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What is far more important in these arguments is the time. These statements 
appeared before the Israeli war on Lebanon in 1982; therefore, any claim that 
considers the Israeli war on Lebanon in 1982 as the cause for a PLO policy 
transformation is dubious.  
 
Once the principle of establishing mini-state on parts of Palestine approved, 
the discursive field was infiltrated by series of “statist” terminology, concepts 
and phrases such as: “independent and national Palestinian state”, “national 
rights”, “national interest”, “to establish just and comprehensive peace in the 
Middle East”, “human rights”, “Geneva conventions with regard to occupied 
population” (PNC 17th session 1984), “international legitimacy” (PNC 20th 
session 1991). All of these phrases modulated the Palestinian self-
understanding of their rights. In 1988 the Palestinian rights (al-huqwq al-
falastiniyya) were articulated as “self-determination”, “right to return”, 
“independent state” over the “occupied Palestinian territories”, “Israeli 
withdrawal from the Palestinian occupied land in 1967 including the Arab 
Jerusalem”, “establishing temporary government” (PNC 19th session 1988). In 
the Palestinian common political language these rights are now called: “the 
unchanged national rights”, the “consonants” as a shorthand (al-thawabt al-
wataniyya). However, the means to achieve this list of right was left 
unconstructed and unarticulated, therefore everything remained flexible, 
open-ended and contingent upon what political realism may offer. 
 
At least since the late 1980s, co-option of the PLO by the “triumphant” realist-
liberalist conception of the world (after the collapse of Soviet Union) became 
increasingly visible (see PNC 20th 1991). For the Palestinian leadership, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union signified a severance with the past; it believed 
that everything has to start anew. While the war on Iraq in 1991 was 
construed as something that ushered “a new reality”, which, to their mind, 
compels the PLO “to give [an] absolute priority to peace in the Middle” and 
reckon with “international legality [which] the issue has become of central 
importance.” (al-Hassan 1992: 31; 36; 39) This wishful perspective of “a new 
vision” imposed itself on the political schema. It tried to distance itself from 
past frameworks of the struggle (i.e., armed struggle) and to replace them 
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with a political settlement. Khaled al-Hassan, a senior Palestinian leader, 
captures this point in arguing that: 
 
If these events [‘détente’, ‘end of Iraq-Iran war’ and ‘global economy’] marked 
the end of an era and open the way to a new vision of the new world, it is 
because they have necessitated a new form of thinking, a new way of dealing 
with a new chapter in our lives. (Ibid. 15-16, emphasis added) 
 
By the same train of thoughts, Khalaf contended that due to the “change in 
the world order”, “unpredictable global balance”, “Communism, as an ideology 
appears to be in wane”,  “the rise of Islamic fundamentalism even among the 
Palestinians” issues of “self-determination, freedom, and basic human rights” 
are among the important issues on the global political agenda. All of this 
propelled a “pragmatic” position because, after all,  “Palestinians are part of 
this change”. The new “world order” was constructed into an opportunity to 
restore the Palestinian rights, self-determination and statehood only if they 
become pragmatic and realistic. Pragmatism was juxtaposed with, and 
formulated as an equivalent to a “negotiated settlement”, “offering a two-state 
solution” and flexibility/ambiguity on the right of return (Khalaf 1990: 92-93).  
 
If the whole world began to appear differently back in the days, then we could 
imagine the degree of transformation in the self-perception, and the 
perception of the Palestinian cause and the other. Israel was reinterpreted 
afresh. The depiction of Israel as “enemy” was given up; instead it was 
identified as an “adversary” with which the Palestinians have “compatible 
goals”. Phrases like “pragmatism”, “realistic”, “derive from an assessment of 
objective-reality”, “sense of responsibility”, “reaching maturity” (al-Hout 1977: 
11; Khalaf 1979: 141; al-Qaddumi 1988: 5) have been constantly invoked in 
order to secure an insecure and a contested belief (i.e. an orthodoxy), and 
hence restrain critical examination (Said 1975: 92, reflecting on Chomsky 
1973: 302-03). After testing out the realist-liberalist recipe for peace over the 
past twenty years, the “peace process” itself is a stark testimony to the fact 
that it is impractical and unrealistic to be practical and realistic, if realism can 
only usher a perpetual peace “process”, yet without peace. The Western-led 
peace process between Israel and the PLO/PA has been ongoing for more 
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than two decades now, yet the reality on the ground is witnessing a continued 
Israeli domination over most aspects of Palestinian life, with some aspects 
delegated to the PA apparatus to run. The Israeli policies of settlement 
expansion, violence and discrimination against the Palestinians have been 
intensifying in a sheer contravention of what peace is supposed to be. 
 
The concept of liberation has transformed gradually from “liberation of the 
entire Palestine” to “liberation of any part.” Its decline continued until it was 
totally dropped from the Palestinian discourse in the mid-1980s. Liberation 
was replaced with “resistance” (resistance vs. termination, liberation, 
liquidation) to the “Zionist occupation” (occupation vs. colonialism), “resolve 
the Palestinian issue”, “to find a just solution for the Palestinian issue”, and 
“the right to confront the Zionist occupation” (PNC 17th, 1984 & 18th session 
1988 respectively). And recently, liberation infers an attenuated statehood in 
the West Bank and Gaza, special arrangement for Jerusalem, with land 
swaps and without the authentic return of the refugees. 
 
Particularly after the 1980s, the so-called “political realism” governed much of 
the PLO imaginative horizon, which became a guiding and explanatory 
schema for decision-making. Nonetheless, it is important to contextualize 
political realism, to think of it in the same way that political actors have 
represented it. The PLO unquestionably picked up the realist-liberalist 
worldviews of the world order, and the PLO policy shift in the late 1980s may 
appear as a perfect example of bandwagoning (joining the wagon of the 
stronger, i.e. the US) after the (assumed) rise of a unipolar world system. And 
one should admit that all of this appears to be true, however, our analysis of 
the Palestinian discourse so far points to different explanations. The 
infrastructure of the interim, limited state and national rights was already 
organized and well distributed before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which 
even international relation theorists and politicians did not foresee.  
 
Undoubtedly, the PLO peace initiative in 1988 was a new thing in the 
Palestinian decision-making and a visible point of transition. But, its contents, 
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mechanisms, apparatus and terminology were already developed, 
deliberated, and distributed incrementally since an-Nakba.  
 
The apparatus of the “politics of phases,” pragmatism and statist framework 
began to crystallize when the Palestinian movements had taken over the PLO 
in 1968, however in 1974, it appeared to be a discursive platform. This being 
said, the year of 1968 was a point that opened up a space for the 
accumulated ideas, imaginations, concepts and terminologies in the 
Palestinian lexicon to materialize in concrete acts. Receiving uncritically the 
realist-liberalist interpretation was contemplated as a vehicle to realize what 
had already crystallized in the PLO’s institutions and the mind-set of its 
decision-makers. After a long period of a piecemeal political socialization, the 
PLO internalized most, if not all, terms of internationally imagined scenarios 
for the question of Palestine. It matters little whether that was intentional or 
not; what matters is how language which has been speaking for the PLO 
evolved in a way beyond its initial raison d’être, and secondly the fact of 
traversing one stage to another with little or no significant moments of 
reflection and review. 
 
The Crux of the Matter: The UNSC Resolution 242 
The UN Security Council resolution number 242 of November 1967 has been 
a core reference point, and hence its frequent mention in this studies so far. It 
will be clear throughout the pages that will follow that the acceptance of 
resolution 242 as a substratum for any possible or imaginable solution is a 
free subscription to the Israeli (and by far Western) discourse on the way 
forward. It should be said that the realist-liberalist peace, the Israeli 
understanding of peace, and market logic are indeed the backbone of this 
resolution. Therefore, the regular distribution, and then the endorsement, of 
resolution 242 constitute an opening for a process of internalization of its 
subtext on several subjects that includes: peace, security, and an introduction 
of the market rules to modulate land and humans in the case of the refugees 
and prisoners. All of these subjects will be thoroughly examined in Part III. But 
for now, let us cast light on the function which resolution 242 played in the 
Palestinian discourse.   
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By and large, resolution 242 was heavily circulated within the Palestinian 
discourse, but in a negative and dismissive way until the mid-1980s. Negation 
of resolution 242 did not exclude the possibility of considering, or be inspired 
by, at least some of its tenets. In fact, the passages I cited from Khalaf’s 
writings in 1981 and Fatah’s Executive Committee policy report after the 1967 
War illustrates how influential the resolution was. 
 
However, as negotiation was accepted in principle and the socialization 
process developed progressively, old interpretations of resolution 24256 were 
discontinued and new ones were produced. Here few examples of what we 
mean by old interpretations: “UNSC Resolution 242 which means accepting 
the negotiation over the right of refugees.” (Khalaf 1981: 127) and “242 deals 
with refugees. We are not refugees. We are a people, the core of the whole 
problem.” (Arafat 1978: 172) 
 
In mid-1980s, the same resolution text was reinterpreted again as follows:  
 
Our stand was that we want 242 and 338 to be accompanied by another UN 
resolution on our people’s right to self-determination within a confederation with 
Jordan. [169-70] … The price Arafat was asked to pat was exorbitant. It was the 
relinquishment of the last of his negotiating cards and the open recognition of 
Resolution 242. (Khalaf 1986: 169-70, 173, emphasis added) 
 
Therefore, we wanted mention made of all UN resolutions because international 
legality cannot be divided. [27] … the PLO recognizes the international 
resolutions as  a whole, a not separately. (Arafat 1986a: 27, 33, emphasis added) 
 
We do not agree on this resolution unconditionally because of what it does not 
contain, not because of what it contains. Resolution 242 means Israeli 
withdrawal from the territories it occupied in 1967. Who among us is against the 
                                            
56 The Israeli interpretation of resolution 242 focused on the vague wording of the clause of 
“withdrawal” and mainly the missing definite article (the) before the word “territories”. For 
example, Maj. Dayan argued that “Resolution 242 of November 1967, which did not call on 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to withdraw fully to that line. Instead, it concluded that Israel 
would need ‘secure and recognized boundaries”. (Dayan 2010: 22, emphasis added). For 
more on this issue, see also Finkelstein 2003: 144-49. 
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withdrawal? We all support the withdrawal. ... There is the cause of the 
Palestinian people —national, legitimate right not included in Resolution 242 
and included in the other UN resolutions. Therefore, we say resolution 242, 338, 
and the other UN resolutions. (Abu Sharif Autumn 1988: 238, emphasis added) 
 
The above citations are a misleading re-interpretation of previous ones. 
Juxtaposing the statements of the 1960s or the 1970s with those of the 1980s 
illustrates the sheer contradiction. By claiming that  “Our stand was that we 
want 242 and 338 to be accompanied by another UN resolution”, “we wanted 
mention made of all UN resolutions”, “including all relevant UN resolutions” 
and so forth, the essence and focus of the point is moved outside resolution 
242 terminology. 
 
To be sure, Khalaf argued while articulating the PLO’s position on the 
conditions to start negotiations that “The price Arafat was asked pay is 
exorbitant. It was the relinquishment of the last of his negotiating cards and 
the open recognition of Resolution 242.” (Khalaf 1986: 173) The last sentence 
makes it evident that the recognition of resolution 242 was considered a mere 
bargaining chip.  
 
The framework of resolution 242 was stabilized and removed from the list of 
controversial issues from the Palestinian standpoint. And finally, the PLO did 
not only recognize Resolution 242 (and 338), but also considered it “the basis 
for negotiation with Israel” (Arafat 1989: 181). From now on, the territorial and 
statist dimensions dominated other elements (self-determination and right of 
return) of what was constructed as an “Inalienable Palestinian Nation Rights” 
(al-huqwq al-falastiniyya al-thabita, or often referred to by the shortcut: “al-
thawabt”, the constants in English). 
 
The genuine Palestinian contributions (e.g., the first Intifada in 1987) were 
often dwarfed and overtaken by the prevalent Palestinian political 
refereantialism, which is a power-ridden regime par excellence, and hence, 
the gradual   assimilation of the realist-liberalist peace recipe in the 
Palestinian political discourse through continuous shifts and transformations 
from one “phase”, UN resolution, initiative, summit and so forth, to another. 
Arguing for a “peaceful settlement” based on “partition[ing] the land between 
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two peoples” (Khalaf 1990: 96) in conjunction with a representation of a 
Palestinian statehood as the future “salvation to the Palestinians and peace to 
both Palestinians and Israelis” (Arafat 1989: 180) is the precise internalization 
of realism-liberalism interpretation of peace.  
 
The Refugees’ Question 
Earlier in Chapter 3, I examined the construction of the Palestinian refugee 
subject-position. Now, the analysis turns into the social and political 
performative impacts of the refugee subject-position. The categorization, 
“Palestine refugees”, has developed negative connotative images of the 
subjects of this category. They are often depicted as weak, needy, cowards, 
victims, escapees, and above all a “problem” by host countries in particular. 
Almost every individual refugee had to interact with a web of refugees’ 
institutions and laws; even s/he has learned to speak the terminology and 
carry the stamps, symbols and ration cards (kart al-wakala) of these 
institutions. Negative images have been projected on the refugees and they 
were inwardly internalized. By being identified as the “problem of”, “question 
of” and “issue of” disconnects the refugees from the overall Palestine issues, 
and hence it needs to be “resolved” independently (see Said 1992: 4). Such 
articulation carries with it an underlying meaning, that anything that has to do 
with the refugees is esoteric, long-standing, and intractable. Most important is 
the implication of the metaphorical meaning of the “refugees 
problem/question” that makes the life of the persons who inhabit the refugee 
subject-position uncertain and ambiguous, and indeed it adds to their 
vulnerability. As such, the refugees have been construed as a problem: an 
unwelcomed visitor and a burden, and a “threat” to the international 
community and Arab countries (Sayigh, Rosemary 1977: 21). 
 
From this perspective, the refugees are a problem, and that is all life for them, 
a problem from within. The inward internalization of the refugee identity (via 
the constructed negative concept of a refugee at the first place) awakened re-
projections manifested in a public rejection of the self-image of the 
(supposedly) weak, impotent, inferior, and the coward Palestinian refugee. As 
Khalaf put it: “Our people is not the one that bear[s] the refugee identity, [our 
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people] carries the fighting fida’i identity.” (Khalaf 1971, cited in Shemesh 
2004: 97) An early study of the attitudes of the refugees (Bruhns 1955) shows 
the paradoxical coexistence of both rejection and acceptance: the rejection of 
UNRWA resettlement (al-tawtin) and development plans, while a bitter 
reception of the UNRWA relief and rations (al-Husseini 2000; 2010). Bruhns 
captured this attitude very well: “When [the refugee was] requested to reject 
concrete items, refugee is articulate.” (1955: 135) 
 
Al-tawtin (translated as settlement, resettlement) appeared in the discourse to 
express a proposed political solution to the “refugees problem.” The English 
translation of al-tawtin (noun/verb) obscures the significant locus of the idea of 
“homeland” loaded in the Arabic term. Al-tawtin refers to the process that aims 
to settle the refugees in the hosting countries and make them their new 
homelands, i.e. the refugees will become national of the host countries. The 
policies of al-tawtin were met with overwhelming rejection among the refugees 
who still scorn these policies despite the passage of time. The plan entails a 
permanent severance between the individual refugee, and his/her very fine 
traces of identity accumulated over centuries in Palestine, the homeland (al-
watan, el-blad).57 Al-tawtin is a contentious and provocative regional subject, 
especially for the Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese. The total 
contradiction between al-tawtin and al-wataniyya (nationalism) explains the 
disavowal of the former. Common and spontaneous58 organic social and 
spatial memories of Palestine are the main texture of the refugees’ 
nationalism after an-Nakba. From the refugees’ standpoint, “wataniyya” is 
therefore synonymous with a return to their homes, villages and towns 
(Sayigh 1997). In other words, it is a return to their watan (homeland) 
                                            
57 In the Palestinian colloquial Arabic language “el-blad” (plural of el-balad) signifies the entire 
Palestine whereas “el-blad” (singular) signify the individual town or village to which the 
speaker belongs.  
58 Refugee’ identification unfolded spontaneously as result of reflexive and reflective 
interpretation of “being already in” a situation, not through pre-conceived constitution led by 
state political intuitions. 
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therefore nationalism in this case is an interpretation of return and absolute 
contradiction of al-tawtin. 
 
The land, homeland and return constituted the subject-matter for most of the 
literary works of the refugees in particular, and the Palestinians in general. 
Such work expressed the refugees’ feelings and perceptions of themselves 
and the world. A sense of deep injustice, bitterness, the rejection of their 
reality, a determination to return and redeem their homeland and past 
memories of Palestine were reflected in poetry, art, folklore, novels, cartoons 
and so forth. Some writers on the subject went a step further by juxtaposing 
the refugees’ experience with that of their victimizer. For example, Tibawi 
metaphorically labeled such an emotional thrust as a “new Zionism” and the 
Palestinian refugee became “the new Zionist who never forgets” (Tibawi 1963: 
514) as epitomized in the following stanza: 
 
Jaffa! My tears have dried but I still wail,  
Will I ever see you again?  
My memory of you is ever fresh,  
Living within my innermost soul.  
How fare your sister cities? I long for them!  
They are parts of everlasting paradise.  
What ails my heart? Wherever  
I turn, it sadly cries  
For my own native town                                   
Mahmud Al-Hut cited in Tibawi 1963: 514 
 
In the PNC’s first session59 the category “refugees” was re-categorized into 
“returnees” (al-‘a’idun). Also a special PLO apparatus was created in order to 
take care of the “returnees issues”. The figurative expression al-‘a’idwn 
demonstrates the refugees’ willingness to return and a political commitment to 
realize that goal.  
 
 In the PNC’s second session, “the Returnees Affairs” appeared as a headline 
and a subject of discussion. To stamp out “the refugee identity” and to restore 
“the sense of pride” (Khalaf 1981: 68-69 cited in Shemesh 2004: 98) became 
                                            
59 Most, if not all, PNC members were from either the first or second-generation Palestinian 
refugees. 
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the goal of the Palestinian struggle. “The new Palestinian personality” was 
articulated as the opposite of what a “refugee” means: the new Palestinian is 
a revolutionary (al-thawri) and sacrificer (fida’i). The two words, “revolutionary” 
and “sacrificer”, convey the image which a Palestinian would want to 
constitute for her/himself: a free, powerful, resilient, rebelling against 
oppression and the one who offers (not waits for assistance) everything s/he 
has including his/her life to liberate the homeland. The fida’iyyun saw 
themselves as a “generation of suffering, of sacrifice, the generation of pain 
and hardships ... This long, unusual problem [of Palestine] needs 
revolutionaries of a certain kind, unusual revolutionaries, revolutionaries 
capable of taking the long view, revolutionaries prepared for sacrifice and 
continuous sacrifice.” (Arafat 1973: 167, emphasis added) 
 
Returnee, sacrificer and revolutionary were among the key constitutive 
elements of the identity of the Palestinians in exile, and an integral part of 
mundane discourse in media, poetry and the names of institutions (e.g., al-
‘awda Center, al-‘awda Vanguards, al-‘awda dreams). However, to gain the 
“returnee” identity requires revolutionary and sacrifice acts (al-‘amal al-thawri, 
al-‘amal al-fida’i) as a manifestation and an affirmation of the eagerness to 
return. Liberation was interpreted therefore as “synonymous” of return (see 
Shemesh 2004). This explains the total absence of any direct reference to the 
refugees and return in the PLO Charter (1964 or 1968); which instead 
emphasized the idea of liberation. Any attempt “to absorb and assimilate the 
diaspora Palestinians in the societies in which they live in” was considered a 
“conspiracy” that infringes on the “revolutionary” identity (PNC 10th session 
1972).  
 
The “revolutionary” and refugee (or returnee) images coexisted with and 
perpetuated one another. Nonetheless, such character was perceived as 
being under constant threat and a subject of “the Zionist and imperialist” 
threat which “aims to wipe out the character of the Palestinian people and its 
entity” (PNC 5th session, 1st annex, Political Manifestation Feb. 1969, 
emphasis added). The sense of threat to the Palestinian identity lingered, and 
continued to be articulated as an exceptional threat, which “no other country” 
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confronted. In Arafat’s words: “no other country has been confronted with a 
plan to liquidate its national identity, as has happened in the case of 
Palestine, nor confronted a plan to empty a country of its people has 
happened in the case of the Palestinian people.” (Arafat 1982: 4, emphasis 
added) 
 
The refugees became the main authors of the Palestinian political discourse 
especially after various Palestinian organizations joined the PLO in 1968. 
Since then, the armed struggle was injected into the PLO Charter in order to 
discern and emphasize the fida’i self-perception, also as a negation of the 
weak-refugee image. In 1969-71, spectacles of power, arms and militarism 
reached its pinnacle in Jordan and in Lebanon between 1972-82. As a result, 
the motto of that era was “all authority for the resistance.”  
 
According to Derrida, discourse is a dual process of deferral and difference 
(différance). Therefore, a change in the articulation of one subject inspires 
change in the other subjects that defer themselves to it. From that 
perspective, since concepts of refugees and return are closely deferred and 
linked with the discursive construction of land and homeland, change (or 
internalization) in the conception of land and homeland (occupied land 1967 
vs. 1948) would still suggest a revision of concept of refugee and return (even 
if that was not clearly articulated because the direction is in the logic itself). 
That is what happened in practice; as the PLO went along the track of interim 
plans in 1974, rejectionist styles started to recede gradually. Meanwhile, 
maintaining the “return” as a primary objective appears inconsistent with the 
“politics of phases” because, firstly, statist objectives (a Palestinian state over 
any part) gained primacy and organized the framework and typology of 
priorities. Secondly, provisional and interim thinking constituted a space that 
helped to defer the question of return. Finally, the ultimate return would be 
achieved after establishing the democratic state over entire Palestine.  
 
By the Ten-point Programme rationale, the PLO’s accepts to negotiate each 
conflict issue, among them, the refugees. Point two of the Programme states: 
“the PLO fights against any Palestinian entity that would lead to a recognition 
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[of Israel], reconciliation, security borders, waiving the national right of our 
people and depriving their right to return and self-determination over their 
national soil.” The transition in the Palestinian political position on the 
refugees issue is clear in the pervious citation. First, refugees and their return 
are no longer exclusive, but on a par with other political and statist concepts 
(indeed establishing a Palestinian state was put first) such as borders, 
recognition, reconciliation, self-determination, national rights, national soil and 
so forth. Second, return was not on the list of “politics of phases;” instead 
“fight against … waiving … and depriving the refugees of the right to return.” 
There is an important qualitative difference between the “right to” and the 
actual performance of return. The PLO’s position on the refugees was often 
articulated in a very convoluted, ambiguous and indirect language that allows 
different readings. Third, endorsing the negotiation principle prescribes 
negotiation about the content of the right of return, Khalaf captured the last 
point: the “right to return … should be on the agenda of any negotiation” 
(1990: 100, emphasis added). 
 
The shift in the PLO’s objectives, liberation (1964-1968), one state (1969-
1973), temporary state (1974-1987), two-states (1988-current), meant a 
transformation in the imagined solution of the sub-objectives or the dependent 
family of issues around the key nodal point. Establishing the two-state solution 
and a settlement based on “international legitimacy” (al-shar‘iyya al-dawliyya) 
had its ramification on the interpretation of the each sub-nodal point like the 
refugees issue. The UN resolutions guided the imagined way through which 
the Palestinian state would be realized and how the refugees’ issue/problem 
would be settled. Accordingly, the refugees issue was articulated as a 
“qadiyya” (a legal case) (qadiyyat al-laji’yyn), which should be dealt with as a 
matter of a legal controversy to be “resolved” through international law and 
institutions, “especially resolution number 194” (cf. PNC 19th, 1988 & 20th 
session 1991). Pronouncing the refugees as a problem found its way into the 
Palestinian political discourse especially when a “Palestinian state [in the 
OPT]” had become the official framework. 
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And even worse, the refugees were framed to be not only a problem, but also 
a “burden” as typified in this statement: “ [the PLO] do[es] not expect any 
party to carry this burden [of the refugees] alone.” (Khalaf 1990: 104, 
emphasis added) There are corollaries to this construction: first, it meant that 
the whole refugee question may be postponed (which is the case), and 
second, the PLO freed itself from the “burden of the refugees question” by 
classifying it as an international community and international law issue —that 
is, transferring the refugees issue altogether to other institutions and de-
linking it from the PLO responsibility as indicated in PNC 19th session: 
“resolving the refugee issue according to relevant the UN resolutions.” 
 
Israel and other countries’ interests were given precedence over the rights of 
the refugees; therefore, others (powerful states and institutions) have been 
shaping the content of the right of return while coopting the Palestinian 
leadership. In this regard Khalaf’s argument about solving “the problem of 
millions of Palestinian refugee … in a manner that serves the vital interest of 
Israel, Palestine and the region” is a perfect case in point. The PLO has 
become even more concerned with the symbolic meaning of accepting “the 
principle of the right of return or compensation” than its actual implementation. 
The “details of such a return to be left open for negotiations … we [PLO] shall 
for our part remain flexible regarding its implementation.” “Right to return … is 
not insurmountable obstacle to a settlement … Our position is that the ‘right of 
return or compensation’ (and the second part of this position is often 
overlooked) has been legitimized by the successive UN resolutions.” (Khalaf 
1990: 100; 103-04, emphasis added) Of course, the PLO’s position on the 
refugees question in 1990s does not correspond with its position in 2009 
which considers the right of return a “bargain chip;” nevertheless, the former 
position was a point of departure in the piecemeal and painstaking 
transformation. 
 
While bearing in mind that the whole Palestinian project has been constructed 
as a provisional moves since an-Nakba, which became an official framework 
for policy-making in 1974, it is not surprising to see the question of the 
refugees postponed to another (supposedly forthcoming) indeterminate 
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“phase.” Although, the Palestinian rights were labeled “inalienable” national 
rights, all of them were negotiable, and thought of as such by the Palestinian 
decision-makers as the following passage indicates: 
 
The right to return to the Palestinian state is not negotiable. It’s a natural right 
for every Palestinian to return to the Palestinian state, ... Any Palestinian who 
lives in exile who wants to come to the Palestinian state, ... must be able to do so. 
 
But if there are Palestinians who wish to return to the place they left in 1948, let 
us leave that to the negotiating table. (Husayni 1989: 11-12) 
 
In fact, the PLO’s leadership re-represented the right of return by dividing it 
into two elements: return to the putative Palestinian state is considered “not 
negotiable”, while the return to the actual homeland (called Israel since 1948) 
can be negotiated. Meanwhile, in the 2000s it was considered altogether as 
being bargaining chip and the focus is put on a “just solution” not return. This 
point will be further elaborated based on the negotiation record (the Palestine 
Papers) and with reference to how the PLO/PA handling of the refugee 
question impacted its legal and human dimension.  
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 6  
A Referential Function  
 
 
The abundance of terminology and political concepts that have regulated the 
production of self-image, reality (past and present) and the meaning of an-
Nakba for its own subjects were assimilated in the Palestinian lexicon since 
then. Clearly, each of these vocabularies and concepts has certain historical 
traces beyond any individual or group. The term Palestinian discourse, is 
neither the subject that the Palestinians produce nor a fixed set of rules, it is 
rather the discourse that has been re/producing the Palestinians and the 
question of Palestine. Therefore, it is a continuous process of making and 
remaking.   
 
With an-Nakba two rhetorical devices were constructed: Arab “legitimacy” and 
the international “legitimacy” (al-shar‘iyya al-‘arabyya wa al-shar‘iyya al-
dawliyya) to orient the decision-making process and justify the political 
behavior. The two “legitimacies” were developed and operated 
simultaneously. They also functioned as grounding touchstones. Despite the 
Palestinian rejection of the Mandate Resolution and the Partition Resolution 
number 181, their text informed the territorial claims (Sayigh 1997), and later 
drawn upon to defend the declaration of the Palestinian State as articulated in 
the Declaration of Independence in 1988. The APG (All-Palestine 
Government) purpose was built on the Mandate Resolution —that is, it 
aspired to establish an “independent state” that corresponds with the map of 
Palestine defined in the Mandate Resolution (Darwazi: 24 cited in Alazaaer 
n.d.: 41). Meanwhile, Arafat (1989: 181) considered resolution 181 to be “the 
basis for Palestinian independence” and resolution 242 and 338 as “the basis 
for negotiation”. From this perspective, the contents of Palestinian 
independence (where, when, how, and for whom) remained undecided and 
flexible. As shown in Chapter 4, negotiation had become the rule to govern 
and relate to in order to achieve a Palestinian statehood. Taking negotiation 
  149 
as the supreme mechanism for constituting meanings implies a Palestinian 
endorsement of the “right” of others to participate in constructing the contents 
of their existence, and accepting the contingency of the national rights upon 
uncertain future mechanics of negotiation. 
 
A closer attention to context in which negotiation was set out, reveals how its 
contents were already distributed in the diplomatic discourse (i.e. in the UN 
resolutions, initiatives, summits, regional agreements) about the question of 
Palestine before the mediation of the negotiation mechanism. In other words, 
the PLO came to the negotiation table with predetermined conditions from 
which the PLO, and the Palestinians in general, were excluded on the official 
(e.g., Western governments) and unofficial levels (e.g., media, academia) 
(see Said 1992: 15-45).   
 
The Palestinian intervention in the formation of international “legitimacy” was 
minimal; however, it was a partial factor in shaping the “Arab legitimacy” 
especially after 1968. Tying up the Palestinian cause with such dual 
legitimacy is a mere Palestinian construction that helped to produce a 
rationale for grounding decisions. It also helped the Palestinian leadership to 
correspond to the political context wherever they happened to operate. As a 
result, a referential function was constructed without prior conscious 
deliberation, but rather through the gradual performance of referentiality that 
became interweaved into the political imagination of the Palestinians (and 
others). Nowadays, it is difficult to think of Palestine without this function. 
Hence, the whole rationale was caught up with, and functioned in, a 
referential function to either or both legitimacies. The referential function is 
indeed a contingent Palestinian construction.  
 
By and large, referring to other texts or discourse to back up a certain policy 
or line of argument is a very sensible and pragmatic tool that builds on 
whatever rhetorical capital or popularity such texts have already established. 
Consider, for example, the ample positive connotations and nuances that flow 
from the reference to international law or human rights today. But here, too, 
referentiality is not without its embedded internal power mechanisms, for any 
  150 
international convention, law or initiative has specific discursive rules of 
formations based on historical power-relations. By infusing bits and pieces 
from multiple texts involves systematic invitation, and thus internalization, of 
the different rules of formations, judgments, principles and emphases that 
regulates them. So, by inviting different rules of formations into the original 
structures and relationships, the latter is opened up for re-evaluation 
adjustments against particular reference points, hence new possibilities of 
becoming. 
 
The political culture of referentiality internalizes the entire structure out of 
which an-Nakba has emerged by anchoring the national project on 
international and Arab regimes’ (direct and indirect) positions before and after 
1948. The practice of referentiality itself, is therefore one of the key meanings 
of an-Nakba. The continuous reference to the “dual legitimacy” supplied the 
Palestinian discourse with the raw materials all the way through, which had 
always been present to orient and inform the Palestinian political thinking in 
positive and negative ways (negation, e.g., negating certain resolutions). 
Referentiality opened up a vast terrain for possible linguistic games, illations 
and extrapolations which had never been available before. This has 
penetrated deep into the language of the peace process and public education, 
as we shall see in pending chapters. Calling UN resolutions or Arab League 
Summits “legitimacy” served internal purposes. And, it represents the UN or 
Arab interpretation of the Palestinian question as legally and morally above 
any other interpretations.  
 
The referential function from which the Palestinian rights were constructed 
was justified and temporarily stabilized. However, we should remember that 
neither international nor Arab “legitimacy” are a fixed matter; but always in a 
process of production and reformation. Considering the diplomatic record, 
many UN resolutions have been issued on the question of Palestine and 
several Arab and non-Arab summits, initiatives, conferences and so forth 
were carried out since 1948. Extrapolating the “Palestinian rights” from 
international and Arab legitimacies entailed an ipso facto systematic change 
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in the content of these rights in accordance with the changes and shifts in the 
international and regional interpretation of the Israel-Palestine question.  
 
What was thought of Palestinian rights were loose and under-articulated 
concepts, and inconsistent with the phrase “al-huqwq al-thabita” or “al-
thawabt” (the unchanging rights). These rights were initially subsumed by the 
idea of liberation as an incarnation of self-determination over the entire 
Palestine. In 1974, the Palestinian rights were nationalized and territorialized 
as a result of the infusion of notions of nationalism, authority on specific 
territorial boundaries into the imaginative horizon of the Palestinian 
leadership. That is, they were put under the reign of the (putative) Palestinian 
authority, territorialized (according to resolution 242) and anchored by Arab 
and international legitimacy through a concerted litany of referentiality which 
transformed the rules of the formation of the Palestinian rights. 
 
The “inalienable” Palestinian national rights included three things: “right to 
return, to self-determination and to establish our [Palestinian] independent 
state.” (Arafat 1982: 8) Every movement within the PLO shared this 
interpretation.  “These organizations had further agreed upon the principles of 
the PLO’s interim national programme, the programme of return, the right to 
self-determination and the independent state.” (Hawatmeh 1979a: 136; 
1979b: 192)  
 
How to achieve these national rights has been an ambiguous matter and an 
area of disagreement in the PLO. Nevertheless, armed (especially on the left) 
and political struggle were among the options. The immersion in the 
referential function brought new dominant concepts to the fore. Calling for 
international conferences, summits, citing UN resolutions, political initiatives 
have constituted the content of not only the PLO’s discourse, but also the 
discourse of its sub-organizations. Since the 1980s, notions of “international 
conference on the basis of the UN resolutions” and “peaceful and just 
solution”, “cling to peace” (Arafat 1986b: 214-15), “peaceful solution for 
Palestine questions” (N.A. 1986b), “peace for territories” (Arafat 1986a: 32) 
were the dominant themes of the PLO’s political language, which crystalized 
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around the mid-1980s as a means that would transform the Palestinian 
“nation rights” from an abstract form into a concrete reality.  
 
The following statements from the1980s illustrate the point I am trying to 
make. The PLO struck a confederational agreement with Jordan on the basis 
of the following principles:  
 
1. Total withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967 for a comprehensive 
peace ... 2. Right of self-determination for the Palestinian people...3. Resolution 
of the problem of Palestinian refugees in accordance with United Nations 
resolutions. 4. Resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects. 4. And on 
this basis, peace negotiations will be conduced under the auspices of an 
International Conference... (N.A. Communiqué of the Executive Committee of the PLO, 
1985: 206, emphasis added) 
 
Arafat said: 
 
… the conscious and calculated linking of armed struggle and political struggle 
against the Zionist occupation of Arab territories. The PLO’s political moves are 
aimed at creating an international atmosphere conducive to the recognition of 
our inalienable national rights, primarily the right of the Palestinian people to 
self-determination and establish an independent state. (Arafat 1985: 152, emphasis 
added) 
 
Our struggle is in conformity with the UN Charter. (Arafat 1982: 9) 
 
positive international consensus in response to the just cause of our people in 
keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights… It is our sincere hope that, through this Conference, the 
international will, deeply committed to international agreements, declarations 
and accords, will finally prove capable of achieving a break-through in the 
search for practical means to secure the enjoyment by the Palestinian people of 
their inalienable rights. (Arafat 1984: 199-200)  
 
A mechanism of echoing had developed between the PLO and international 
forms (mainly UN-related ones). For example, the Draft Declaration of the UN 
International Conference on the Question of Palestine on 6 September 1983 
 
reaffirms and stresses that a just solution of the question of Palestine, the core of 
the problem, is the crucial element in a comprehensive, just and lasting political 
settlement in the Middle East.  This settlement must be based on the 
implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions concerning the 
question of Palestine and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people, including the right to self-determination and right to the 
establishment of its own independent state in Palestine and should be also be 
based on the provision by Security Council of guarantees for peace and 
security... (N.A. Winter 1984: 204, emphasis added) 
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Juxtaposing the Draft Declaration with the internal language of the PLO on the 
so-called “international legitimacy” demonstrates the degree of infiltration and 
organic relations between the two discourses.   
 
Today, the usual litany of referential ideas are in circulation more than ever as 
clearly reflected in the so-called “Prisoners’ Document” (2006) (wathiqat al-
’asra), which was drafted by the representatives of the Palestinian political 
movements in Israeli jails, including Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. 
 
The fine enunciation of the three national Palestinian rights draws heavily on 
the UN framings of the question of Palestine. Two of these rights, self-
determination and the independent state, have been articulated at a relative 
ease unlike the right of return which often transpires in complex and indirect 
phrases or omitted all together (for example, it was omitted in the last two 
citations). The refugee question is usually expressed as something subsidiary, 
to be resolved “in accordance with” or “based on” the United Nations 
resolutions and (recently) the Arab Peace Initiative. This complex and indirect 
language relegates the refugees question into a second or third-rate matter in 
comparison with the right to self-determination and independent state. While 
the exact nature of the supposed solution and the specific resolution (194) 
that regulate and govern the imaginative thinking about the refugees have 
been repeatedly silenced and mystified in being wrapped up within phrases 
such as “in accordance with …” or “all relevant UN resolutions”, and recently 
“a just and agreed upon” solution. I am going to discuss this in some details in 
later chapters. But for now let us see how the loose language on the refugees 
intercedes in the constitution of the self-determination.  
 
The ambiguous language on the refugees renders the right to self-
determination of the Palestinian people obsolete, because at least half of 
them (the refugees, let alone the Palestinians in Israel) would not be able to 
exercise that right, or they would be stripped of the return option. Indeed, this 
scenario was in making, as we will see while analyzing the Palestine Papers 
in the Third Part of this dissertation. Linking the Palestinian self-determination 
with the (promised) Palestinian state (on 22 percent of Palestine) 
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automatically de-links half of the Palestinian people from performing self-
determination as Palestinians, even if they return to their “homes” in what is 
now called Israel. In other words, the territorialization of self-determination in 
the West Bank and Gaza excludes the Palestinians who live outside this area 
from that right. More to the point, the operating mechanics of the discursive 
conception of the refugees and their right indicate (perhaps on the long run) 
the de-Palestinization of the refugees and the Palestinians in Israel. Yet, what 
is paradoxical and eccentric in this conclusion is the fact that it came from 
within the refugees themselves, given that most of Palestinian leaders are 
refugees themselves. The fine outcome of the process of socialization 
deconstructed the Palestinian initial political conception of their cause as a 
cause of an uprooted people from their homeland and replaced by another 
one. At the same time, it helped to reconstruct that cause into a territorial 
conflict over the details of when, where and how much, which is the subject of 
next chapters. 
 
Maintaining and living with contradiction is perhaps something that is hard to 
reconcile in ‘Western’ philosophy. However, social reality itself is a cauldron of 
contradiction and paradox. The Palestinian discourse is rife with structural and 
organic contradiction. And among the key contradictions which the 
Palestinians lived was the irreconcilable tension between the 1974 PLO’s 
interim political plan and the simultaneous bid for a “comprehensive 
settlement” while not taking note of the laden contradictory entailments of 
concepts like interim and comprehensive on the national struggle. That is, to 
reconcile the irreconcilable.  
 
The setup of the PLO answered the needs of the Arab states more than the 
Palestinian questions as mentioned elsewhere. And from the beginning, the 
constructed “Palestinian rights” were tailored according to the Arab political 
conditions, not the Palestinian aspirations. This explains the dramatic and 
chronic shifts in the articulation of the Palestinian rights and how they would 
be achieved from time to time without going back to the beholders of the 
rights, the Palestinian people. The PLO preferred top-down legitimacy from 
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Arab regimes (represented by the Arab League) and later from international 
resolutions and forums, or a combination of thereof.  
 
It is crucial to pay closer attention to the aspects of invisible power in 
referentialism. The referential function in the Palestinian cause is power-
ridden and works most of the time in one direction: the weaker refers to the 
norms of the powerful. For example, power deferential played a significant 
rule in the construction and interpretation of the Mandate Resolution, Partition 
Resolution of 1947, or Resolution 242.60  
 
Apparently, the Palestinian political style is caught up within the invisible 
alliance between socialization, provisional horizon, and referentialism with its 
power-relations, therefore the Palestinians are likely to remain at the receiving 
end no matter what kind of balance of power exists in their relationship with 
Israel. The equation is much deeper than what Edward Said (1993) thought of 
as a lack of balance of power. The flow in the direction of power is embedded 
from within and internalized in essence. It is in the means of production of 
what the Palestinians perceive as their rights. Ironically, the referential 
function is a Palestinian construct that often directs their discourse towards 
borrowing and receiving. It is therefore not only a matter of the weak versus 
strong dichotomy, but also a system of power differentials from the beginning.  
 
 
Al-Marj i ‘ i yya  (The Terms of Reference)  
The substance of referentiality has three patterns. The first involved reference 
to the PLO Basic Law and Charter as stabilizing and foundational guiding 
sources. The second pattern continued until the Palestinians reached the 
peace process in 1991. It included particular anchoring points like the 1974 
Ten-Point Programme, UN resolutions, Fez Summit of 1982 and the 1988 
Declaration of Independence. The third pattern, however, started after the 
                                            
60 Several scholars have analyzed aspects of power in the UN resolutions, for examples see 
Pappé 2007: 30-38, also see Finkelstein 2003: 144-49. 
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Madrid Conference in 1991 until this day. Referentiality served as the basis 
for the so-called “marji‘iyyat al-‘amaliyya al-silmiyya” or “marji‘iyyat 
al‘mufawadat” (this translates respectively: the peace process terms of 
reference, negotiation’s terms of references). Since referentiality is unfixed, al-
marji‘iyya has been evolving and changing with it. The last pattern is very 
broad, multiple and inter-textual. It is an assemblage of principles instantiated 
from various UN resolutions, summits, agreements, conferences, visions and 
so forth. These elements are embedded in one another, each has a particular 
context and logic, and hence inconsistency and disruption. The logic of 
embedding explains therefore the construction of marji‘iyyat al‘mufawadat and 
the internal developments and contradictions. This led to a further discursive 
transformation. 
 
Certain diplomatic junctures such as the Madrid Conference in 1991, 
Resolution 242, 338, Clinton Parameters 2001, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) 
2002, the Bush Vision 2002, the Roadmap 2003, agreed agreements, Quartet 
principles 2006, and Annapolis Summit 2007, offered an ongoing possibility of 
constituting terms of reference. However, Palestinian and Israeli 
representatives disagree on the content of virtually all of these junctures. 
Therefore, each side tried to embed particular parts and ignore others. To be 
sure, even if the “parties” agree upon certain elements of the terms of 
reference, each would still hold a different interpretation, and bargains which 
part to cite and which to leave out.61 For example, Israel and the PLO/PA 
declared their acceptance of the UNSC resolution 242 and the two-state 
solution; however, they maintain two diametrically opposing interpretations. 
                                            
61 For example, Tzipi Levin said: “We quoted parts of the RM [Roadmap of 2003], you quoted 
others. If we keep the RM, we can delete the quotes and make it shorter. Two real problems: 
one is the ToR [Terms of Reference].  But we need to find a formula.  I think we cannot agree 
to all the ToR that you [Palestinian side] put.” (Doc.1987) “We are now looking at what we 
have and where are the gaps. Without writing this down you know we are working according 
to 242 and 338. We are not talking about giving you all of [19]67 [land], but when you look at 
the facts on the ground and the discussion on swaps, it is based on it.” (Doc.2826, TL)  
  157 
From the Israeli viewpoint, resolution 242 grants Israel rights in the West 
Bank, whereas the PLO/PA interpret it as a full withdrawal to the 1967 
armistice line. Furthermore, for Israel the two-state solution is closely linked to 
the character of Israel as a “Jewish State”; it meant that each state is “the 
homeland for its people and the fulfillment of their national aspiration and self-
determination” (Doc.2003, TL). 
 
Two different, incommensurable terms of reference governed the so-called 
peace negotiations. Palestinians and Israelis contemplated different terms of 
reference. On the one hand, the Palestinians put out the following reference 
points: the API of 2002, International law/legitimacy, UNSC resolutions 242, 
338, agreed upon resolution of the refugee question based on API and 
resolution 194, Bush vision, Roadmap, and the two states solution (Doc.2826; 
Doc.2055; Doc.2003). On the other hand the Israelis listed the following terms 
of reference: “the Bush vision, the principle of two states for two peoples, 
language referring to the fact that a future agreement will address all 
outstanding issues, that the two states will be the homelands of their 
respective peoples and fulfill their national aspirations, Israel a state for the 
Jewish people, and Palestine for the Palestinians, 242, 338, RM and previous 
agreements, 3 quartet principles” (Doc.2002), “The Roadmap and previous 
agreements as accepted by the parties” [9] “US will judge, [and] no timeline 
for completion of negotiations” (Doc.1987), also adding, “reference to the 
Jewish refugees” (Doc.3651).  
 
Not only were the issues of the conflict not agreed but also there was  (and 
still is) significant disagreement on the governing principles, which guide the 
negotiation of each of the final status issues.   
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 7  
Politics of the Intifada 
 
 
There is much excellent research covering most aspects of the first Intifada 
that broke out in December 1987, however, this chapter adds a discursive 
perspective to this literature while focusing on the Intifada’s politics within a 
wider historical horizon. The flyers-mechanism (al-manashir), which involves 
the distribution of flyers to deliver political massages to the public, was the 
main communication device between the PLO-related bodies and the public in 
the West Bank and Gaza.   
 
Mishal and Aharoni (1994) studied a larger sample of flyers in one chapter 
entitled “Paper War”. Their analysis, however, adopts a narrow 
contextualization within intensive Israeli resources. First of all, the analysis is 
contextualized from the occupier’s perspective of the occupied. Secondly, the 
substance is concerned with what the flyers’ texts mean for Israel and with 
little or no attention to the Palestinian interest and ambitions. Finally, the 
authors used uncritically common Israeli lens to represent the Palestinians 
and their space and acts. The space is signified as “territories” (shtahim in 
Hebrew) or Israel’s backyard; meanwhile the Palestinians and their acts were 
represented as a radical and irrational subject that lacks the ability to conduct 
a civilized dialogue. This is how the authors put it in the first page of the book: 
“The Intifada inspired a new kind of Palestinian radicalism, a radicalism borne 
on young shoulders, a radicalism that conducts its dialogue with Israel and the 
local population via the stone, the slingshot, the petrol bomb, and the leaflet.”  
 
My analysis of about 100 flyers ponders the redistribution of the relationships 
the politics of the PLO and the public in Palestine. I will demonstrate how the 
Intifada’s events and politics have opened up the common discourse in 
Palestine (mainly in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza) to the PLO’s 
  159 
politics and the transitions in the latter’s discourse during that period. Placing 
flyers’ text within the Palestinian politics to see what it tells us about the link 
between concrete events and their political milieu elucidates the point. 
 
The spark of first Intifada coincided temporally with the PLO diplomatic 
endeavors towards the mid-1980s. The timing was a very important factor 
because it started when a specific set of “rights” was constructed in the PLO’s 
discourse as an “inviolable Palestinian national legitimate rights.” The 
migration of the discourse on rights to Palestine, gave the Intifada a political 
form and purpose. Meanwhile, the alliance of the underlying conceptual 
regimes of socialization, provisional horizon and referentiality continued to 
organize and influence the politics of the Intifada.  
 
The record of the main local newspaper, al-Quds,62 in the West Bank and 
Gaza shows how the PLO-related topics used to be mentioned fleetingly and 
rarely featured in the main headlines of local newspapers before the 
beginning of the Intifada.63 However, political tropes like “the settlement of the 
Palestinian cause” (taswiyat al-qadiyya al-falastiniyya), “international 
conference” (mu’tamar dawli), “endeavors for solving the Middle East crisis” 
(masa‘i hal azmat al-sharq al-awast), “activating the peace process” (tanshit 
‘amaliyyt al-salam), “independent state” (al-dawla al-mustaqilla) and so on, 
along with the names and pictures of PLO figures have become prevalent and 
regularly featured on first pages of the newspaper from 1987-8 on onwards. 
When the Intifada broke out, an ironic pattern in local newspapers began to 
juxtapose pictures and texts that depict the “violent events” (ahdath al-‘unf), 
and “confrontations” (sidamat) with the PLO diplomatic moves. Despite the 
                                            
62 I have reviewed all issues of the Al-Quds newspaper between 1974-1978 and between 
1987-1993. Hard copies of newspapers are available in Hebron Municipality Library.  
63 This lack of interest in the PLO and national political news could be due to Israeli 
constraints and surveillance imposed on local media outlets. Indeed, I am concerned with 
discourse as it appears. Read more on the Israeli censorship on the West Bank’s press and 
Palestinian resistance to censorship in Najjar (1995: 139-149). 
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increasing intensity and spread of events on the ground, diplomacy-ridden 
subjects dominated the newspapers’ theme and space. Although on the front 
page, concrete events occupied a minimal space. What is outstanding from 
this spatial juxtaposition on paper is yet another unuttered spatial juxtaposition 
between inside (the West Bank and Gaza) and outside (exile), and a 
relationship between internal concrete events and external diplomatic ones.    
 
In general, the research on the Intifada hasten to emphasize its spontaneity 
(see Schiff & Ya’ari 1990), this does not mean that grassroots leadership and 
PLO were distant from its actual events. On the contrary, the local leadership 
of the Intifada was in making, and already bethinking to inaugurate the 
confrontation with the Israeli occupation forces (see Bilal 2013).64 On the 
other hand, the PLO supported and later designed actual events on the 
ground (Habash 2009: 205). The PLO’s engagement was initially embodied in 
the formation of the Intifada’s United National General Command (IUNGC). 
Later, the IUNGC guided, ordered and above all supplied the events with 
specific contents and meanings. It also initiated a new apparatus called “strike 
squads” (al-majmu‘at al-dariba) to police and discipline those who do not 
follow the directions of the “struggle programme” (al-barnamij al-nidali).  
 
Furthermore, a communicative mechanism known as al-manashir (plural of 
manshwr, a flyer in English) re-appeared with further political purpose than 
before (Mishal & Aharoni 1994). As the leadership of the IUNGC led by Khalil 
Al-Wazir, best known as Abu-Jihad, was in exile and thus physically far away 
from the actual events, al-manashir constituted a communication platform for 
the PLO to articulate its plans, instructions, frameworks and give orders to 
local people. The IUNGC, “striking squads” and al-manashir were the key 
                                            
64 According to Dr Adnan Maswady’s memoir (one of the key founders of Hamas in Palestine) 
the local members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine began debating and organizing a 
confrontation strategy against the Israeli occupation force around mid-1980s. On 23 October 
1987, the founder of what later became know as Hamas decided to take practical 
confrontation measures (see Bilal 2013: 96-101). 
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linking points between peoples of the Intifada and those in exile. Seeing it 
from this angle, the Intifada offered an opportunity for the PLO with its political 
vision to establish tangible links with the potential constituents. What is far 
more significant at this point of time is a concrete authoritative relationship 
that was established between the PLO politics and events on a Palestinian 
land for the first time in its history. And it turned out that not only the PLO’s 
guidelines and orders articulated in the manashir were performed on the 
ground, but also they were received with wide popular participation. The link 
between the PLO and the public found its way, and the West Bank and Gaza 
became the new geopolitical site for the PLO discourse. Since then the PLO’s 
focus has shifted from outside to inside. At any rate, the Intifada provided the 
necessary nexus between outside/inside Palestinians.   
 
The IUNGC distributed about 100 flyers between 1998-1993. Apparently, the 
flyers’ theme and format did not vary much. It always begins with the refrain 
“no voice loader than the voice of the intifada” (la sawt ya‘lw fawqa sawt al-
intifada), and then it praises and hails the people (yaa jamahir…) into three 
things: the political programme of the PLO, a brief political analysis, general 
guidelines and ends with an action-plan for a week or two.  
 
At first, the political programme was clearly stated and re-stated in every flyer 
in a successive order as follows: right to return, self-determination and an 
independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza “under the 
leadership of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people everywhere”. Expressing the PLO’s representation of the Palestinian 
people was especially acute during the 1987 Intifada as a response to the 
American and Arab regimes’ efforts to outmaneuver the PLO (see Abu-Sharif 
2009: ch.23). Therefore, the phrase “the sole legitimate representative” was 
underlined in every flyer and statement. To emphasize its leadership further, 
the PLO staged a “strike under the slogan: ‘no alternative to the PLO our sole 
legitimate representative’ ” (Flyer no.10), and also stressing the PLO’s 
exclusive entitlement “to manage the conflict and Political solution” (Flyer 
no.34).  
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The building block of the political message was as follows: Intifada + 
consonants (or unchanging political rights) + national + rights + return + self-
determination + independent state + East (or Arab) Jerusalem. This order is 
succinctly expressed in the opening paragraph of one of the flyers: 
To the masses of our great people ... your victorious Intifada is escalating day 
after another, and attaining one achievement after another. It is going forward in 
an unyielding courage and stable unity in the struggle while holding on the 
consonants [al-thawabt] of the Palestinian national action exemplified in our 
people’s national [1] rights in return, [2] self-determination and [3] the 
independent state over its national soil with Arab Jerusalem as its capital… 
(Flyer no. 22, emphasis added) 
 
A correlation was made between the Intifada and a Palestinian statehood on 
parts of Palestine, of course. According to Habash  (2009: 205) the 
Palestinian state has become “a very realistic possibility.” From the beginning, 
the discourse imbued with statist concepts gave the Intifada a function and 
lever to champion the pursuit of state  (i.e. to catch this “possibility”). Husayni 
explains this way of thinking very well:  “Now we have strength behind us. We 
are relying on the Intifada. We can now face the Israelis and say what we 
want. If they ask us to stop the Intifada we will say no. Before, when we met 
with them we had nothing to say, only to beg.” (Husayni 1989: 14) 
 
Consolidating the idea of the Palestinian national rights was the key message 
of the thirty-odd flyers circulated during 1988. The flyer-mechanism served as 
a vehicle to migrate the referential political discourse in the form of repetitive 
citation of UN resolutions, UN, Security Council and political initiatives in the 
form of “rejection,” “denunciation” or “calling on” certain action, or calling for 
the convening of an “international conference” into the public discourse in the 
West Bank and Gaza. The general message of the flyers validates the 
“political solution,” and therefore, increased the legitimacy and political status 
of the PLO on Palestinian land. But there is something broader to say here: 
framing the Intifada through a matrix of referentiality and PLO politics led to 
  163 
socialization en masse in the West Bank and Gaza, with which we are familiar 
with in hindsight.65    
 
Usually the “action-plan” or “struggle programme” sets a range of activities 
and request from the public to carry them out in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Every day was linked with particular schedule. Most of the activities were 
attuned to resonate with the cultural and historical significance of a certain 
day or period; and even certain days were given additional names to convey 
nationalist and struggle sentiments (e.g., the martyr day, the PLO day, the flag 
day, declaration of independence day). The “struggle programme” decreed 
the following: throwing stones at the settlers and occupation soldiers, strikes, 
shop-closure (allowed to open only 2-3 hours daily), abstaining from paying 
taxes and bails, road-closure (by rocks, burned vehicles’ tiers, nails, etc.), 
dissolving local municipal and council committees, resignation from posts in 
the Israeli civil administration and police, writing on the walls and signing it 
with the IUNCC or PLO, raising the Palestinian flag over the minarets, 
electricity cables and houses, raising the picture of the “brother and the 
leader” Arafat, defying curfews, boycott al-Nahar newspaper, public boycott of 
Israeli goods, and participating in “loud public demonstration while chanting 
‘with our soul and blood we sacrifice ourselves for the martyr … with our soul 
and blood we sacrifice ourselves for Palestine’ .” Moreover, the IUNGC 
approached the middle class with demands in line with their professions (e.g., 
taxi and buss drivers, pharmacists, doctors, merchants, tradesmen, 
academics, teachers, peasants, workers in Israel) (see Flyer no.1-30).  
 
As the Intifada’s first year came to a close, especially after the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence in November 1988 in Algiers, the flyers’ central 
message began to fuse “statist” and “diplomatic” language together more 
                                            
65 Hamas, the biggest rival of the PLO politics, has gradually endorsed referentiality and 
statist discourse in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, especially after 2006 election. The 
Head of Hamas Political Bureau Khalid Mashal articulated this position unequivocally in an 
interview with Christine Amanpour on 21 November 2012. 
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vigorously, and since that date, every flyer was signed by the phrase 
“Palestine State” (Flyer no.31). The Declaration and “peaceful solution” of the 
conflict were constructed as “a causal outcome of the Intifada and sacrifice 
and new reality on the political map,” however this “new” reality was managed 
to augur well for the PLO’s diplomatic framework, which involves a 
“Palestinian independent state and calling for just peace…” (Flyer no. 45) 
Therefore, the Declaration was assembled at a critical juncture to rally the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza by “celebrating the declaration of 
independence” and “a step on the way of announcing a real independence.” 
(Flyer no.29; 30) Notice how provisional thinking employed to justify the gap 
between a “declaration” of independence (i.e. symbolic) and “real” 
independence to the public. 
 
The political statements put the Intifada in a linear dependency relationship 
with the struggle, occupation and an independent Palestinian state. For 
example, in 1989 Palestinian officials sent a memorandum to the US 
Assistant Secretary of State to explain (their self-imaged) message of the 
Intifada as the, “rejection of, and resistance to, the Israeli occupation of our 
land and oppression of our people” (G.27 1989: 346). Meanwhile, the end of 
the occupation was constructed to signify an end of the struggle, and hence a 
beginning of the state. The following examples illustrate: “continue the 
struggle until the regress of the occupation” (Flyer no.11), “the popular armed 
struggle until realizing the independent Palestinian state” (Flyer no.10), “the 
struggle path is the tested and credible path to drive out the occupation” (Flyer 
no.11, 10, & 13 respectively). 
 
The occupation-struggle exclusive correlation overshadowed other aspect of 
the struggle and confines it to limited spatial and demographic entities. I have 
showed in earlier chapters how the meaning and purpose of “the struggle” 
evolved in the Palestinian political thinking. This official understanding of the 
struggle co-opted the Intifada and delimited its goals to “regress” or “drive out” 
the occupation and replace it with a Palestinian state. It is worthwhile to 
observe what is present and what is omitted in the above statements. The 
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usage of the word “occupation” draws the spatial boundary of the conflict 
within 22 percent of historical Palestine; meanwhile phrases that signify the 78 
percent are absent. Moreover, this formation excludes the future of the 
refugees and Palestinians in Israel form self-determination. In other words, it 
excludes about 70 percent of the Palestinian population. As a result, the 
discourse of the Intifada is territorialized within the West Bank and Gaza.  
 
The litany of the state-laden vocabulary is usually articulated in conjunction 
with the referential regime and diplomatic peaceful solutions. For example, the 
PLO argued in one of the flyers for  
 
a serious work to formulate a clear and decisive political plan that guarantees 
our people’s inviolable national rights in line with the requirements of the 
current phase and able to deal with the international community while clinging 
to realize peace based on justice in the region and solving our cause honorably. 
(Flyer no.28, emphasis added).  
 
Another flyer explained the “political plan” as a “Palestinian peace aggression  
… to force Israel to accept the international will in convening an international 
conference.” (Flyer no.31, emphasis added) The curious antagonistic binary 
like “peace/aggression, force/accept is mainly of a rhetorical purpose. 
 
The terminology of peace, negotiation and dialogue infiltrated the discourse 
and modulated the articulation of the struggle to be more amenable to 
negotiation. As a result, the purpose of the struggle was transformed again 
from “ending the occupation” to a “struggle for peace” (Flyer no.66), “struggle 
to achieve just and permanent peace” (Flyer no.85). “Peace” began to be a 
theme in the weekly “struggle programme” in late 1989 as put in Flyer number 
46: “21st October is a general strike to protest against Shamir’s [the former 
Israeli Prime Minister 1986-1992] plan and to underline commitment to the 
Palestinian peace plan”. And since then, the mission has become “to find the 
required political solution and reach a just peace” and a “comprehensive and 
balanced solution” (Flyer no.52). 
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Liberation, the initial dominator of the struggle as I have explained in Chapters 
3 and 4, disappeared altogether from the linguistic equation. Since mind 
1980s, expressions like “ending the occupation,” “honorable solution” and 
“peace and settlement” replaced liberation. With the arrival of “the political 
battle”, “peace aggression” and similar configurative tropes, the armed and 
popular struggle manifestations in the Intifada were relegated and diminished 
in seeking to open up the space for diplomatic actions, represented in the 
guise of confrontation metaphor (e.g., aggression, battle, wage) to regenerate 
the psychological nuances of the “revolutionary spirit” accumulated since 
1960s. Such metaphorical expressions give moral and “revolutionary” capital 
to the political solutions. According to the IUNGC 
The IUNGC knows well that a just and comprehensive solution for the 
Palestinian question will not be achieved through future dialogue and negotiation 
in isolation to the struggle on the ground, which represents the spearhead of the 
political activity. But also the struggle on the ground alone will not achieve this 
solution without waging the political battle; these two directions are organically 
connected. (Flyer no.70, June 1991, emphasis added) 
 
The PLO constituted the Intifada’s political purpose in a way that accedes with 
the two-state solution as follows: Israel to withdraw from the Palestinian and 
Arab occupied land since 1967 including Arab Jerusalem; abolishing all 
annexations and removing the settlements; put the occupied Palestinian land 
under the UN supervision; and convening an international conference with the 
UN supervision (Flyer no.26). And it articulated the two-state solution as “not 
a free concession, but rather a realistic, revolutionary and responsible 
representation that put an end for the Zionist’s lies about the goals of our 
successful revolution, and it put an end to the suffering of our people inside 
and outside… our forthcoming state is for all Palestinians” (Flyer no.29, 
emphasis added). This implies that, first, any other solution is unrealistic, 
unrevolutionary and irresponsible; and second, the refugees’ “return” is 
something to be addressed within the supposed Palestinian state. 
 
There are important observations that should not be underestimated. First, the 
constant decrease in the number of flyers distributed each year (1988:31, 
1989:19, 1990:15, 1991:10, 1992:12, 1993:10). If flyers were the key medium 
of communication between the PLO’s leadership and the public, cutting back 
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on flyers could be interpreted, perhaps with hindsight, as a sign of a PLO lack 
of interest in concrete acts and a further concern with diplomacy. Arafat called 
on the Palestinians to end the Intifada and “to take part in the steps leading to 
the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace 
and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic 
development and cooperation.” (I.1.2: 142) Second, with the transformation 
from “rights”, to “state” and finally to “peace”, the PLO demands from the 
Palestinians decreased in general, and requests of violent escalations 
disappeared in particular. Third, flyers’ language embraced nationalistic and 
mainly secular phrases; it was free of religious citations (contra Hamas and 
the Islamic Jihad). Finally, there is a clear assimilation of concepts and 
expressions loaded with geographic and demographic divisions of Palestine. 
Expressions like “the Palestinian occupied land”, “our people inside [Israel]”, 
“our people behind the green line” (Flyer no.4), “inside the 48” (Flyer no.42), 
and “the IUNGC in the occupied territories” are representative examples. 
Internalizing such concepts indicates acceptance of the status quo, “reality” 
and being “realistic” about it.  
 
 
In conclusion, it may be worth restating the broader rules of formations we 
have encountered thus far in Part II. The first and second rules are drawn 
from the metaphorical meaning loaded in the word an-Nakba. First, an-Nakba 
events put an end to the physical link between Palestine and the Palestinians. 
These events became a touchstone in the Palestinian discourse that at once 
disconnects and connects the social orders in-and-out Palestine and before-
and-after an-Nakba. From now on, the new discursive order has constituted 
Palestine through its parts, Palestine as an “imagined totality” was 
discontinued. This opened the space for different articulations, concepts, 
spatial mapping, identities, and new of forms of struggle and politics to 
appear.  
 
The second rule has to do with the pursuit of a solution. By and large, finding 
a solution to restore the links between Palestine and the Palestinians 
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organized the post-1948 discourse. Several scenarios evolved since then, 
they include the liberation of entire Palestine, democratic state for all and a 
state of any part of Palestine, which finally transformed into the two-state 
solution. All of this transpired after deep adjustments and even disappearance 
of central orienting concepts in the discourse.  
 
The third rule organized the order after 1948 through process of socialization, 
referentiality and temporary and provisional thinking style. Any arrangement 
since an-Nakba was articulated as a temporary and provisional one until a 
final solution is reached (liberation and return). However, the provisional 
horizon became self-fulfilling and the norm. In the meantime, the practice of 
referentiality, drawing back to a wide range of political, diplomatic and legal 
statements, invited new styles and concepts into the purview of circulated 
articulation. Referentiality, best captured by the phrase “Arab and 
International legitimacy” (al-shar‘iyya al-‘arabiyya wa al-dawliyya), became the 
source for stipulating and deriving discursive material. In short, international 
and Arab interpretation of the question of Palestine reigned over the 
understanding of the Palestinian “national rights.” These rights were linked 
and derived from unstable and changing reference points. The power-
relations are embedded in the referential rule itself and they flowed in one 
direction. The problem is therefore not a strong/week dichotomy but a system 
of power differential.
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 Part III  
 
 
This part of the dissertation takes key selected documents from the Israel-
Palestine peace process record and the ‘Palestine Papers’ as a text for 
interpretative analysis. This wide range of textual material shares a common 
theme that represents the official Palestinian political communication with the 
Israeli counterpart.  
 
While examining this material I am trying to continue to uncover the internal 
rules of formations and logics of the Palestinian political discourse. Moreover, 
I attempt to analyze how this discourse continued to evolve and change since 
early 1990s. Indeed, since 1991 the Palestinian political discourse became in 
a direct relationship and exchange with the Israeli occupation discourse. I also 
examine how the occupied internalizes from the discourse of its occupier. 
With this question in mind, the analysis explains how discursive 
transformations and internalization reshape the Palestinian perception of 
Palestine and the question of Palestine. 
 
Here is a brief overview of the main findings of this part. First, metaphor from 
different regimes of thought have intersected and produced new discursive 
material, deferred and discontinued others; second, an embedded motion 
metaphor in peace-building processes in general, and the Israel-Palestine 
peace process in particular, has structured the Palestinian discourse for the 
last two decades; third, logic of division has made it possible to replace 
Palestine as an imagined totality by several divisions; fourth, the realist-
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liberalist understanding of peace has played a significant role in shaping and 
setting priorities for Palestinian discourse. This realist-liberalist version of 
peace develops into two main rules: peace as security and the market logic; 
both logics have played a central role in orienting the ways in which each 
divided part is modulated. Together, the last three hypotheses have reduced 
the complexity of the Palestinian question to fairly abstract and logarithmic 
simulacra.  
 
To mention briefly three methodological points, firstly, while discourse does 
not consist of ready-made documents, but needs to be analytically 
constructed based on the visible and invisible relations and linkages that 
make articulation possible. Once these relations are constructed, they provide 
an analytical lens for re-reading the textual content afresh. Therefore, the 
methodological basis of this part involves a double reading of the same text. 
The primary reading is concerned with the construction of analytical relations, 
regimes of thought and rules of formations as discussed in the methodology 
chapter. The discoveries and perspectives of the first reading inform the 
second reading which is more concerned with the performativity of discourse.  
 
Secondly, key junctures can be used methodologically to organize the 
analysis. They also help to put discourse within a contextual framework, both 
spatially and temporally, especially when the case study is stretched over a 
long period of time where many factors are involved. However, these 
junctures do not exist in themselves, but they are constructed as such through 
numerous practices. The signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993 
between the PLO and Israel is constituted as a key juncture. This construction 
is a product of various discourses: (1) a prior discourse about peace 
negotiations since 1988 until the Oslo channel came out to the public; (2) 
during the signing, which includes indirect meanings derived from what the 
place (in the White House garden) represents, the ceremony, media, live 
steaming, and direct articulations in speeches of politicians who pronounced 
the event as a “key junction”, “a new dawn” and “a new history”; (3) the 
discourse and concrete acts that followed after the event itself. Given this 
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background, this part of the dissertation is analytically structured on the 
juncture of the Declaration of Principles and tries to analyze the discursive 
development around it.  
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 8  
Peace from within the ‘Process’: A Metaphorical Conceptual 
System  
 
Deferral in Motion  
Before going any further, it is worthwhile recalling the emotional status of the 
Palestinian leadership that became embroiled in the peace process. This 
leadership regarded the Palestinians’ achievement as deeply ephemeral and 
volatile. “The accomplishments which the Palestinians achieved as individuals 
or collectives resemble tall buildings without ceilings, or decoration trees 
without deep roots, vulnerable to be easily pulled out from their places. This 
reinforced the dream of return which has been enriched by powerful feelings 
of dispossession and lack of citizenship in exile.” (Abu-Alaa 2005: 18) This 
psychological consciousness underlies the transitional and temporary 
thinking.  
 
The idea of “transitional” agreements and understandings that may “lead to” a 
Palestinian self-determination is consonant with the Palestinian “interim”66 
thinking in the pursuit of a solution since An-Nakba. It resonates at different 
levels of Palestinian society. For instance, the leadership of the West Bank 
and Gaza declared, “Any phases in the peace process must be clearly 
designated as interim stages in an overall process, with internal coherence 
and causality logic, leading to the defined objective of independence and 
statehood, security, and genuine regional stability and development.” (G.37 
1991, emphasis added)  
 
                                            
66 This is not to say that all Palestinians have endorsed the “transitional” thinking, however, it 
has been dominant among the representative leadership. For example, the PLO went further 
and proposed a model of a “Palestinian interim self-governing authority” (H25 1992: 59). 
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Indeed, since the late 1980s, the PLO saw the solution in a negotiated peace 
deal with Israel, as shown earlier. The general transitional thinking mood was 
again put into concrete political outcomes. The PLO’s situation was articulated 
as “revolutionary reality” (al-waqi‘ al-thawri), implying an historical link 
between the PLO’s discourse of the 1960s and self-perception, and the 
concrete diplomatic approach it has followed. The subject-position of 
revolutionaries is juxtaposed with “the possible” and the “real” to constitute the 
“realistic revolutionaries” (al-thawriyyuwn al-waqi‘iyyuwn) subject. The 
“possible” and “real” is constructed as evolving temporally in phases. From 
this perspective, the PLO adopted the “burning phases method” (manhajiyyat 
harq al-marahil), step-by-step, to break the Israeli “NOs” and “register 
precedence” (tasjil sabiqa) (Abu-Alaa 2005: 19). Meanwhile, diplomacy and 
negotiation were represented as “the only possible” way forward and “a 
compulsory corridor” (Ibid. 29; 44).  
 
The process to reach such a deal has been actualized through diplomatic 
rituals in multiple series of negotiation meetings, declarations, summits, 
conferences, exchange of letters, speeches, and so forth. These rituals were 
named the “peace process”. The phrase, “peace process”, links two different 
and contested concepts: peace and a process.  Peace belongs to the realm of 
ideas and therefore it is an interpretation and means different things to 
different people. Meanwhile, the realist-liberalist perspective on peace 
dominates peacebuilding imagination and blueprints. The realist-liberalist 
peace unfolds in a calculative “inner” motion in the automata called process. 
These automata have officially been fuelled with self-perpetuating rituals since 
the Madrid Conference in 1991, both in secret and in public.67 The metaphor 
in the word process, as a calculated and mechanized series of events, 
bestowed an analytical context and guidance to the practical actions of peace 
agents. 
 
                                            
67 The Israeli Government and the PLO negotiated publicly in Washington after Madrid 
Conference, whereas a secret negotiation channel was initiated in early 1993 in Oslo. 
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Building on the realist-liberalist ‘rational’ calculations of peace, the period that 
followed the Declaration of Principles in September 1993 was constituted and 
imagined even before it had begun. For the Palestinians, the Declaration of 
Principles represented “a new journey towards a new future” and a moment 
where “peace has started” (I.1: 141, 11).  Oslo Accords “put our people at the 
onset of the road towards independence and the establishment of the entity 
and glory [al-kayan wa al-majd]” (Abu-Alaa 2005: 14). Similarly, the Israelis 
perceived themselves as embarking on “a new journey... [and a] new dawn” 
(I.1: 141, 11). Peace agents positioned themselves in a “moving process”; 
however, each side contemplated a completely different direction of the 
upcoming journey. On the one hand, the Palestinians conceived themselves 
as part of a process “leading to”, and “towards”, their statehood and self-
determination on the part of mandatory Palestine.  On the other hand the 
Israelis saw a process “leading to” an “arrangement” to the Palestinian issue 
and an opportunity to maximize security and a continued hegemony (Ben-Ami 
2006).68  
 
Motion logic directed reason, order and priorities. Essentially, the process was 
divided into two sequential phases: first, a “transitional period leading to a 
permanent settlement based on the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338” (I.4: article 1: 145, 12). Everything in this “transitional” phase was 
unstable and negotiable, and hence transpired a mixture of kinetic and 
ambiguous terminology to guide behavior. For example, authority, land, 
military forces were rendered “transferable”, this was coded in agreements as 
follows: “orderly transfer of authority from Israel”, “Israeli will withdraw and re-
deploy its forces”, “dissolve its Civil Administration”, “the Palestinian Authority 
will assume executive authority in the area of responsibilities transferred to it” 
in a piecemeal style (H.25: 59). The principle of “moving forward” justified a 
re-categorization of particular central issues as “final status”, “complicated” 
                                            
68 The Oslo Accords including Paris Economic Protocol have effectively institutionalized the 
Israeli hegemony over the Palestinians. For thorough critique of Oslo Accords see Edward 
Said, The End of the Peace Process, 2001. 
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issues and an impediment to progress and movement. Therefore, they (final 
status issues and self-determination) needed to be postponed and deferred.  
 
Meanwhile, such a moving process is supposed to usher a subsequent 
“permanent” and static phase. Motion would end when all “outstanding issues” 
were settled. The diplomatic record is awash with motion figures of speech. 
As discussed in the first chapter, these metaphors have functional purposes 
and orientations to which politicians are not necessarily conscious of. To 
illustrate the point I am attempting to make here about how the concept of 
motion guided the peacemaking framework, it is worth citing, at some length, 
extractions from the peace agents’ statements (notice added emphasis): 
 
I have been filled with faith that the arduous trek on the long path of pain will 
end in our home’s yard … to take the first steps in the battle, the battle of peace,  
(Arafat J.9: 236: 21)  
 
Because peace requires concerted action, the parties agreed to explore practical 
steps in the political, economic, security, and human dimension... to accelerate 
negotiations on all tractions” (J.13: 239: 22). The peace process is the only path 
to security and peace for Israel, the Palestinians and neighbouring states. (K.5: 
275: 24)  We have return to the path of peace along which they have already 
traveled so far. (K.20: 294: 26)  For three years now, the Israelis and the 
Palestinians have been moving forward along the path to a lasting peace.  (K.24: 
297: 26) 
 
This [Hebron] agreement represents an important step on the road towards a just 
and stable peace (K.44: 321) … leaders agreed that the Oslo peace process must 
move forward to succeed. (K.46: 322)  Hebron agreement is “an important step 
towards ... using the momentum created by the Hebron agreement  (L:1).  
 
 we’ve obviously made remarkable strides… put the peace process back on track 
(L14: .342)…. We will be talking … about how best to move forward. And we 
will look for the ways to do that.”  (L.14: 342) …  
 
put peace negotiations back on track… The next step in the process (L14: 343)… 
the peace process was back on the track (L.10: 338) to get the peace process 
back on track. We have been pushing very much (L.24: 355).  
 
Israelis and Palestinians in Oslo opened the path to their peaceful coexistence... 
It is time to take concerts steps towards a lasting peace.” (L28: 357)…. we think 
there should be positive steps forward by both the Palestinians and the Israel to 
reignite the peace process and to reengineer peace negotiations. (L.14: 343)   
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to create thrusting force in order to achieve a breakthrough and move the 
negotiation process … pushing Israel to realize what remains from the short 
distance on way to sit with the PLO … linking between stages in order not to be 
frozen phase but a moving and gradual one towards the final situation … the 
latent thrusting power  in the peace process (Abu-Alaa 2005: 114; 169; 332). 
 
The Palestinian national “rights” were transformed into “outstanding issues”, 
“permanent status issues” (qadaya al-hal al-da’im) and “core issues”. The 
nature of these “issues” has to be processed and determined within the 
automata of peace, namely, the rituals of peacemaking. These rituals were 
constituted as the “only way” and the “only option” for resolving the conflict 
and generating peace.  
 
Once the process is put in motion, a considerable institutional and structural 
power flows via discourse to keep it going. Moving “forward”, “progress” and 
“momentum” are hierarchically superior than their implied opposite (backward, 
reactionary, motionless). Therefore, taking measures to “save”, “protect” and 
“revive” the process per se appear ethically defensible and desirable 
(Doc.2100; 1451; 1440). The pacemakers “endeavor to save the peace 
process, to protect it and to put it back on track” (L.10: 339), ensure its 
“irreversibility” justified various sorts of (violent) actions which were articulated 
as procedures to “combat all acts that aim to destroy the peace process, 
particularly terrorism and violence, and to stand staunchly against and put an 
end to all such acts.” (J.13: 239: 22, emphasis added) The effect of this 
understanding has re-regulated the relationship between the occupied and 
occupier through a judicial and institutional construct. It has also produced 
new binary categories in Palestinian society such as, pro/anti-Oslo, 
with/against the PA, violent/non-violent, resistance/compromise, lawful/ 
fugitive, pragmatic/ideological, realistic/unrealistic, and so forth, which led to a 
further Palestinian political disintegration. 
 
The other half of the binary is always indicating an anti-peace force and thus 
an obstacle to progress. Impeding the movement of the peace process by 
being “un-pragmatic” and “unrealistic” seemed to be worth the blame and 
punishment. Anything that does not fit this system of peace construed as 
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“endanger[ing] peace and stability” (I.2: 142, 11). To realize a “future of 
peace, security and stability” requires that the peacemakers be at once 
worriers who, “continue to combat terror” and peace agents who, “pave the 
way for a Palestinian-Israeli future devoid of terror and violence” (K.1: 271: 24, 
emphasis added). The uncertainty in the internal dynamics of motion has 
always been overtaken by self-assuring presuppositions elicited from the 
realist-liberalist peace-building paradigm. For example, when someone states 
that “the process is put on track”, s/he presupposes the existence of the track 
and that such a track is (supposedly) leading to peace.  
 
It is important to explicate how and in what ways positive notions of motion 
produced particular conceptions of peace, and how certain practical measures 
were justified. Generally speaking, peace appeared in the image of an object 
undergoing constant motion and transformation. It is something that “grows”, 
is “entrenched”, is “built”; it requires a “solid basis” and “material conditions”. It 
has “enemies” and “friends”; it is also precarious and in continued danger and 
risk from the “enemies of peace”. Subsequently, peace-builders must 
undertake two opposite acts: to “build and protect” and “combat and 
eliminate”. There is “no real peace without security and stability. The parties 
declared that they are committed to combat all acts that aim to destroy the 
peace process, particularly terrorism and violence, and to stand staunchly 
against and put an end to all such acts.” (I.13 1995: 239) Peace is therefore 
constructed as being contingent upon security. Let us now leave the 
discussion on the peace/security nexus and its impact on the Palestinian 
discourse at this level since more will be said on this later.  
 
Such perceptions of peace at the cross lines of building/destroying stimulated 
the construction of a “non-peace” subject-position which functions as a 
constitutive other. The “enemies of peace” (the other) stand in competition 
with the “alliance for peace”. It has also informed the action and embedded 
forces of “destruction” and “violence” on the menu of the “required” elements 
for peacemaking. Besides “promot[ing] security and stability” peace agents 
must also “prevent the enemies of peace from achieving their ultimate 
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objective of destroying the real opportunity for peace” (J.26 1996). The pursuit 
of peace bifurcated violence into two types: one from within, which is never 
constituted as violence but a “legitimate” and “required” act. The other type is 
automatically classified into violence and terrorism. Hence the “alliance for 
peace” is founded on a premise that does “not allow anti-peace forces to 
prevail” (Alliance for Peace, L.4 1997: 331). “The enemies of peace are 
purposefully and relentlessly attacking Israel. So that war against terror being 
waged by those who support the path of peace.” (Albright L.31 1997: 365, 
emphasis added) The confused and ambiguous notions of “enemy” and 
“violence” contested the nature of peace.  If “violence serves the enemies of 
peace”, as the European Parliament declared, then how is it possible that 
violent acts carried out in the name of peace do not serve the enemies? In 
reality, the peace process gave violence form and validity as a means to 
“save”, “protect” and “put the peace process on the tract” (K.2 1996: 273; L.10 
1997: 339). This analytical bifurcation with its prior well-received framework of 
legitimate/illegitimate and builders/destroyers binary interprets which acts 
merit the name, ‘violence’ or ‘non-violence’. This is intimately corroborates the 
construction of an internal Palestinian other as I shall argue in later chapters.  
 
Additionally, the representation of peace as motion swept through the 
discourse of donors and funders of the peace process. For example, EU 
policymakers circulated the same motion-laden tropes such as: “rule of the 
road for the negotiating process” (EU L.28 1997: 360), “rowing together in the 
direction of security”, “put the peace process back on track”, “restore 
momentum, ... accelerating permanent status negotiations” (EU L.28 1997: 
361-2). While having these motion schemata in mind, certain actions were 
articulated as “obstacles” to peace. It informed and intercepted the UN legal 
judgment. For instance, a UN resolution called the Jewish-only settlements in 
the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza “illegal and a major obstacle to peace” 
(L.6 1997: 333). These enunciations blur the line between international law 
and the peace process, and put the latter on a par with international law.  
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The “process” of peace coincided with another “process” to govern motion. 
The latter process has direct impacts on the spatial sphere of the Palestinian 
representatives and institutions. The Israeli policy began building the matrix of 
control, whether in agreements or on the ground, before the PLO’s arrival at 
the West Bank and Gaza to constrain and dominate the latter’s spatial 
horizon. It may be useful here to analyze, briefly, this process of control and 
the degree of Palestinian internalization because this is the area from which 
the Palestinian representatives operated since 1994.  
 
This matrix of control regulates movement over the two sides of the “Green” 
or Armistice Line. The West Bank (of the Jordan River) designation has been 
established in the Palestinian discourse to encounter the ideological 
designation, “Judea and Samaria”, and “territories” in the official and everyday 
Israeli discourse (Shenhav 2007). How to regulate movement flow became a 
conundrum. After all, Israel wants to maintain an uninterrupted ‘Jewish’ 
movement between what is, and what is not, “Judea and Samaria”, and to 
simultaneously regulate the Palestinian spatial existence. This conundrum 
was addressed through policy of spatial ambiguity. The elusive term, 
territories (shtahim in Hebrew), became hegemonic in designating the areas 
inhabited by Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Therefore, a new 
system guided by an ethno-religious binary, Jewish/non-Jewish, has emerged 
to regulate motion.  
 
The motion control apparatus have been in constant development since 1991. 
The Israeli authorities devised and enforced the permit system over the 
Palestinians who hold orange (later green) identification documents in 
accordance with the Israeli-controlled population registry. The Israeli 
authorities define the criteria (age, gender, material status, intelligence record, 
etc.) for the individual in order to be entitled to such permit. Israel, thus, sets 
the conditions for the possibility of moving on two accounts: first, by defining 
the spatial boundaries for those who were given movement permits, and 
second, by shrinking the spatial domain of those who do not meet the criteria. 
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The ratification of the Oslo Accords generated a “new reality” which justified 
“creating a mechanism that facilitates the entry and exit of people and goods, 
reflecting the new reality” (I.13 1994: 157, emphasis added). The term to 
“facilitate” warranted procedures that have deepened and sophisticated the 
structure of control. It was already obvious that the control “mechanism” is not 
intended to “facilitate”, therefore the counting on “modern procedures” for 
moral validation is as follows: “The two sides are determined to do their 
utmost to maintain the dignity of persons passing through the border 
crossings. To this end, the mechanism created will rely heavily on brief and 
modern procedures.” (Ibid. emphasis added) This system had been in place 
before the arrival of the PLO and its related institutions. It has strategically 
“regulated” the movement of the Palestinian leadership and institutionalized it 
in the form of “given” (and thus withdrawn) “special arrangements” and VIP 
entitlements.   
 
Moreover, policies of spatial reorganization were carried out to further 
movement control and oversight. A new net of roads was designed to achieve 
a fluid movement for Israelis (mainly Jewish) and the degradation of the 
Palestinian possibility to move. Or indeed, establishing hierarchical order 
based on ethno-religious identities. Every Palestinian urban area was 
generically codified as an “Area”, and summed into “Areas”69 in harmony with 
the Israeli concept of “territories”. At the entrance of every Palestinian city, 
village or camp there is a red sign (ca. 1.5 square meters) characterizing the 
area behind it and movement regulations. The sign says: “A Palestinian area 
A, No entry for Israelis —entry into this area is a violation of the [Israeli] law.” 
Ironically, there is no equivalent sign on areas designated exclusively for non-
Palestinians (i.e., Jewish settlements). Additionally, ethno-religious-based 
roads and border/checkpoint crossings (e.g., “Palestinian wing” and “Israel 
wing”) coupled with colonially defined privileges (e.g., “Special arrangements 
                                            
69 According to Paris Protocol the term areas “means the areas under the jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian Authority” (Paris Protocol 1994: 163). This entails that the Palestinian leadership 
endorsed the all out codification of the Palestinian urban areas into “Areas”.  
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will apply VIPs crossing through the Palestinian Wing”70 (I.13 1994: 158)) 
have prevailed since the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Palestinian leadership 
endorsed, normalized and internalized the Israeli domination and control so 
long as it remains “in an invisible manner”, behind “tinted glass”, with an 
“indirect and invisible Israeli checking” (Ibid. 158-9) and in absolute secrecy 
(Doc.2702).  
 
Discourse is not something coherent and without contradictions; on some 
occasions, the Palestinians resisted the secretive styles. For example, the 
Palestinians preferred pure occupation (“In this case we prefer occupation”) 
as a response to an Israeli insistence on codifying the Israeli oversight, “We 
insist on some Israeli ‘stuff’ [on borders]; but maybe we can hide it” (Doc.616, 
UD, SE respectively). 
 
Land, goods and people were re-characterized to fit in the crafted mechanism 
to control the “state of nature” in the West Bank and Gaza, so to speak. The 
Palestinians (in the West Bank and Gaza) were given new green-coloured 
identification documents, permits for movement and magnetic IDs. Land was 
virtually divided into areas A, B and C, the sea was divided into areas K, L 
and M, and goods were categorized into A1, A2 and B. The powerful side 
defined the criteria (e.g., area, quantity and type) and ensured a chronic 
dependency and underdevelopment (see Roy 2007).71 Under the guise of 
                                            
70 Another example of “given” privileges is exempting “the Palestinian returnees who will be 
granted permanent residency in the Areas from import taxes on personal belongings including 
house appliances and passenger cars as long as they are for personal use.” (Paris Protocol 
1994:166)  
71 Paris Protocol links and weighs the price of every product and services in the West Bank 
and Gaza with the Israeli market. For example, if the quantity of imported goods is classified 
into category A1 and A2, it the quantity exceeds “the agreed upon” limit the PA must charge 
no less than the Israeli purchase tax and levies. Israel has automatic veto power on the 
quantity and type of imported goods (“agreed upon”). Paris Protocol formalized Israel’s 
economic hegemony over the Palestinian market through different ways: using Israel’s 
currency, Israeli monopoly over customs, fixing Palestinian VAT (15-16%) at a similar rate to 
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“free trade economy” and “consolidate a foundation of free-market economy” 
(J.1 1994), the Palestinian economy was put in an unequal competition with 
the well-established Israeli economy.   
 
The Palestinian leadership has been a paradoxical “partner” divided between 
substantive achievements and symbolic gestures. For example, on the one 
hand, they have been asking for “settlement freeze”, while on the other hand, 
they have agreed to reap the “full amount of income tax collected from 
Palestinians” employed in the settlements, mainly in construction (Paris 
Protocol 1994, article v/b 1994: 168). Moreover, the Palestinians assumed the 
responsibility of protecting settlements: “the Palestinian side shall take all 
measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the 
settlements” (I.19 art. xviii, 1994: 179). The British military liaison officer took it 
for granted that NSF “concept of operation” includes the protection of Israeli 
settlements (Doc.308: article 14, B-3). Obviously, this implies an implicit 
illation that the Palestinians can tolerate the continuation of the Jewish-only 
settlements on the very area on which they aim to establish their own state 
on. Despite the sheer paradox between the unabated Israeli expansions that 
is at odds with the principle of, “land for peace”, the Palestinians continued to 
engage with the peace process. The Palestinian inconsistent behavior helped 
the Americans (among others) to downgrade their pleas, as George Mitchell 
puts it: “I have a 6 inch folder on my desk containing all your statements on 
the settlement freeze, and despite that you negotiated.” (Doc.4899) 
  
 
Old Conceptions Rethought 
This flow of metaphorical abstractions and, of course, the entailed actions 
have effects on key concepts in the Palestinian discourse. We should 
therefore ask about the meaning and position that particular organizing 
                                            
Israeli one (17%). Moreover, gasoline price is directly linked to the gasoline price in Israel, the 
difference in price should not exceed 15%, and of course this affect fright costs (ibid. 1994).  
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concepts, such as Palestine, liberation, return and resistance, gain in the new 
discursive flow.    
 
The preeminence of “transition and motion” rule intercepted the possibility of 
articulating and making interpretations. The possibility itself is constrained and 
negotiated through peace rituals. That is to say, self-imagination is not a 
reflection of the ‘self’ but rather a complex and an unfinished process of 
analysis, projections and re-projection founded on referentiality and peace 
rituals. These rituals became another constitutive substratum. The 
Palestinians positioned themselves in uncertain temporary settings during the 
“interim phase” in parts of the West Bank and Gaza (“Gaza-Jericho first”) 
while looking for opportunities via peace rituals for further spatial and status 
extension.  
 
Motion-ridden configurative tropes such as “transfer of jurisdiction”, 
“withdrawal of Israeli military government and its civil administration”, 
“withdrawal from all populated areas”, “withdrawal in mutually agreed phases 
to redeployment points along the borders of the occupied territories”, “further 
redeployment”, etc. (H.25 1992: 59-60) molded the nature of conceivable 
actions. Such tropes are entrenched in the (supposedly) peace-oriented 
Palestinian discourse; they gained primacy over revolutionary and self-
determination vocabulary. Thus, a new competing cause, “the cause of 
genuine peace”, emerged on the PLO’s agenda, which later substituted its 
original raison d’être as a liberation movement and expressed its goal to 
“support and advance the cause of genuine peace based on international 
legitimacy and justice.” (H.27 1992: 62) The PLO executive committee 
declared in the name of all Palestinians that: “Our brave people will remain 
determined on their aims and rights until just and honorable peace is 
attained...” (I.3 1993: 144, emphasis added) 
 
Substitution and discontinuation of “liberation rationale” in favor of the “cause 
of peace” (or an “honourable peace”) carried with it the possibility of 
reinterpreting the relationship between the occupied and occupier 
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(Palestinians and Israelis respectively). The occupied-occupier relationship 
was reproduced in the form of a dispute between two parties which needed to 
be settled through only direct negotiations: “We see no way for any dispute to 
be settled without direct talks between the parties to that dispute” (Abu-Sharif, 
G.8 1988: 310, emphasis added). In short, the order of replacement is like 
this: dispute replaced conflict (Doc.3597), before that, conflict had replaced 
occupation and the latter replaced conquest and imperialism, as shown in 
earlier chapters. Introducing the dispute relationship involves a difference of 
opinions about certain “outstanding issues”, less than a national cause, and a 
commitment to resolve “all outstanding issues … through negotiations” (I.2 
1993: 142). The term “outstanding issues” is deceiving as it misleadingly 
implies that, “other” issues were already resolved. This belittles the depth of 
problem.  
 
The “peaceful settlement” (al-taswiyya al-silmiyya) and the “dispute to be 
settled” (hal al-sira‘, hal al-niza‘) replaced the logic of liberation altogether. 
Such phrases explain the extent to which the Palestinians have internalized 
the Israeli formula for “self-government arrangements”, “coordination” and 
“self-rule” for the “inhabitants of the territories” whereby these inhabitants are 
given “an opportunity to run their own affairs in most spheres” (H.29: 1992: 
65, 6, emphasis added) or to “enable the Palestinians to administer their own 
affairs” (H.42 1992: 120, emphasis added). To internalize does not 
necessarily mean to accept, rather to go along with it as a fait accompli. To be 
sure, the Palestinian leadership drafted and approved a similar self-governing 
model that involves the establishment of a “new authority” to “enable the 
Palestinians to gain control over political, economic and other decisions that 
affect their lives and fate.” (H.32 1992: 73) The result of the practical 
measures taken to create a “new authority” with little administrative self-
governing arrangement has never been deliberated or critically analyzed. 
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Indeed, Oslo Accords define the scope of “spheres”72 in a functional and 
service-based way. Moreover, spheres-based agreement has decentralized 
the Palestinian authority vis-à-vis Israel into a mere direct “coordination” not 
only between the main Palestinian authority but also every authority-organ 
has its quasi-independent relations with Israel. Serious debate on possible 
ramifications was demoted in maintaining rhetorical devices, quickly 
contradicted by concrete practices, such as adherence to the national firm 
Palestinians rights, the new situation “does not in any way prejudice the 
exercise of their legitimate right to self-determination,” and so on (H.32 1992). 
 
 
 
Despite the change in the representative Palestinian discourse, the essence 
of the occupier-occupied relationship between Israel and Palestinians did not 
change much in reality. However, the peace process introduced an additional 
net of intermediary institutions (e.g., offices, centers, committees and sub-
committees73) to administer and run Palestinian affairs. So instead of 
terminating the institutions of the Israeli military government and its “civil” 
administration, which have been in place since 1967, the intermediaries 
                                            
72 September 1992, the Israeli Government led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin proposed the 
following 15 spheres: Administration of justice, administration of personal matters, Agriculture, 
Ecology, Education and Culture, Finance Budge and Taxation, Health, Social Welfare, 
Industry and Commerce Communication, Labor, Local police, Local transportation, Municipal 
affairs, Religious affairs, Tourism (H.41 1992). The Spheres “encompass nearly all aspect of 
the Palestinians’ daily life. Issues relating to security, foreign relations, Israeli and vital Israeli 
needs in the territories will remain in Israel’s hand in the framework of residual power.” (H.41 
1992: 99) Israel transferred authorities in the following spheres: “education and culture, 
health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and other authorities agreed upon.” (I.4 1993: 
149, article iv) Hanan Ashrawi declined this proposal.   
73 Examples: “Coordination”, “Liaison Office”, Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation 
Committee”, “Joint Regional Civil Affairs Sub-Committee”, “Maritime Coordination and 
Cooperation Center”, “Aviation Sub-Committee” and “Ministries”.  
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coexisted with them. In fact, the traditional occupation institutions 
“empowered” and “legitimized” the new intermediaries (J.6, article vi 1994).  
 
The intermediary institutional dispersion represents a schema for division and 
delegation of labor between existing and new institutions. So the entire act of 
managing the occupied Palestinians was redistributed afresh. The flow of 
information and power via intermediaries was given a new shape through 
mechanisms of “coordination”, “cooperation”, “liaison”, “communicate” and so 
forth. These mechanisms establish and service the micro-power relations that 
“monitor” and ensure the continuation of “exchange of information between 
the two sides” (I.19 1994, Annex I: 181; J.6 1994, article x, Annex iii). The 
control extends over dead as much as it does the living Palestinians; hence 
the PA is obliged to “inform the Civil Administration in a routine manner of 
birth or deaths” (J.6 Annex ii, 1994: 217). This allows traditional institutions of 
occupation to update their detailed information about its occupied subjects. It 
also, retrospectively, indicates a Palestinian participation and internalization of 
the primacy of the occupation institutions in determining and keeping track of 
who is Palestinian and who is not. The gist of these measures warrants an 
Israeli overarching in the new framework of Palestinian-run institutions.  
 
Instead of ending domination, the peace process furthered it by compelling 
the occupied to coordinated and cooperate with its occupier. The current 
Palestinian state of affairs is ordered by a Palestinian-Israeli relationship 
based on dependency and dominance over almost all imaginable domains 
(e.g., economy, military, jurisdiction, cultural sphere, etc.). 
 
Facts and indications gathered from the negotiation record and agreements 
between the PLO/PA and Israel are particularly telling. The relationship is 
codified into agreements and treaties that institutionalize the Israeli hegemony 
and dominance under the pretense of ambiguous formulas of “coordination”, 
“cooperation” and “state-to-state relation”. Security and economic relations 
are among the key arrangements that govern the Palestinian/Israeli 
relationship on the macro and micro-level. Security-wise, at the macro-level, 
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the PA/PLO has endorsed foreign tutelage composed of military bodies. They 
argued for “bilateral and regional security cooperation from Israel based on 
the principle of reciprocity and sovereign equality” and “strong international 
presence… under the leadership of the UN, NATO, US, EU, or a combination 
therefore” (Doc.2702, annex). It is not clear what “reciprocity and sovereign 
equality” means in a context of gigantic and powerful institutions.  
 
Co-operation or collaboration with Israel (al-ta‘awun ma‘ isra’il) used to be 
taboo in the Palestinian discourse. Palestinians executed many of their 
fellows on the ground of “al-ta‘awun”. With Oslo Accords and the Roadmap of 
2003 cooperation, especially security cooperation (al-ta‘awun al-amni) 
became systematic and customary. The prefix, “co-”, connotes a joint act and 
purpose, and moderates the psychological distance between involved parties 
and distorts the reality of the occupier-occupied relationship by representing it 
in the mask of something else.  The logic of co-ordination and co-operation 
has been internalized at micro-level of daily interactions. For example, the PA 
complained about the Israeli raids on Palestinian towns because of the lack of 
a prior coordination with the PA, not raids or the Israeli military “missions” per 
se.  This is what the Chief PLO/PA Negotiator Saeb Erekat argued for: “Israel 
has not coordinated its activities with Palestinian security forces despite its 
obligation to do so under the Interim Agreement and the Road Map. It failed to 
share any information about its planned military activities in Nablus.” 
(Doc.2918, emphasis added)  In other instances, the Palestinians asked 
Israeli security to submit a name-list of the “dangerous [Palestinian] people” to 
the PA in order to arrest them instead of Israel doing it. (Doc.2657, Doc.1832).  
 
The Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) for the Rafah Crossing 
between Gaza and Egypt (signed in November 2005) is an exemplary model 
for the supposed borders/crossing into the Palestinian state (Doc.3264).  In 
essence, the AMA operates with “invisible” Israeli control. The agreement 
creates three types of responsibly: first, the Palestinian side performs the 
required action; second, the EU and US contribute with funds, equipment and 
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monitor the performance of the Palestinians; third, the Israeli side approves 
and decides.  
 
The coordination-cooperation schema proscribed a US-led training and 
preparation of the Palestinian security personnel, European funding, and 
Israeli ability to evaluate and approve or disapprove the Palestinian 
performance. This schema co-opted the Palestinian security and political 
leadership. For example, the Palestinian Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, was 
recorded in a security meeting as saying that the “Israelis, even [Yuval] 
Diskin,74 are saying good things about Pal[estinian] performance.” (Doc. 
3274)  
 
The application of coordination-cooperation resulted in a process of 
externalization of a section of the Palestinian people who do not seem to fit 
the peace process mold, and hence, they fit the constitution of an internal 
Palestinian ‘other’. Many security meetings provided candid exchange of 
information and political analysis on the situation of Hamas and Gaza, 
especially since 2006. The language depicted the ‘internal other’ as a security 
threat and an obdurate obstacle to the peace process motion. The following 
summery of a security meeting between the Palestinian side represented by 
Saeb Erekat (SE) and Col. Hazem Attallah (HA) and the Israeli side 
represented by Ephraim Sneh (ES) and Eitan Dangot (ED) demonstrates the 
openness of questions and answers with regard to the conditions of 
Palestinian ‘other’: 
 
ES: how many loyal men do you have now in the PG?  
 
ED asked about the recent transfer of guns from Jordan. HA replied that 200 
guns were transferred to Ramallah and 465 to Gaza. He said that a number of the 
guns are not fit for use (some are very old –1950s). He said he needed at least 
functional Kalashnikovs. He concluded that this transfer is insufficient. His 
preliminary assessment was that 60 out of the 200 guns in Ramallah are simply 
not useable.  
                                            
74 Yuval Disken is the former directory of the General Security Service (Shabak) in Israel. 
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ED asked about number of people that Hamas has on the ground in Gaza.  
 
HA said the estimate is up to 5000.   
 
ES asked about reports that there may be an agreement with Hamas: If so, what 
will happen?  
 
SE said it will [sic] not happen. The issue is not about forming a joint 
government –rather it’s about the programme, and the Quartet conditions. 
(Doc.640) 
 
In practice, surveillance and censorship of “mosques” and control of “al-zaqat” 
(Islamic religious donation), “killing Palestinians”, incarceration and violations 
of human rights have become established Palestinian measures to deal with 
the ‘internal other’ (Doc.4827). “Observing and follow[ing] incitement in 
mosques, schools, universities and residential clusters, and local media” also 
became usual activities (Doc.160, Doc.173). Ironically, the US-EU training 
programs (supposedly) “heavy on human rights” (Dayton 2009: 7) did not 
impede human rights violations. As General Keith Dayton put it: “the [PA] 
intelligence guys are good. The Israelis like them. They say they are giving as 
much as they are taking from them –but they are causing some problems for 
international donors because they are torturing people.” (Doc.4676) The way 
the General articulates torture and aid highlights perfectly his (as a 
representative of US-EU project) callous indifference towards the former, but 
a more concern with funds for his mission in the West Bank and Gaza. As a 
matter of fact, the Head of the PA security forces admitted that despite his 
understanding of human rights the PA forces were given orders to shoot 
Palestinians, in his own words: “In Qabatya today when someone shot at the 
NSF [PA National Security Forces], they shot back. That is the way, they have 
to learn to respect the authority of the Palestinian security forces. I understand 
human rights, but this is not Switzerland.” (Doc.2520, HA)  
 
The Palestinian security apparatus internalized the Israeli security language to 
the extent that they contemplated “the possibility … of establishing a secure 
buffer zone to prevent missiles launches” (Doc.616, HA). Acts against 
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occupation sounded unreasonable to the Palestinian leadership. For example, 
in a security meeting with Dayton, Erekat wondered, “why anyone would 
attack Karni [Crossing]. What is their interest?” Activities like attacks on Karni 
or lunching missiles were constructed as a vehicle, “to undermine the 
president [Abbas], and generally to cause trouble.” (Ibid.) In other words, 
these acts are irrational and only “cause trouble”, and most importantly, the 
Palestinian leadership did not view Israel’s policies as a valid justification for 
such acts. The above framing constitutes a positive link between Israel, the 
PA and internal Palestinian politics that helps to interpret acts of resistance 
against occupation as being against the Palestinian leadership.  
 
Indeed, the PA is co-opted by the realist-liberal peace, or the American-
European framework of peace. And since 2002 it has increasingly believed 
that implementing the precepts of this peace and doing “everything possible to 
build the [state] institutions” is the only way towards Palestinian statehood 
(Doc.4827).  
 
Confusion by Design  
The piecemeal transformation of the Palestinian political discourse 
established a certain vision of “the possible” and “the realistic” (al-mumkin, al-
waqi‘i) based on fragmented readings of the equivocal geopolitical conditions, 
diplomatic interactions and interpretations of UN resolutions, yet with an 
equally caricature-like grasp of the object of this reading, the reality (al-waqi‘) 
in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, and how others, mainly Israel and the 
US, interpreted this object. The PLO/PA gave up the quest for justice in favour 
of a “realistic” territorial existence, its boundaries were conceived through the 
so-called “Arab and international legitimacy”, believing that they have already 
made a compromise by accepting 22 percent of historical Palestine.  In his 
letter to President Clinton during the Camp David negotiations in 2000 Arafat 
made it clear that: “by accepting UNSC resolution 242, I have accepted 22 
percent only from the historical land of Palestine. Thus I have made the 
biggest and foremost concession for a final settlement” (cited in Abu-Alaa 
2006: 352).  
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However, the internalized terminology (e.g. “based on” and “in accordance 
with resolution 242 and 338”, “agreed upon”) tilted towards the Israeli 
understanding: that the compromise is not yet made and it needs to be 
worked out from within the 22 percent.75 For example, the Declaration of 
Principles specifies two things: “permanent status issues” and “permanent 
status negotiations”. Moreover, Article IV states clearly that certain permanent 
issues, “will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.” (I.4 1993: 
145) Ironically, the PLO recognized Israel yet without a single word to 
describe its territorial character. 
 
 
Peace is not singular or unitary but a compound situation of consistent and 
inconsistent narratives, justice and injustice; it is a situation where neither 
component is denied but rather given an opportunity. Therefore, my critique of 
the peace process is concerned with the denial of an equal opportunity to 
articulate the terms of peace, and justice and fairness from the beginning. 
However, the peace process framework determined these terms in advance. 
The language of power/politics modulates the contents of the concept of 
peace; hence, it is either just or unjust according to power/politics conditions. 
The US laid down principles of the “just peace” between Israel and the 
Palestinians after it had emerged triumphant in the first Gulf War 1990-1 as 
follows: 
A comprehensive peace must be grounded in the United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace. This 
principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel’s security and recognition, and 
at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else would 
fail the twin test of fairness and security… we must foster economic development 
for the sake of peace and progress... foster economic freedom and prosperity for 
all people in region... By meeting these challenges, we can build a framework for 
peace. (Bush 1991, emphasis added)  
 
                                            
75 Israeli interpretation of 242 is different from the Palestinians 
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On this view, although the “peace” framework was stabilized to some extent, 
the object of negotiations was confused from the beginning. The PLO’s 
starting point is the historic Palestine (and settled on 22 percent), whereas the 
Israeli starting point is from within the 22 percent of Palestine (West Bank, 
East Jerusalem and Gaza). Despite this key ‘misconception’ (?) peace rituals 
continued on ambiguous grounds to mediate over the territorial and ideal 
aspects of peace within the phrase “territory for peace”.  
 
The market metaphor embedded in the phrase “territory for peace” (or “land 
for peace”) together with the positivist and reductive notion of security formed 
the ground on which peace and justice were given concrete meaning in the 
process of peacemaking. An arbitrary intertextuality from selected UN 
Security Council resolutions fixed the meaning of “just”, “lasting” and 
“comprehensive” peace. Meanwhile, these principles gained broader 
recognition by think-tank and non-governmental organizations. For example, 
The Alliance for Peace echoed the above citation in declaring that it aims, “at 
the achievement of lasting and comprehensive peace based on the formula of 
land for peace, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 
338 in all their aspects.” (L.4 1997: 331)  
 
Justice and fairness evolved as no more than an exchange of land, 
implementation of resolutions 242 and 338, and security and economic 
development. From this perspective, a “just and comprehensive peace” 
constitutes the interplay between these elements, and thus a process of 
isolation and exclusion of reality on the ground and the suffering of the 
vulnerable. In other words, the termination of the occupation and the move to 
address the rights of the Palestinian refugees were undermined in the 
supposed “just and comprehensive peace” formula, while alternative visions 
to this peace were disregarded. These “peace” principles filtered down to local 
leadership. For example, in August 1989 a handful of West Bank and Gaza 
local figures signed a memorandum calling for “implementation of the principle 
land for peace” (G.27 1989: 347). Generally speaking, it can be said that there 
was some sort of consensus on the broader framework; however, the details 
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of “how much” (e.g., land, security, sovereignty) are left to the businesslike 
negotiations; indeed, this is what the discussion is turning to in the following 
chapter.  
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 9  
Palestine Re-Imagined? 
 
 
The Disappearance of Palestine as an Imagined Totality 
 
The peace process is a constitutive chapter in the Palestinian discourse 
history on all levels. It has played a significant role in the production, revision 
and displacement of the action-orienting76 concepts like Palestine and the 
Palestinian national rights, or the constants (al-thawabt). Although such 
concepts continued to organize the official Palestinian discourse, their visceral 
contents were transformed and reproduced afresh. This is what I shall refer to 
as the logic of replacement.  
 
The imagined “state of Palestine” —in the West Bank and Gaza— replaced 
Palestine as a perceived totality, and it is supposed to replace the PLO 
(Doc.3597). The new imagery of Palestine has interrupted the Palestinian 
people as an “imagined community”, to use Anderson’s phrase, and casted 
further ambiguity over and within the Palestinian subject-position. Therefore, 
supplementary qualification is inserted in sentences, sometimes in brackets, 
(e.g., “Palestinians (living in the oPt)”) to specify who is included, excluded 
and whose opinion matters (Ibid., brackets in original).   
 
The PA expressed “content with the 1967 [armistice] line” as a “baseline for 
the border” (Doc. 2731). It is worthwhile placing sufficient emphasis on the 
orienting metaphor in the term “baseline” in representing the elasticity of the 
                                            
76 Action-orienting regimes in particular concepts are themselves constructed (Foucault 1970; 
Carver 2008). 
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Palestinian understanding of al-thawabt and how far one may proceed from 
there. The imagined map of the ‘new Palestine’ is unsettled in the Palestinian 
political consciousness, and hence the strains of indeterminacy embodied in 
phrases like “modifications” on the 1967 armistice line, land swaps and 
annexation (Ibid.). In an interview on the Israeli Channel II in November 2012, 
which coincided with the Balfour Declaration’s anniversary, the PLO/PA 
President Abbas went beyond the tacit meaning of Palestine as subsumed in 
the peace process principles. He unequivocally said that “Palestine now for 
me is [19]67 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, this is now and 
forever. I believe that [the] West Bank and Gaza is Palestine … and the other 
parts [are] Israel.” He also underlined his no right to return and live in his 
original home in Safad, which was occupied in 1948. This is of course an 
individual choice, but interpretation flows from within text and context, and 
therefore, while speaking form the subject-position of the ‘President of’ and 
from an Israeli TV, political messages with regard to right of return should not 
be missed out.  
 
Indeed, that represents what Said called the oxymoron of the “overlapping 
territories” (Said 1994: 210), where at once the Palestinians are fighting for 
recognition and internalizing imperialist designs for Palestine.77 Notions such 
as “baseline” and “swaps” are not without deep infiltration in the Palestinian 
narrative, rights and spatial perception of Palestine. Endorsing these notions 
implicitly involves the recognition of Israel’s entitlement to the refugees’ 
properties beyond the 1967 non-border line (land in particular, which Israel 
                                            
77 The PLO internalized the Israeli made “1967 line” and what originally an imperialist British 
design.  In 1949, the British High Commissioner adopted the Land Transfer Regulations, 
which divided Palestine into three Zones: Zone A where land transfer is limited to Palestinian 
Arabs (about 16.680 km2), Zone B (8.348 km2) where land transferred from Palestinians to 
Jews; and the Zone outside A and B (1.292 km2) which could be freely transferred. The West 
Bank and Gaza fell entirely in Zone A according to this division and annexed map (Doc. 
3369). 
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classifies as Absentee Property78). Moreover, it deeply intrudes on the 
refugees’ right to restitution.79 Hence, the PA/PLO’s simultaneous bidding for 
restitution and swaps is inconsistent, however, this is not to derogate from the 
right itself rather from the PA/PLO policy towards that right.  The leadership is 
conscious of this dilemma since a confidential analysis carried out by the 
Negotiation Support Unit (NSU) underscored the implication of the swaps 
principle on the refugees rights (Doc.3001).  
 
To speak of the question of Palestine in its totality had officially ended in 
1993. The logic of partition penetrated through the totality and sliced it up into 
various issues, sub-issues and “claims” which may be agreed or disagreed 
upon (Doc.2547).80  
 
The Palestinian question has been bifurcated into various parts in a 
typological order as “core issues” (this includes: territory, refugees, 
Jerusalem, security, water) and “generic issues” (this includes State-to-State 
issues: compensation, economics and trade, fiscal, infrastructure and 
services, energy, tourism, monetary, etc.) (Doc.2093). Each sub-issue is 
given a particular track. For example, the “refugee issue” is split between Tal 
Baker/Saeb Erekat and Ehud Olmert/Abu Mazin tracks. As a result, four ‘men’ 
seized the right to decide the fate of about 5-million refugee with “unclear 
Palestinian red lines” (Doc.3460). 
 
                                            
78 On the Absentee Property Law see Badil 2005: 41-55.  
79 On the Palestine refugees right in international law see Takkenberg 1988. 
80 A clause related to “end of claims”, “end of conflict”, “finality of claims”, states the following: 
“The applicable legal principles, rules, and relevant precedents that govern the status of 
claims between parties following the conclusion of a treaty between them...” (Doc.2547)   
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Each issue is placed within a mathematico-judicial schema of percentages, 
numbers, UN resolutions and pragmatism.81 Consider, for example, the land, 
Jerusalem and refugees “issues.” The “land issue” is reduced to the size of 
the land occupied in 1967 and as a matter of percentages, swaps and 
exchanges.82 Jerusalem is also split into “East and West”, “Yerushalayim and 
Al-Quds,” “territory and arrangements” (Doc.2003). The “refugee issue” is 
divided between a set of options: return to Israel, return to the putative 
Palestinian state, compensation or a settlement in their current place of 
residence or in a third country (Doc.2731). As far as the return option is 
concerned, a certain group of refugees was prioritized over the rest; the PA 
prioritized the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.83 Meanwhile, these options 
were produced as a means to detract from the possibility of return inasmuch 
as more efforts were invested in “marketing” the non-return options. This will 
be discussed further at the end of this chapter. 
 
Core and generic issues come with a “matrix” of agreed or not agreed upon 
“positions”, “offers and counteroffers” (Doc.3610, Doc.2826). The difference 
between the Israeli and Palestinian positions is articulated as “gaps”. In the 
words of the Palestinian negotiators/politicians: “We look into the positions of 
both sides and means to bridge the gap between them.” (Doc.2454, emphasis 
added) Erekat echoed the above: “We all know what the end game looks like 
(1967 border with minor modifications…). It is a matter of trade-offs that can 
be agreed [upon] quickly” and “tradeoffs within and between issues” 
(Doc.1815, Doc.4861, SE, emphasis added). The term gaps is at once 
                                            
81 The Palestinian pragmatism is relative to the Israeli perception of pragmatism which best 
summed up by these phrases spelled out by Israeli negotiators: “forget rights” and “facts of 
the ground” (Doc.2499). 
 
83 Note that the PA argued for return of more than 50000 (5000x10 years) and less than a 
million, i.e. maybe only return of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.  
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strategic and misleading, because it falsely minimizes the difference84 and 
insinuates an impression that the process is “moving forward” (logic of motion) 
and “trade-offs” (logic market) are underway to keep the process rolling 
(Doc.2093). 
 
The transformation from the national representation of the Palestinian cause 
to a mathematico-judicial and a market-like negotiations served as a common 
dominator in the production of new apparatus for that purpose, such as the 
PLO Department of Negotiation, NSU, and discounting old ones like the 
Department of the Refugees Affairs. Obviously, this formula dispensed with 
the fida’iyyun (freedom fighters) subject-position and replaced it with an army 
of lawyers, negotiators, experts, advisors, etc. This diverse mosaic of 
infrastructure and the “discourse in transformation” are mutually constitutive. 
Out of this confused assemblage emerged a technical and political language, 
sub-institutions, sub-committees, categories, and so forth (for examples, see 
Doc.1739). 
 
This transformation is intimately related to the relation between the 
forerunning institutions embodied in the PLO and the subsequent institutions 
of the ‘new Palestine’ and ‘Palestinians’ as represented the PA. While 
officially, the PA is  “an extenuation of the PLO [and gains] its legitimacy from 
it, which will remain its political and legislative reference.” (J.1 1994: 207) 
Given this prescription, the PLO is expected to determine the structure of the 
PA in advance. However, this is not the case. Israel was given the right (at 
                                            
84 On the land issue the gap was on how much Israel would annex. The PA proposed 1.9 
percent, whereas Israel wanted 7.3 percent of the West Bank (Jerusalem is not included in 
7.3 percent).  On refugees the difference is on wording (responsibility vs. suffering, totally 
Israeli rejection of return). On security, the difference is on the international presence, and the 
degree of the Palestinian state militarization, Israel rejects both options and argued for 
demilitarized state, while the Palestinians argued for a state with limited arms. On 
settlements, Israel insists on annexing Ma’ale Adumim, Ariel and the areas around these 
settlements. Jerusalem was not discussed and instead the Tzipi Livni argued that the parties 
should say: “there are gaps [on Jerusalem]” (see Doc.2826; Doc.2797; Doc.2454).  
  199 
least) to have a say in the design of the PA structure, legislative and executive 
power according to Oslo II (J.17).85 For example, although the PLO 
Department of the Refugees Affairs still exists in name, it did not appear 
anywhere in the negotiation record represented in the Palestine Papers.  
 
In practice, however, the shape of the PA institutions was bound to, and 
“empowered” by, Israeli policies and institutions. This resulted in an 
ambivalent PLO-PA sway between formal and practical discourse. On this 
view, the Palestinian politicians were caught in this dilemma. It was not clear 
whether to speak form a PLO or PA position, hence the injection of the 
forward-slash between the PLO and PA (PLO/PA). The forward-slash tells us 
a lot about complex situation where is almost impossible to distinguish 
between the two entities in practice, and simultaneously it is still possible to 
alternate between them. The “PLO/PA” imperative is confusing and expedient 
at the same time. It turned out to be useful since it has made it possible for 
the leadership to situate itself strategically in two positions. On the one hand, 
the leadership has maintained an exclusive representation of the Palestinian 
people without corresponding accountability. And on the other hand, the PLO 
prerogatives and institutions were virtually put on hold. So whilst speaking 
from the PLO’s position, the PA, represented by a thin elite class became the 
actual player. 86 In sum, the PLO played the role of the legitimizer for 
decisions usually taken by a limited number of an unrepresentative leadership 
and institutions under occupation took the command to determine the fate of 
the entire Palestinian people.  
 
                                            
85 In September 1995, the “Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Oslo II” 
(J.17) laid down the structure and institutions of the PA. There are articles on the elections, 
structure of the Palestinian council and its size and responsibilities, the executive position of 
al-Ra’iys (the President or Chairman), etc.  
 
86 None of the PLO related institutions was represented in the process of negotiations. For 
example, the PLO Refugees Department was not present in the negotiation over the rights of 
the Palestinian refugees, particularly return and restitution.  
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This player perceived Israel, especially after the first Intifada, as leaning 
towards “a compromise [hal wasat] based on 1967 borders.” (Abu-Alaa 2005: 
77). Articulating the settlement on 22 percent of historic Palestinian as “hal 
wasat” is the most ironic and false assumption. The internal features of the 
phrase “hal wasat” (which literally means, a middle solution, compromise or 
meeting half way) evoked a sense “equality”, “two sides”, “balanced interests 
of the two sides” between the PLO and Israel; and impelled a Palestinian re-
framing of the Palestinian rights into Israeli “concessions” (tanazulat), 
“compromise” (taswiyya), and “gainings” (muktasabat) (Ibid. 77, 98, 199).  
  
Concepts and mechanisms that the PLO/PA relied on oriented the power-play 
in the interactions between itself and other countries (Israel, in particular). 
First of all the phrase al-taswiyya al-silmiyya (peaceful settlement) is 
misguided. The meaning that is loaded in the Arabic word taswiyya (derived 
from sawwa) entails equality and justice. While being plugged into a 
relationship of “parity” and “partnership”, “two sides”, and within already well-
established inter-state relations (e.g., international relations between Israel 
and the US, in particular) impelled the PA to act on a faulty consciousness of 
imaginary state capacities unmatched on the ground.87 The negotiation 
paradigm created a false equivalence: two equal parties sitting at the 
negotiation table to negotiate their respective positions, “our position” vis-à-vis 
“your positions” (Doc.2176). Logically, this order transferred the burden to the 
Palestinian side, as it requires them to reciprocate “equally” or else be 
perceived as suckers and a non-partner. They are expected to make “offers” 
and “give” as much as they “take”, notwithstanding the very little or nothing 
they initially have to reciprocate with.  
 
The PLO/PA reliance on essentially statist concepts and terminologies (e.g., 
ministries, ministers, national security, governments, elections, etc.) without 
corresponding state-order in the real world has created a confused image of 
                                            
87 State related concepts (e.g., “ministries”, “ministers”, “coup d’etat”, “embassies”, etc.) 
structure the discourse of the PA.  
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reality and self-understanding, which is neither a state entity nor a liberation 
movement. Consequently, the PLO/PA has lost, or at least constrained, its 
actual non-state power. This account of power, it is not about Israel’s power 
onto the PLO/PA, rather a systematic flux of relations and acts embedded in 
the order of this relationship that disarms the PLO/PA from its genuine 
abilities as liberation organization, and certainly not a state. While being co-
opted in a deceptive subject-position of a state entity, the PLO/PA 
maneuvering capacity was diminished from within. This is what precisely 
constrained the means for the struggle against occupation power.  
 
Power and resistance to power coincide. “Where there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a 
position of exteriority in relation to power.” (Foucault 1978: 95) Resistance, in 
all forms, is the Palestinian power to resist the power of occupation and 
colonialism therefore it is not outside them. However, the power to resist 
originates from different regimes and rules. The (classical) power of 
colonialism originates from state apparatus, whereas counter-forces to 
colonialism emerge from non-state apparatus. The different nature of the two 
powers makes acts of resistance less predictable in magnitude and form. 
From this vantage point, harmonizing resistance with the power it is initially 
meant to challenge and dismantle breaks the opposing nexus between them 
and makes the former more co-optative. The quasi-state structure within 
which the Palestinians found themselves after the Oslo process reduced 
prospects of resistance.  
 
The American diplomacy ditched the idea of dealing with core issues and 
endorsed the Israeli unilateralism, with the PA collaboration, as the best way 
forward. This is especially clear in Obama’s diplomatic approach, known as 
“proximity talks” piloted by George Mitchell, a renowned American diplomat 
for his contributions in the Good Friday Agreement. The so-called “proximity 
talks” mounted pressure on the PA to “go with the process” while urging the 
PA not to miss the opportunity and accept whatever Israel is offering: “with 
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Obama, it is absolutely clear that this is the last time [and…] the best time.” 
(Doc.4844, emphasis added)   
 
Through the Israeli (and American) lens, this analytic of the conflict serves an 
overall objective of creating a Palestinian state on what may be agreed with 
the PA on each sub-issue without agreeing on any substantive issue, i.e. a 
state with “provisional borders”. Rice, for example, argued for applying the 
German model: “Germany was a ‘provisional state’ until 1990.” (Doc.485; see 
also Doc.4882; Doc.2942)88 
 
All in all, the peace process, by-design, permits only generic issues as a 
negotiation subject which means that the input is always less than the actual 
problem; hence any outcome is always less than an agreement on the total or 
the core issues.  
 
 
Struggle: By Any Means or Nonviolent Means? 
 
Mohammad Dahlan: 
And we’ve told Hamas that if they even think about terrorist activities after the 
agreement, we will crush them. They have the right to struggle through other 
means —but not violence. (Doc.38, emphasis added) 
 
International law establishes a direct link between self-determination and the 
“legitimacy” of the struggle “by any means” against powers that subdue 
peoples right to self-determination (UNGA Resolution 2649 XXV). Apparently, 
this specific resolution does not make any distinction between violent and 
non-violent means. Given the function of referentiality, and the fact that the 
                                            
88 Rice’s analogy between Germany and Palestine is ill-fitted, both historically and 
contextually. Germany was an aggressor country and the Allied Forces occupied it in order to 
eliminate the Nazi regime and build the democratic Republic of Germany. However, Palestine 
was never an aggressor but the victim, while Israel has been occupying and colonizing the 
Palestine for a long time (see Doc.485).  
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Palestinians are seeking their self-determination endorsed by international 
law, they have expressed their right to use “any means” to achieve that goal. 
Nevertheless, the violence/non-violence distinction turned out to be an uneasy 
issue in the Palestinian discourse. In 1993, the PLO re-denounced terrorism89 
and pledged to undertake expansive measures, beyond the customary 
(however contested) definition of terrorism,90 against “other acts of violence” 
(I.2 1993: 142). Despite this pledge, the paradigm of non-violence remained 
on the margins of the PLO/PA discourse until the appearance of the so-called 
Quartet Principles (or Conditions, shurut al-ruba‘iyyia) in 2006.91 Phrases like 
“culture of non-violence” and “non-violent means of conflict resolution” began 
register frequent appearance in documents, plans, the negotiations record, 
and above all in the street (see Doc.1987; Doc.1987, Doc.2162).92  
 
The most important outcome of this language is the constitution of an arbitrary 
nexus between non-violence and the legitimacy principle: 
 
                                            
89 In 1986 the PLO condemned “all acts of terrorism” (see N.A. Winter 1986). The 
condemnation was reconfirmed in 1988 in Arafat’s Speech to General Assembly. 
90 Although the definition of terrorism is contested, however, there is a consensus in Western 
academia that terrorism is a “tactic”, a “technique” and “instrumental” which aims to inflict fear 
among a wider number of civilians in order to achieve political ends (cf. Richardson 2006, 
Blakeley 2009; Lutz and Lutz 2010). 
91 The Quartet required “all members of a future Palestinian Government must be committed 
to non-violence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and 
obligations, including the Road Map.” See Statement By Middle East Quartet, 30 January 
2006. 
92 This does not mean that non-violent struggle was not contemplated in the Palestinian case. 
To the contrary, there were studies arguing for a nonviolent struggle in the academic sphere. 
Mubarak Awad was among the pioneers who argued for nonviolence and gave examples of 
nonviolent measures used at different periods by the Palestinians. However, in juxtaposing 
nonviolent struggle with armed struggle, Awad conflated them. Namely, nonviolence would 
signify a struggle devoid of armed means only. This does not exclude violence per se (See 
Mubarak Awad 1984). 
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Calls for a Continued Cessation of Violence: While the NUG [National Unity 
Government] reaffirms the Palestinian people’s inalienable and internationally-
recognized [sic] right to resist occupation through legitimate means, it extends 
the unilateral Palestinian ceasefire with Israel. (Doc.1674, Key Points on The Palestinian 
Unity Government’s Platform, 9 May 2007) 
 
Every [Palestinian] party must do two things: (1) accept the PLO charter and 
commitments, and (2) reject violence and only use democratic means for 
implementing their program. (Doc.1962, YAR)     
 
The non/violence has become a Palestinian concern as much as an Israeli 
one. The “success” of violent struggle against the occupation is constructed 
as a threat to the PLO/PA political line. For instance, the PA considered Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza to be a threat to its policy of negotiation and signals  “a 
victory for violent elements” (Doc.177). The PA Prime Minister, Salam 
Fayyad, argued against the opening of the Gaza border crossings because 
“the message will be that rockets yield results. I told Rice to weigh in on Israel 
on this but she didn’t get anywhere with them.” (Doc.2330) 
 
Despite the ambiguity of the word violence and the phrase “legitimate means” 
or “democratic means”, none of them was contextually reviewed. This 
omission strategically leaves space for constituting any act other than 
negotiations as violence. President Abbas (2012) excluded any option of 
“violence” in resisting the occupation and stressed that: “We want to use 
diplomacy. We want to use politics. We want to use negotiations. We want to 
use peaceful resistance. That’s it.” 
 
As I mentioned elsewhere, discourse does not need to be coherent or linear, it 
is the opposite. Although the PLO/PA draw heavily on international law, 
referentiality was shelved with regard to the means of the struggle as the 
PLO/PA ruled out any option beyond negotiation and diplomacy. In this 
regard, the end result is an attenuated conceptualization of the means of the 
struggle. Phrases such as “legitimate” or “democratic” or “non-violent” means 
aim to belittle the already little power which the occupied left with to resist its 
occupier than what the default formula of international law allows. The latter 
considers “any means” to be legitimate while resisting foreign occupation. 
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Violence/non-violence distinction seeks to disarm the occupied Palestinians 
from their right to use violence as a means of resistance to the occupation, 
whereas the Israeli occupation continues to inflict its violence on the 
Palestinians, and continues to use “any means” to sustain its dominance. It is 
worth emphasizing that armed struggle is only one aspect of violence.  
 
 
—————— 
Above I have examined the imaginative fragmentation of Palestine materially 
(territory and population and the means of the struggle), now I will turn to the 
ideational aspects and discuss the concept viability and a viable state. 
 
In June 1997, the European Union Presidency concluded that: “The creation 
of a viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian entity is the best guarantee of 
Israel’s security.” (L.28 1997: 359, emphasis added) The former US President 
Bill Clinton echoed the same point: “I think there can be no genuine resolution 
to the conflict without a sovereign, viable, Palestinian state that 
accommodates Israeli’s security requirements and the demographic realities.” 
(Clinton 7 January 2001) Unequivocally, viability unfolds as a security function 
that absorbs the Israeli terms and terminology (security and demography) in 
advance before any negotiations. Thus the priori imposition of the Israeli 
conditions is constitutive part of the interpretation of viability. For Israel, the 
nature of any tolerable Palestinian entity must be no more than an 
arrangement of an “enlarged autonomy”, which the Palestinian might call a 
“state” if they wish (L.3 1997:  329).93 
 
                                            
93 In 1997, major Israeli political parties (Likud and Labor) reached an understanding on what 
they consider acceptable structure in the West Bank and Gaza. The understanding states: “If 
the Palestinian entity subject itself to limits presented in this document, its self-determination 
will be recognized. According to an alternative opinion it will be regarded as an enlarged 
autonomy, and according to another opinion, as a state.” (L.3 1997: 329, emphasis added)  
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It is more common to speak of independent or sovereign states, however, the 
term “viable state” is an anomaly in political and international relations theory. 
Since 1974 the Palestinians have been calling for the establishment of an 
“independent Palestinian state”; statehood is a key element of al-thawabt al-
wataniyya (the national consonants). The viable state (dawla qabila lilhaya) 
phrase entered the Palestinian discourse following George W. Bush’s speech 
in 24 June 2002 where he outlined his vision for ‘peace’. Since then, the 
“Bush vision for peace” (ru’yyat Bush li al-salam) has been inscribed in the 
terms of reference. President Bush laid down the interpretation of “viable 
state” as follows: (1) it achieves Israel’s security, (2) it is peaceful and 
democratic, (3) it is, “based on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli 
withdrawal to secure and recognize borders” (4) it is to “resolve questions 
concerning Jerusalem, the plight and future of Palestinian refugees” (i.e., 
short of return); in 2004 he added (5) “contiguous, sovereign and 
independent”, (Bush 2004) and (6) “Palestine as a Palestinian homeland” 
(Bush 2007). 
 
However, a viable state from the Palestinian standpoint has to be 
economically and politically viable (Doc.2863), geographically contiguous and 
“capable of absorbing most Palestinians here [in the West Bank and Gaza] 
and in the Diaspora [i.e. the refugees]” (Doc. 2328). In another meeting, Abu-
Alaa stated clearly that viable state means, “A state that has adequate land 
space that is geographically contiguous and is able to absorb all civilians of 
whom refugees are a part.” (Doc.2309, emphasis added) The third aspect 
accommodates very well the Israeli understanding of “our mutual interest in 
the establishment of a viable Palestinian state” (Doc. 1963, TL) and Bush’s 
interpretation of a viable Palestinian state, mainly points number four and six.  
 
The Palestinian endorsement of adjective “viable” to describe their putative 
statehood, regardless of their interpretation of its contents, implies a further 
elasticity of the meaning of the Palestinian national rights and an acceptance 
of negotiation on the internal substances of the already limited self-
determination that the PLO accepted.  
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Peace: A Metaphorical Marketplace 
War sketched the rough contours of the supposed peace. After June 1967 
War the UN Security Council passed resolution number 242 to frame the 
terms for a (supposedly) “just and lasting peace” between the Arab countries 
and Israel. The resolution called upon the latter to “withdraw from territories 
occupied in the recent conflict [1967 War]” in keeping with the principle of  
“inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and in exchange for the 
“termination of all claims or states of belligerency”. In essence, this formula is 
congruent with the realist interpretation of peace; it juxtaposes territory with 
non-belligerency and constitutes land and peace as convertible entities.  
 
The metaphor loaded in the phrase “land/territory for peace” is the first 
building block of the market logic in the peace process that constitutes land 
and peace into bargain and barter objects. The phrase combines two 
concepts that belong to two different configurative connotations and rules of 
formation. Land has a quantifiable physical existence, whereas peace is 
ideational and qualitative. On this account, performing mathematical 
calculations over land is more tangible than working on the idea of peace. 
Hence, all types of logarithmic questions arise: how much land is required? 
What sort of peace is to be made for such area of land? If peace is equivalent 
to security, then how much land needs to be annexed for security reasons? 
and so on. Moreover, the deliberate omission of the definite article (“the”) 
encouraged the “businesslike” or “the souk mentality” to determine the 
quantity and the nature of peace. Peace “agents” were fully conscious of their 
position in market-like schema. Hanan Ashrawi, a former negotiator and 
spokesperson of the Palestinian delegation to Washington in 1992, 
characterized negotiations as making business: “The second week of 
negotiation so far continues to be serious and discussions are substantive 
and businesslike” (H.55 1993: 132). In one of the plenary sessions Saeb 
Erekat mocked negotiations “souk mentality” (Doc.2618).  
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The role of peace “agents” is conceptualized through certain market 
terminology such as, “broker”, “players”, “partners”, which is more appropriate 
to business or commercial transactions than deciding over national and 
historical matters (Doc.2942). The US position as an “honest broker” implied a 
threefold subject-position: the buyer and seller of subjects occupied by 
Palestinians and Israelis, and the middleman position occupied the US.  
 
But the market terminology and style also precipitate at lower levels. The 
NSU’s reports and analysis which inform the plenary level are rich with 
phrases like: “the API must be operationalised and marketed” (Doc.5194, 
emphasis added), “ ‘shop’ between Palestinian negotiators” (Doc.2095), “A 
‘US only’ initiative will be more difficult to ‘market’ to Palestinian refugees”, “ 
‘buy in’ of refugee communities in host states” (Doc.2937, emphasis added), 
“sell ideas”, “more saleable” (Doc.419). Or as an Israeli maps expert puts it: 
“The leaders haggle, and we generate a map”. (Doc.3424, LA). 
 
The market logic underlies the exchange relationship in the “land for peace” 
principle. Accordingly, additional market terminologies have gradually grown 
in number and significance, and infiltrated through the political language 
propagating the land/peace correlation. The Palestinian implicit endorsement 
of the “land for peace” (i.e., resolution 242) in 1974 marks the beginning of the 
discursive internalization of the market logic. Later, this logic was stretched 
beyond its original subjects (land/peace) to regulate humans, language and 
legal rights.  The diplomatic record is imbued with a web of verbs like: offer, 
give, take, want, pay for, package, deal, land exchange, lease, compensate, 
swap, sell, buy, transfer,94 etc. As such, land, humans, ideas have become a 
commodity and the object of these verbs. The following examples will 
elucidate: 
 
                                            
94 On the concept of transfer, see Masalha (1992) Expulsion of the Palestinians. 
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The 7.3% offer by Olmert is the most generous, and will be perceived by Israelis 
as the most fair. This is the offer. (Doc.2826, TL) 1:1 swap. I cannot accept this 
percentage. (Doc.2484, TL, emphasis added) 
 
We have offers and counter offers on refugees (Doc.4861, SE)… We’ve already 
paid in advance. We’ve already delivered on security… They want us pay 16 
times for the same thing. Give them [families whose houses were demolished by 
Israel in Jerusalem] a package to rent something… (Doc.4882, RS) It has to be 
Salam [Fayyad] ⎯not you or the Jordanians to pay them. (Doc.4882, SE, 
emphasis added)  
 
The analysis of this web of signs should be situated inside their broader 
market orienting-regime and the subjects on which they operate. Scrutiny of 
the Palestinian Papers indicates three main subjects: land, humans and 
language.   
 
Firstly, land became a variable with the market-like operations. The phrase 
“land/territory for peace” (al-ard muqabil al-salam) has been assimilated within 
the Palestinian discourse as a key element in the peace process “terms of 
reference” (H.32 1992: 73). Land is understood as the “real substance of the 
peace process” (H.31 1992: 70). How much land is required to achieve peace 
is something that market operations mediate. This has strengthened the 
formula of peace through partition and at the same time belittled the possibility 
for peace through other ways. Ample energy, effort and time have been 
dedicated to bargain “how much” land ought to be exchanged in the name of 
peace. The following examples show how the Palestinian land is articulated 
as a mere abstract numbers and percentages devoid of its historical and 
national meanings, especially in the case of Jerusalem: 
 
SE: So he should ask: 67? Swaps? What will be percentage? You have the 
different offers. Can your experts define a number? The same applies to 
Jerusalem... Even the Old City can be worked out [discusses breakdown of 
sovereignty over Old City] except for the Haram and what they call Temple 
Mount. There you need the creativity of people like me.  
 
SE: A decision on what percentage. We offered 2%. They said no. So what’s the 
percentage… 0.07%. It is part of the swap if we get sovereignty. Otherwise no.  
 
JS: So swaps, percentage does not preclude different numbers …  
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SE: 1 to 1.  
 
JS: And value?  
 
RD: Value can be negotiated in the bilateral. (Doc.4899, emphasis added) 
 
Here an offer and counteroffer: 
 
UD: There is difference between offering a “package” deal and our discussions 
on territory. You have not presented a counter offer to us.  
 
SE: Yes, we did. On territory, we have offered 1,9% of the WB.  
 
UD: this is not a counter offer to our “package”. It deals only with territory.  
 
SE: But we have made detailed offers on refugees, territory, Jerusalem etc. We 
have submitted detailed papers on all issues. (Doc.3651, emphasis added) 
 
SE: What is left are the needed tradeoffs. When Olmert spoke of 6.5% in 
exchange for 5.8, and AM agreed to swaps in East Jerusalem, this is significant. 
Same with security… On refugees, there were discussions on numbers that will 
return to Israel over a number of years. The deal is there. (Doc.2437) You know 
there are tradeoffs within and between issues… So if we have agreement on 
something, it is a card that I won’t announce until the other issue is announced. 
(Doc.4861, emphasis added) 
 
Secondly, it is common to think of land/territory95 in a positivist way; but the 
same process was also applied to the human body (exchange of population, 
prisoners), concepts and language. The market style of negotiations 
structured thoughts and imaginations. For example, Palestinian “national 
rights” are re-constructed into something convertible into numbers, 
percentages, values, financial indictors, and hence exchangeable objects. 
This approach is rooted in resolution 242 and what American diplomacy says 
(or does not say) about the refugees. Article 2/b of resolution 242 disregards 
any reference to resolution 194 in favour of “achieving a just settlement of the 
refugee problem”. I argued before that the meaning of “just” was left open to 
market-like peace process. 
                                            
95 Notice that land and territory are not synonymous in the legal language.  
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The market side of peace covered the human face in the guise of a numerical 
existence within a mathematico-judicial formula. Let us now elaborate on two 
specific human categories: the refugees and prisoners to examine how the 
market rules mediated on them. 
 
The refugees’ subject has a very strong political aura in general, and a 
Palestinian one has even greater political and historical subtexts originating 
from the historical context. The Palestinian refugee identity is multi-layered for 
reasons determined by the political environment in which the individual finds 
his or herself in and how s/he interacted with it. For example, the Palestinian 
refugee identity is composed of refugeeness in the host country, refugees 
under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, internal refugees in Israel, 
refugee-citizen in the case of Jordan, and a second or third term refugee.96 
Therefore, the self-image of a refugee unfolds through a complex set of 
multidimensional rules and norms projected from the conceptual history of 
each concept (e.g., refugee/international law, Palestinian/PLO, etc.).  
 
In the meantime, the way the refugee is perceived by others is re-projected 
from within the internal framework of the other. As a result competition over 
the representation of the Palestinian refugees ensued, yet without their 
consent. For example, Jordan as a host country of about two millions 
refugees (UNRWA Statistics 2012) claimed the right to speak on behalf of the 
refugees (Doc.3343). The PLO has challenged Jordan’s claim on the basis of 
the UN endorsement of the PLO as “sole representative of the Palestinian 
people.” Today, the fate of the refugees, is at the mercy of a small 
unrepresentative individuals and institutions under occupation.    
 
                                            
96 There are Palestinian refugees who became refugees twice. For example, Palestinians 
refugees were forced to leave Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the same scenario is 
now talking place in Syria.  
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Although the refugees represent approximately half of the Palestinian people, 
their presence in the peace process and in the Palestinian political discourse 
is metaphorical: a virtual commodity that can be sold, bought and bargained 
over. They are only present as objects, which have never been represented or 
been able to intervene because they were left out from the start. The refugees 
and their rights constituted “bargaining chips” owned by the PA as the 
pronoun “my” indicate: “these are my bargaining chips” a Palestinian 
negotiator said (Doc.3284, emphasis added). The PA claims the right to 
speak on behalf of the excluded refugees. The exiled population has been the 
source of the Palestinian narrative, identity and struggle is constituted as a 
burden and obstacle to peace. In consequence, the refugees represented an 
unspeaking and dehumanized subject-position and hence a bargain object. 
This helped Israeli interlocutors to frame not only the refugees’ return to be an 
“unrealistic” negotiation subject, but also restitution was reduced to a “lump 
sum” transaction.  
 
… the  only way to facilitate a “buy in” of the various refugee communities is to 
put the emphasis on individual justice… success … depends on our capacity to 
market a resolution proposal to refugees” communities ... selling a US led 
proposal might be quite a challenge. (Doc.3284, ZC) [R]estitution [of the 
refugees] is totally unrealistic … I agree on a lump sum … The Palestinian 
government would be in charge of distrusting money … [this is] what can be 
sold to the Israelis and the Palestinians. (Doc.3284, TB, emphasis added)  
 
The denial of any responsibility for the refugees’ plight is deeply rooted in 
Israeli society. This has been accomplished by silencing the unpleasant 
discourse concerning the 1948 events. The year 1948 is represented as a 
“sacred year”, “absolute justice”, independence, and fulfillment of dreams, 
redemption and triumph in the Israeli popular consciousness. The discourse 
about an-Nakba, transfer and villages’ destruction is systematically erased 
(Pappé 2010). The post-1967 history is the only history that matters for the 
peace process, as if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict starts there. This is even 
the case for the report of the UN Fact Finding Mission to Gaza Conflict (best 
know as Goldstone Report 2009).  
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Since the Palestinian question was split between “tracks” and “issues,” the 
refugee “issue/track” was divided between four “men” and two tracks: “Abbas-
Olmert” and “Erekat-Becker.” The refugee subject-position appeared in the 
mathematico-judicial framework of negotiations with an obscure referent. To 
be sure, there was no definition of who is a refugee in the diplomatic process 
(Doc.3651). Furthermore, the Palestinian “redlines” on the refugees’ file and 
“referent” was unfixed, ambiguous and usually dealt with “in secret”. 
(Doc.3460; Doc.2437; Doc.3048). This partially reveals how the refugees 
were absented. The absence of a referent, unclear principles and secrecy 
were effective mechanisms to the process of de-articulation of the refugees 
question by marginalizing its subjects and their representation, and hence 
downgrading its status and position in the political and concrete policymaking.  
 
The terminology used in the discourse of some Palestinian intellectuals 
suggests the depth of the marginalization of refugees. Consider these 
indicative phrases: “engage the outside Palestinians” (ishrak filastiniyyi al-
kharij), “activate the role of the diaspora” (taf‘iyyl dawr al-shatat). For example, 
Sari Nusseibeh argues that the right of return contravenes the “public good” 
and therefore the “best-option scenario” requires the forfeiture of that right or 
be fulfilled elsewhere. The only solutions he suggests for those who are 
unwilling to fit that mold is to ask to be “discounted” or “left out of any deal” 
(Nusseibeh 2011: 140-142). Nusseibeh’s terms foreclose and preempt the 
very prospects of the return option in advance.  
 
The refugees question was classified in the “final status issue” and hence 
deferred to later negotiations. It was opened for discussion in the Camp 
David/Taba Summits in 2000/1. President Clinton submitted his “take it or 
leave it” vision for the solution, best known as the Clinton parameters.97 The 
US position on the refugees is a generic reproduction of these parameters 
since then. They pointedly preclude the right of return and any mention of 
                                            
97 The Palestinians and Israelis submitted their reservations on Clinton parameters (see 
Shlaim 2009; Abu-Alaa 2005) 
  214 
Israel’s responsibility for that matter altogether. To be sure, the parameters 
demand a “formulation on the right of return that will make it clear that there is 
no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration 
of the Palestinian people to return to the area.” (Doc.48, 23 December 2000) 
  
Discursive replacement operated over the refugees’ question. The Roadmap, 
which represents a practical application of peace-making theory, displaced 
the “right of return”; it replaced it with “an agreed, just, fair, and realistic 
solution of refugee issue”. As mentioned elsewhere, the Roadmap is an 
essential element of the Palestinian terms of reference, and therefore it is not 
controversial to say that the Palestinians have endorsed a “realistic” solution 
for the refugee. Textual displacements have ensued to reach the supposedly 
realistic solution. The Palestinian officials re-interpreted resolution 194, from 
the “return to their homes” into the “Return to Israel —to be implemented in 
accordance with an agreed annual quota and within an agreed period of time” 
(Doc.3597). This forming, first and foremost, internalizes Israel’s overriding 
interpretation of “return,” whether to admit refugees into Israel or not, and to 
define the status of those it may admit (e.g., immigrants, second or third class 
citizens). Second, the phrase “return to Israel” downgrades the statute of the 
right of return. In simple words, the refugees’ right to choose between return 
or not, is diluted and made contingent on Israel’s will. 
 
The mechanism’s main principle isolates the question of the Palestinian 
refugees from the global refugees’ phenomena and represents the Palestinian 
refugees as a special case exterior to international norms and laws.98 A 
Palestinian “agreement draft” may serve as an exemplar of the internal 
Palestinian thought on this issue (see Doc.3597). The supposed mechanism 
would be composed of Palestine, Israel, hosting countries (Jordan Lebanon 
and Syria), other countries (donor and receiving countries, e.g., Canada) and 
                                            
98 Establishing a new institution like the International Mechanism is in line with Israel’s stand 
which aims to de-link the refugee issue from international law and UNRWA. Israel considers 
UNRWA “part of the problem” (Doc.2437, TL). 
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it would be led by the United States. It has three main tasks, to: (1) “assist in 
coordinating the orderly and secure implementation of the permanent 
destination options to be offered to Palestinian refugees”, (2) “shall also 
provide rehabilitation assistance”, (3) and “All Palestinian refugee claims shall 
be resolved in accordance with procedures, criteria and time-limits determined 
by the international mechanism.” (Doc.3597, emphasis added).99  
 
The mechanism’s main principle isolates the question of the Palestinian 
refugees from the global refugees’ phenomena in the world by representing 
the Palestinian refugees as a special case exterior to international norms and 
laws. This aim was partially achieved in 1950s by excluding the Palestinians 
from UNHCR (see UNCHR 2010, Article 1/C, D, E), while the International 
Mechanism would practically accomplish this goal. It is important also to 
underline the lack of fixed resources and the dependent nature of the 
intended mechanism on donors’ goodwill; it is not an advocacy but a 
framework with voluntary tasks as tropes like to “assist” and “help,” indicate. 
Furthermore, it outsources responsibility by transferring it from the party 
caused the problem at the first place (Israel),100 to other parties. The third task 
unequivocally excludes international law (resolution 194, in particular) and 
sets new conditions and criteria. The International Mechanism is the 
“exclusive forum for dealing with the Palestinian refugee claims” (Ibid.). On 
this perspective, international law is virtually neutralized and Israel is tacitly 
pardoned. 
 
In addition to the Roadmap, Arab states have proposed a set of principles for 
a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict in December 2002 
                                            
99 Form the US perspective, the solution for the refugees issues lies in three things: (1) the 
“Palestinian state”, (2) “new international mechanisms”, (3) and “compensations” (see George 
Bush 10 January 2008). 
100 There is sufficient thorough and serious historical research that proves Israel’s 
responsibility and intent for the driving the Palestinians out of their homes in 1947-8 (Pappé 
2007).  
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(reconfirmed in 2007), best known as the Arab Peace Initiative (API). The 
initiative suggested, “a just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem to be 
agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.” (API 
2002: article 2/b, emphasis added) The insertion of “agreed upon” and “in 
accordance with” phrases in conjunction with “194” is rhetorical. It is not 
exactly to affirm the refugees’ rights, but rather to allow a twofold 
interpretation, each directed to a specific audience. One interpretation 
underlines “194” is meant for the internal consumption (especially the 
refugees) while the other underlines “agreed up” and “in accordance with” to 
offset the return option and market it to Israel and the peace sponsors. The 
API position on refugees question is no more than an upgrade of what 
resolution 242 said about the matters. 
 
The API spurred a Palestinian reinterpretation of “haq al-‘awda” (the right of 
return) by de-articulating resolution 194 and international law in this regard 
from the political language or use them as supplements. This was fulfilled in 
two steps: the first step wrapped the refugees’ question inside an opaque text, 
while the second replaced the specific resolution addressing the refugees’ 
rights by the general, the API. This ambiguous insertion left the fate of the 
refugees open to bargaining and deep uncertainties. The official Arab 
authorization to trade the refugees’ rights, which is unequivocally stated in the 
API, gave a cover for the PA/PLO pragmatism.   
 
Since the 22-Arab governments backed the API, the PLO/PA call for an 
“agree upon solution” to the refugees question had been emboldened and 
dispersed without hesitation into the public sphere. Indeed, the Palestinians 
had already proposed less than the right of return in the first session of the 
Camp David negotiations on 7 November 2000: “Talking about a return of 4 
millions refugee is a catastrophe [karitha] for Israel, and this is not acceptable. 
But we are calling for the right of return [haq al-‘awda], and a significant 
return (‘awda mu‘tabara)… and we are confident that the refugees in Syria 
and Jordan would not return [lan ya‘uwdu].” (Abbas cited in Abu-Alaa 2006: 
243, emphasis added) The call for return was made on the assumption that 
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the majority of the refugees “would not return” to Palestine if the peace 
sponsors would concoct tempting alternatives to return. Accordingly, return is 
transformed into a symbolic gesture that neither rectifies the deep injustice 
nor achieves national or human rights of the Palestinians. 
 
Not only the right of return was a bargain subject, but also the language that 
signifies it was constituted to be so. For example, the PLO/PA suggested that 
the mention of resolution 194 be discounted if Israel accepted the addition of 
the API in the terms of reference (Doc.3284). Equally, the refugees issue was 
a trading card and secondary to other final status issues like Jerusalem and 
territory as expressed in this sentence: “Let’s see them move on Jerusalem 
and territory and we will move on security and refugees.” (Doc.2769, SE) As 
such, the refugees question, their rights and the language that articulates that 
are relegated to second or third rank and rendered tradable. 
 
The new Palestinian interpretation of resolution 194, whether at the expert 
level or at highest political level is identical. For example, in the internal emails 
explaining the position of refugee issue in the API:  
 
Reference to [the] UN Resolution 194 stresses the fact that the solution to be 
found should be based on international law and respect refugee choice. This is 
the best guarantee for any solution to be just and perceived as such by refugees. 
   
 ‘To be agreed upon’ means that the resolution should also adapt to current 
realities and to the legitimate interests and concerns of the different stakeholders 
in the issue, amongst which, in particular, Israel & the future State of Palestine.  
(Doc.3271, emphasis added) 
 
In the same vein, the PA/PLO President Abbas approached the refugees’ 
issues through the API, as he puts it: 
 
The API represents close to a universal consensus… many people either 
understate or exaggerate the article on refugees: either say it is not enough, or 
interpret it to mean that 5 million refugees will return. Neither is correct. The 
language is correct in stating “just and agreed upon.” Therefore I recommend 
that you focus on the API.  
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On numbers of refugees, it is illogical to ask Israel to take 5 million, or indeed 1 
million – that would mean the end of Israel. They said 5000 over 5 years. This is 
even less than family reunification and is not acceptable. (Doc.4507)  
 
1) Focus should be on the API, “it is the basis” he [Abbas] said. 2) “The API is 
an equation and a clause (requirement…) i.e. the equation is full Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for full Arab and Islamic 
normalization, the clause/requirement is the refugees.” As we said a just and 
agreed upon resolution based on 194. Emphasize agreed”. These were his words. 
(Doc.1669; emphasis added)   
 
President Abbas’ reading of the API excludes the absolute majority of the 
Palestinian refugees from their individual right to return. To him, a return of 
“even 1 million [refugee] would mean the end of Israel.” This indicates a tacit 
internalization and implicitly acknowledgment of Israel as a “Jewish State” 101 
in the political calculation of the leadership. To be sure, the PA signaled its 
indifference to how Israel defines itself as put by the PA negotiators: “If you 
want to call your state the Jewish State of Israel you can call it what you 
want.” (Doc.2003, SE) “It’s your decision —we [PLO/PA] recognize your state 
however you want [to define it yourselves].” (Doc.2002, YAR) In numbers, the 
Palestinians are talking about the return of less than a million but more than 
25 thousands refugees to “Israel.” 102 
 
The relative simplicity of the legal statute of the refugee questions is 
reproduced in more arcane expressions like “agree upon”, “in accordance 
with”, “realistic solutions”, “annual quota”, “time limit” in the API and Roadmap. 
Also it has been wrapped inside other enunciations and texts with the aim to 
subvert the right of return. To do that, the refugee issue is divided into four 
isolated solutions: reparation, settlement, reallocation, and “some” return to 
                                            
101 Ahmad Khalidi (2011) analyzed the implication of recognizing Israel as a “Jewish State” on 
the Palestinian narrative, history, moral and legal claims and effect on the Palestinians in 
Israel.  
102 Saeb Erekat also echoes this: “On refugees, AM said we need a credible number, not 5 
million but not 1,000. Abu Mazen said. I am ready for the endgame. I know there are lots of 
painful decisions to make, but I am ready to make them. I hope I have a partner in Israel.” 
(Doc.4625) 
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Israel (Doc.2344; Doc.2436, AA). The Palestinians were talking about a 
symbolic103 return as they regard the “full implementation of the right of return 
is unlikely” in their political imagination. Therefore, discourse focused on 
creating a formula which could “be perceived as a real option” in order to 
“market” it to the refugees (Doc.2731; see also Doc.3202). Meanwhile, 
stressing and maximizing the non-return options is one way to reduce the 
possible number of returnees (Doc.2344; Doc.4066).  
 
The refugees were removed from the beginning and they were never given 
the chance to intervene, let alone set the agenda; others vie to represent and 
design “offers” in their name and afterwards seek means to “market [such 
offers] locally and internationally”. For the purposes of marketing, a new “ ‘PR’ 
unit” and kind of  “a minimum of coordination with refugee communities” were 
recommended (Doc.3548). This order substitutes representation with a 
minimal coordination, which in concrete terms, is a deliberate denial of any 
adequate representation. 
 
On 14 September 2008, a meeting with the title, “Progress meeting on 
Refugees” took place to discuss the “available” options for the refugees in 
detail. The PLO/PA chief negotiator “hardly disagree[s] on anything” the on 
the Israeli list of agreement and disagreement points. Directly to the point, the 
PA/PLO and Israel are in agreement on the following: (1) compensation (not 
restitution), (2) rehabilitation, (3) settlement choices (except return), (4) 
termination of UNRWA, (5) the International Mechanism is the exclusive 
forum, (6) Establishing an International Fund, (6) Israel will “contribute” to the 
International Fund, (7) no other obligation beyond the Treaty (Doc.3651).   
                                            
103 As it appears from the NSU memorandums and recommendations, the PA/PLO was doing 
its best come up with pragmatic and symbolic solution for the refugee issue. First, PA/PLO 
has acknowledged Israel “legitimate concerns” regarding its “capacity to absorb” the 
Palestinian returnees, and hence accepting to negotiate the number of the returnees 
(Doc.3028). Second, another recommendation suggested finding new “resettlement options… 
in order to alleviative the pressure put on Israel…” (Doc.2930)  
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Points of disagreement have little to do with the return of the refugees to their 
homeland because return was downgraded to a mere emblematic matter and 
without plans to implement it in practice. However, disagreement lingered 
over secondary, though important, issues such as linguistic framings (e.g., 
reference to 194 and the API vs. two states for two peoples), reference to the 
“Jewish refugees”, the wording of responsibility question for the refugees’ 
plight, granting Palestinian refugees a Palestinian citizenship,104 Israeli 
rejection of restitution and preference to “remain vague” on the Israeli 
contribution to the compensation either to refugees or to hosting states 
(Doc.3651, TB).  
 
When Saeb Erekat’s assistant lawyer, Ziyad Clot, began to question the list, 
Erekat left the meeting room abruptly (Doc.3284). Firstly, Clot challenged the 
ambiguous referent, i.e. the absence of a clause to define the Palestinian 
refugee in the treaty. Secondly, the clause on refugees was too general with 
no satisfactory details concerning Israel’s financial contribution, and the lack 
of implementation procedures. The Israeli side represented by Tal Becker 
replied to Clot’s objections by asserting that it was “agreed initially with SE 
[Saeb Erekat] that a reasonable balance should be found on the level of 
details”. Erekat remained silent and did not contest Becker’s point as far the 
record can tell.  
 
This particular meeting reveals three conclusions: a very deep Palestinian 
ambiguity, a gap between the decision-makers’ level and their assistants, and 
secret understandings between a limited number of Palestinian decision-
makers with Israel and the US. For example, it was underlined that the PA 
shared “sensitive information with the Americans” which was unknown to even 
the “committee heads” (see Doc. 3959). Finally, it showed a Palestinian 
                                            
104 To be sure, the PA/PLO President Abbas was recording as saying that: “All refugees can 
get Palestinian citizenship (all 5 million) if they want…” (Doc.4507, AM) 
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readiness to accept a “pragmatic” and symbolic solution, short of any 
significant return. 
 
Who is responsible for the refugees’ exodus in 1948 was classified among the 
“disputed” issues. Responsibility is indeed directly linked to the Palestinian 
and Israeli respective narratives. Israel refuses to recognize any responsibility 
for this exodus despite the increasing evidence of its responsibility as 
documented by several Israeli historians. The US fully backed the Israeli 
position as argued by former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: 
“Responsibility is a loaded term” and “it is the responsibility of the international 
community, not Israel”, and she pushed the Palestinians to “imply 
responsibility without using that word/saying it” (Doc.2942). The PLO/PA, 
however, considered the issue of responsibility as a “trading card”, Saeb 
Erekat clearly stated: “When she raised the issue of responsibility, I told you I 
can’t.  These are my trading cards.” (Doc.3048, emphasis added) 
 
The Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails are yet another related human subject 
over whom market rules mediated. The prisoners constituted another 
category for further bargaining, listing, pricing, linking, “released for” and used 
instrumentally to bolster specific leaders. This is explicitly articulated in the 
following conversations:  
 
TL: I know the complexity of the lists [of prisoners], and the price will be the 
price… When we need to release prisoners, we need to do it with moderates…  
 
AA: Can AM expect 1000 released? 
 
SE: You used “benchmarks” in Berlin. So let’s invent something – how about 
we are in this political process, as part of the process.  
 
TL: How about a link to the situation in Jenin and Shechem [Nablus] – areas 
with greater Palestinian security control. Can we release to those areas? 
[Discussion on criteria for release, numbers, lists, Hamas list]. TL: Just throwing 
ideas: let’s assume Hamas asked for a list – we release some to them and some…  
 
SE: Don’t link us. It is time to release prisoners as part of the political process.   
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TL: If I give you “heavy” ones, I may then need to give Hamas “heavier” ones.  
 
AA: You can release some to AM before Hamas, and some after.  
  
TL: Most of the “big fishes” are on the Hamas list.  
 
SE: Suggestion: I know the complexity of the lists, and the price will be the 
price. But if you want to tell Palestinians that is not the only way you function, 
look at the list of pre-Oslo prisoners.  
 
TL: I prefer to release for the peace process than on a holiday.  
 
SE: … So instead of Hamas releasing Marwan Barghouthi, have AM do it – the 
same with the pre 93 prisoners.  
 
TL: No. Maybe we can connect Gilad Shalit, as we have done to Rafah, and as 
opening Rafah is connected to you – you get credit [market]. That way you get 
credit for release of prisoners. (Doc.2826, emphasis added) 
 
The same pattern is used in other conversations: 
 
AA: As for the prisoners, if Israel responds to the demands of Hamas and 
releases 450 prisoners, some of whom are very important prisoners, this will 
embarrass us. But if Israel releases the prisoner because Abu Mazen demands 
this, then the situation will be different.  (Doc.2436, emphasis added)    
 
AA: Any release of prisoners for Hamas should be after a release for Abu Mazen.  
... Particularly the old prisoners from before Oslo... I want to speak about real 
prisoners that will be influential in the negotiations. (Doc. 2797) 
 
HA: How to use the potential of the prisoners in support of the peace process... 
We need coordinated moves and measures in the interim period. Coordination of 
names, categories of prisoners… We need coordination for who will be released 
as opposed to you releasing whoever you want to release unilaterally.  (Doc. 
2797, emphasis in original) 
 
The above citations illustrate how Israeli and Palestinian 
negotiators/politicians operated within the same rationale, style, concepts and 
vocabulary. As a result, it was self-evident to both sides that prisoners 
represent a bargaining chip in the process. Prisoners were therefore listed 
and categorized into “heavy”, “heavier”, “pre-Oslo”, political affiliation, 
“moderates”, and used strategically as a means to “support the peace 
process”, support certain politicians (“release for AM”, “let AM do it”, “you get 
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the credit”) and certain political parties (Fateh versus Hamas). Despite the 
PLO/PA’s desperate efforts to demonstrate to the Palestinian public the ability 
of its policies to achieve some concrete results, Israel refused to release 
prisoners.  
 
The prisoners’ issue is a major emotion-laden subject to the Palestinian 
public. However, it is still a variable matter, which helps Israel to change the 
negotiation compass from the main conflict issues. Indeed, so long as the 
Palestinians lack sovereignty, Israel will remain able to release and detain 
more and more Palestinians at will. Therefore, a Palestinian participation in a 
formula that constitutes the prisoners a bargaining chip is both morally and 
strategically misguided.  
 
So far I discussed how the market rationale modulated the representation of 
land and humans; now the discussion turns to the third subject of this 
rationale and how it operates over language itself. 
 
Linguistic maneuvering is especially acute in politics and diplomacy. Kissinger 
noted at the onset of his famous thesis, A World Restored, that diplomacy 
aims to build a “legitimate” system as a result of a shared understanding. 
“Diplomats can still meet but they cannot persuade, for they have ceased to 
speak the same language” (Kissinger 1957: 2). George Mitchell, the architect 
of the “Good Friday Agreement” and later Obama’s special envoy to the 
Middle East understood this dilemma in saying: “we need language that both 
sides can agree to.” (Doc.4844, emphasis added) 
 
Although the Palestinians have internalized a great deal of the realist-liberalist 
peace-building and Israel’s security language, the Americans, Israelis and 
Palestinians still spoke a totally different language on specific issues. To be 
sure, there was an agreement on the overall framework, but difference on the 
details. Even at the non-political level (expert level) Palestinians and Israelis 
have different perspectives as put by a Palestinian maps expert, “We must 
have a common language, agree on common maps and data, and then we 
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can have a discussion about the issues.” (Doc.2339, Samih Al-Abed) Market 
logic operates inside language itself. In other words, the bargain is within and 
over language as a means to bridge difference in the following examples:  
 
I suggest that you take out East Jerusalem and I will take out our language on 
national aspirations… we want Jewish, you want independent and sovereign. 
Lets take both out. (Doc.2055, TL) 
 
TL: Tradeoffs like no refugees to Israel in return for the borders you want – we 
cannot discuss it like this if we go through the issues one by one. [INTERNAL 
NOTE: At another point she implied that the tradeoff for them would likely be 
security + refugees for borders.]   (Doc.1962) 
 
TB: I believe that 6.1 will be agreed at the end. Saeb, you told me that if we 
accept the reference to the Arab Peace Initiative here, you would be ready to 
remove the reference to 194.  
  
SE: I told you that we might consider it. (Doc.3284) 
 
Linguistic complications became more evident during Mitchell’s efforts to 
“revive” negotiations between Israel and the PA in 2009. Language 
encumbered his mission from the beginning as he tried to accommodate all 
Israeli terms and phrases, which excludes the main issues such as Jerusalem 
and borders. The following excerpt is sufficient to demonstrate the tension 
arising from language:  
  
GM:  We are making efforts to find language that is satisfactory to you. Then we 
will make an effort to get Israeli agreement… So our discussion with them 
earlier was general and did not get into the precise language as we intend to do 
with you today... We need as straightforward a formulation of that concept as 
possible:   
   
An independent and viable state encompassing all of the territory that was 
occupied in 1967 or its equivalent in value. (not equal!!!!)  
  
SE: What is this? What is it part of?   
   
GM: ToR [Terms of Reference] or side letters. This is better than swaps for you,   
  
JS: Your ToR language didn’t say equal.   
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JS: We did not want a mathematical formula, so we used “equivalent”. I know 
you have a specific area …   
  
GM: I will read it all out loud and RD [Rami Dajani] can write it down. I recall 
our discussion on territory and your concern on the previous language, that it 
would preclude swaps from their territory.  I raised it with them —that it meant 
they would get the blocs and you would get nothing— and they said that was not 
the intent and it did not occur to them. Now we need to think of the context in 
which this language can occur. (Doc.4899, emphasis added) 
 
Perhaps the implications of the market side of peace have been transformed 
into a repetition of linguistic-play that the Palestinians have imparted. The 
market style and the vast terminology and concepts it is bound up with have 
infiltrated the Palestinian consciousness. It is therefore very hard to resist, or 
detect, the systematic demoralization and dehistorization of the conflict and its 
subjects when market regime reigns over the national struggle.  
 
Palestine: A Primal Scene in Schoolbooks 
As the analysis above demonstrates, Palestine ceased to exist as an 
“imagined totality.” Instead, it appears as an eclectic assemblage of temporal, 
demographic and spatial fragmentation in the Palestinian political discourse. 
In examining school textbooks, this section serves as an example of the 
performative entailments of the political discourse on the walks of everyday 
life. Education is a suitable subject of analysis for this purpose. After all, it is a 
repetitive activity and in a dialectical relationship with discourse. The analysis 
here is brief and specific. It examines the Palestinian elementary school 
textbooks prepared by the PA from grade 1-7 covering four subjects: national, 
civil, history and geography education. These subjects are selected because 
they reverberate throughout political questions in constituting the primal scene 
of Palestine as it unfolds in the new Palestinian mediated textbooks (i.e. self-
representation). The Palestinian textbooks have been examined and criticized 
heavily before, however, most of these studies are “anxious to assess the 
extent to which the curriculum and its textbooks promote incitement to hatred 
of Israel and Jews; secondly, they have identifies omissions” (UNESCO 
Report 2006: 14). 
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It is worth noting that after the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 
1967, the Israeli authorities modulated the content and design of the 
textbooks in order to guarantee a Palestinian education devoid of national 
sentiment and historical and spatial memory. The direct Israeli intervention 
ended in the late-1990s in consequence of the Oslo Accords as education 
was among the “spheres” which were transferred to the PA’s jurisdiction (see 
J.6 1994). In 1998, the Palestinian Legislative Council decided to draft a new 
school curriculum in stages (see resolution no. 3/3/255), in the meanwhile, an 
Israeli mediated curriculum continued to be used in Palestinian schools for 
several years until the Palestinian Ministry of Education gradually started to 
distribute its new textbooks.  
 
The PLO/PA spirit of the Oslo process is discharged through the new 
textbooks. Although Oslo Agreements granted the PA mandate over 
education, they have also restricted its freedom by certain equivocal clauses 
regarding “culture of peace” and “fighting incitement” which have deformed 
and silenced essential terminology in the Palestinian narrative. The word 
‘Palestine’ and its imagined spatial equivalence have been silenced, at best 
they are highly ambiguous in the textbooks, as we shall see.  
 
The imagery repertoire throughout textbooks is political; it seeks to proliferate 
narrative, identity and spatial consciousness. Maps are key pre-mediated 
imagery that enables students to locate themselves inside certain (clear and 
abstract) boundary lines, colors, shapes and landscape which help to 
construct an imaginary visual spatial identity and a territorialized one. 
Students are exposed from an early stage to a world which is “actively 
spatialized, divided up, labeled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater 
or lesser ‘importance’ by political geographers, other academics and political 
leaders.” (Agnew 2003: 3) 
 
Palestinian students in the first to seventh grades encounter illustrative 
images, maps and names representing the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza 
in their textbooks such as the Nativity Church, Dome of the Rock, Hisham’s 
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Palace in Jericho, Cave of Patriarchs in Hebron, Dead Sea, Gaza Airport, 
Sabastiya Ruins, Jenin Plain, Gaza Plain (NE 1st G; CEi 2nd G; NEi 2nd G.; 
NEii 2nd G; CEii 3rd G). The frequency of the visual echoing creates a pattern 
in which certain images in Palestine garner pervasive familiarity to the extent 
they become iconic spatial features. As a rule, images of Palestine from 
places beyond the West Bank and Gaza do not appear altogether, on 
occasions, however, some odd indication may be registered but it remains a 
secondary, in the background and an exceptional appearance (e.g., picture of 
Akka (Acre) Wall see NE 7th G: 47).   
 
When the map of (historical) Palestine is provided there are three curious 
lapses in the caption to evade speaking of Palestine as a geographical 
totality. The map is either presented without a caption, or with a one that 
either leaves the word “Palestine” out or (at best) mentions it vaguely as a 
secondary word in the caption. Moreover, explanatory information (e.g., 
demography see GoP 7th G: 43-45) and symbols are situated only within the 
boundary of the West Bank and Gaza (i.e., inside the “1967 border” in peace 
process parlance) while the rest of the map is painted in a plain color and with 
no or very limited information. The figure below, from a second grade 
schoolbook, displays a map of Palestine without a caption and with instructive 
signs over certain areas in the West Bank and Gaza only. The map is 
juxtaposed with a text asking students to “fill the table with the names of crops 
in the Palestinian areas;” (see Figure 2, emphasis added) notice reference to 
cities in the West Bank and Gaza in the provided table to the right (Hebron, 
Jenin, Nablus, Jericho and Gaza).  
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Figure 2: Schematic map of Palestine with information on areas in 
the West Bank and Gaza only 
NE2nd G:34 
 
Figure 3 shows a curious imagery and text juxtaposition. First and foremost, 
the word “Palestine” is absent although names of neighboring countries are 
indicated (Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt). Inside the map boundary there 
are two colors, green and brown,105 where information is placed on the areas 
in brown to signify the “Palestinian areas” (see also figure 2). Ironically, there 
is no equivalent text on the area in green. In the absence of a caption, the text 
on the right constitutes a relationship between the two colored areas and 
indirectly informs students of the current names of these areas. There are 
complex relationships and inferences to be drawn —perhaps beyond the 
capacity of 5th grade student— from the map, colors and text. The two words, 
‘Palestine’ and ‘Israel’, are readily written within the descriptive text but not 
over a map or an image. This complexity is strategically used in order to leave 
ample space for connotative ambiguity (see Barthes 1977), for a word inside a 
corresponding boundary (e.g., the phrase “West Bank” is surrounded by the 
                                            
105 The choice of colors on maps has political meanings related to self-image and 
representation of the other. Nurit Peled-Elhanan (2012) showed in her analysis of the Israeli 
textbooks how the brown color is used to depict a negative image of the Arab or Palestinian 
space, while the Israeli-Jewish space is painted in green to represent development and 
progress.  
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“Green Line” or 1967 borders) is not as malleable for interpretation as being 
inside a text. 
 
 
The British Occupation 
The Palestinian society had fallen 
under the British occupation in 
1917, which continued until the 
beginning of the Israeli occupation 
in 1948. 
 
The Israeli Occupation 
The Nakba befell the Palestinian 
society in 1948 was committed by 
the Zionist organizations, which 
forced the majority of Palestinians 
to leave their land. Consequently, 
the State of Israel was founded in 
part of Palestine. The West Bank 
was annexed to Jordan, whereas 
the Gaza Strip was annexed to 
Egypt. In 1967, the Naksa 
(relapse) befell the Palestinian 
society as Israel occupied the rest 
of Palestine including the Sinai 
desert from Egypt and the Golan 
Heights from Syria. 
Figure 3: Palestine map demarcating the West 
Bank and Gaza 
NE 5th G: 30; see also NG 5th 
G: 63; HG 6th G: 53 
 
 
Title: Administrative Institutions 
 
Caption: Governorates the Homeland 
 
1. Enumerate the governorates of the 
homeland (emphasis added). 
 
2. To name the governorates in which 
we live, and spell out the name of its 
governor.  
Figure 4: Governorates of the West Bank and Gaza NE 6th G: 42 
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Figure 5, however, benefits from the referential formula (“according to the UN 
Partition Plan”) to articulate the phrase, “map of Palestine”, in the caption (NE 
7th G: 22).  
 
 
The caption below the map reads as:  
 
The map of Palestine according to the UN 
Partition Resolution of 1947. 
Figure 5: Palestine map according to the Partition Plan of 1947 NE 7th G: 22 
 
At Grade 7, however, students begin to be exposed to further geographical 
and historical information about Palestine. The text articulates the “natural 
borders of Palestine” as the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. It spells 
out the area of Palestine as 27,000 square kilometers and border-length with 
neighboring Arab countries. But also it gives additional details on certain 
areas, such as the area of the West Bank (5842 square kilometers) and Gaza 
(366 square kilometers), but it leaves other areas without any details (see 
GoP 7th G: 4). However, there is still a serious omission despite this level of 
information about historical Palestine. That is, the direct and explicit link 
between the text and provided map is omitted. The caption does not say “the 
map of Palestine”; instead, it says: “Map no. (3) the Arab Countries Adjacent 
to Palestine” as shown in the figure (6) below.  
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Figure 6: Palestine and surrounding countries GoP 7th G: 4 
 
In general, there are two narratives: one represented textually while the other 
is represented through imagery. Schoolbooks are at ease with the former and 
very disciplined and specific on the latter. Imagery, cartographic images in 
particular, are powerful educational tools that create a dialectical spatial 
consciousness. The selected images and maps in the Palestinian textbooks 
prepare the students to see Palestine as fragments; meanwhile certain areas 
are visually and textually emphasized. As a result, students are left out with a 
confused and fragmented imagery that encumbers their perception of 
Palestine as an imagined totality.
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 10  
Peace Securitization 
 
 
Security as Peace 
In this chapter, I will try to explain how the Palestinians officials have gradually 
internalized a securitized version of peace. Also I will examine the structural 
and institutional implications of this internalization.  
 
Security-related questions are fundamental in international relations and 
peacebuilding theory. As Der Derian puts it: “no other concept in international 
relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power 
of ‘security’ ” (Der Derian 1995: 24-25). Then, no wonder to find a chapter on 
“democratic peace” wrapped inside every under/graduate Security Studies 
module. A security-guided peace paradigm takes partition at a face value as a 
logical solution for conflicts that involve two ethnic or national groups, 
whereby each group would be given a state of its own as the best way to 
reduce the “security dilemma” (Mearsheimer & Van Evera 1995; Kaufmann 
1996). This rationale dates back to the 17th century Westphalian peace. This 
conventional wisdom is at the heart of the Israel-Palestine peace process: two 
states for two peoples “living side by side in peace and security”. Security has 
been an orienting concept for the peacebuilding process. For instance, the EU 
supported the “creation of a viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian entity” 
granted that it would be “the best guarantee of Israel’s security.” (L.28 1997: 
359) In these circumstances, peace is usually juxtaposed with security as a 
default setting; meanwhile, neither the meaning of peace nor security were 
deliberated or contextualized.  
 
The phrase “peace and security” has been constantly reproduced in the form 
of a self-evident “truth” and singular simulacrum. The security-peace nexus 
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has travelled within the language of peace sponsors (later the Quartet), and 
gradually the Palestinian leadership internalized it in order to join the peace 
club. For example, in 1993, the PLO went beyond the “recognition” of Israel to 
underline the recognition of the “right of the State of Israel to exist in peace 
and security.” (I.2, emphasis added) This language conceives “peace” and 
“security” as being interdependent and co-constitutive elements. As a result, 
the phrase became an underlying conceptual frame and a strategic refrain in 
Israel-Palestine policymaking discourse.   
 
A “security-based diplomacy” became a hegemonic paradigm (Diker 2010: 
90) in structuring and contextualizing power-relations between the 
Palestinians, Israelis and peace sponsors. For example, the EU (one the main 
sponsors) declared the peace process “the only path to security and peace for 
Israel, the Palestinians and neighbouring states.” (K.5 1996: 275, emphasis 
added) Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued for a peace 
“based first on the security of Israel and its citizens. The test of peace 
agreement is security” (K.10: 1996: 282, emphasis added). More pointedly, 
Israel believes that it has “special security needs” that no one can 
comprehend (Doc.2797). From the Israeli standpoint peace is security. The 
Israeli representatives argued persistently that the task of the peacebuilders is 
making security: “Last week we had breakdown in security and peace 
collapsed. And what we need and have committed to do is rebuild the 
foundations of security; the old ones that were there that need refurbishing.” 
(K.25 1996: 298) The emphasis put on security dominated the peace rituals 
(in form of meetings, summits, communication, etc.) to the extent it constituted 
a “precondition” and a priori: “in order to have peace, we need security first” 
(Doc.2324; Doc.616, AG).  
 
The Copenhagen School of security studies helps us to understand the 
process of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998). Initially, the linguistic linkages, 
juxtapositions and echoing of “peace and security” constitute the rudimentary 
infrastructure for peace securitization. Peace as a referent object is 
represented as something at risk. On this account, a process of identification 
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began to constitute the “enemies of peace” and authorize “extraordinary” 
measures to defeat or stop them. For example, Hamas and Gaza were 
represented as endangering peace, thus indeed the PA, Israel and peace 
sponsors undertook joint extraordinary “security measures” against them. 
 
By and large, security is imagined through a military prism whereby powerful 
military institutions and personnel designed the agenda. Having Israeli 
“peace” negotiators in their military uniforms at the negotiation table is by far 
the most notorious epitome of this model (Abu-Alaa 2006: 356). Western 
discourse constructed the PA security reforms as the key for achieving 
security and hence peace, and pointed towards a further Western 
engagement in concrete strategies coupled with material and financial 
sustenance to implement structural reformations within the Palestinian 
security institutions. This effort was dubbed as capacity building. On the 
ground, however, American and European military institutions106 drafted the 
required security arrangements and reforms of the PA’s structure.  
 
Nietizsche’s analysis of moral judgment proves to be timeless and relevant. 
He explains in the genealogy of morals how “the judgment ‘good’ did not 
originate among those to whom goodness was shown. Much rather has it 
been the good themselves, that is, aristocratic, the powerful, the right-
stationed, the high-minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, 
and that their actions were good…” (Nietizsche 2003: 11, emphasis in 
original). By a similar way of thinking that Nietizsche found, the developed and 
powerful countries and institutions defined the criteria for “good” and “bad” 
governance in much of the developing and less powerful countries. Palestine 
is no exception in this regard.   
 
                                            
106 For example, “Security Working Group” has been submitting reports and executives 
summaries to the Department of the Army, US Security Coordinator, US Consulate General, 
Jerusalem, APO AE 09830.  (Doc.390) 
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Indeed, the same military Generals who served in the occupation of Iraq in 
2003 were appointed to “oversee” the Palestinian reform.107 The oversight 
and evaluation of the proclaimed successful institutional and capacity building 
did not spring from people to whom these projects are made, but rather from 
powerful institutions like the US Department of Army, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), EU, the World Bank and the military generals.  
 
A prevailed perception constructed the failure or success of the peace 
process as being dependent on the “Palestinian management of the internal 
security.” (Doc.2455) The British Secret Intelligence Services (MI6) concluded 
that, “a real opportunity to revive the peace process, starting with security 
steps by the PA.” (Doc.238) The Palestinians accepted this order and acted 
accordingly. For instance, Erekat wrote to the US Special Envoy for the 
Middle East Security General Jones “we undertook that implementation of a 
comprehensive agreement will be contingent on Palestinian security 
performance as required by the Road Map.” (Doc.2702, emphasis added)   
 
The following citation illustrates the hierarchy in the security planning: the US 
and the UK make plans, the PA performs, and Israel judges and takes 
decisions.  
 
Tony Blair: “Yes, I spoke to Jones on this and he agreed that we need a whole 
package for Hebron. I’m [Blair] having a long meeting with Barak and am 
thinking of bringing Jones with me. I understand that if battalion succeeds in 
Hebron then you can move to another area, but we need to negotiate with Israel 
to ensure we are all clear on where we are going. Nablus worked but Hebron 
needs a whole package.” (Doc.2330, emphasis added) 
 
                                            
107 Among these military Generals: Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, Lt. Gen. William Fraser, USAF, Col. 
William Costantini, USMC - Special Assistant to the Assistant to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, LTC Richard Sele, US Army, Lt. Col. Darren Duke, USMC (Stationed full-time here, 
between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), US Con Gen Jake Wallace, US Con Gen Peter Evans, 
Political Officer, (Doc.2260).  
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In essence, the caliber of the so-called capacity building schemes is 
subsumed in the ability to respond to security contingencies. This paved the 
way for security reforms and training arrangements to ensue. Two security 
institutions were established in order to retrain, rebuild and reform the 
Palestinian security forces. The Office of the United States Security 
Coordinator (USSC) and the European Union Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Support  (EUPOL COPPS). The USSC: 
 
was established in 2005 to assist the PA in rebuilding its security capacity. It 
provides advice and guidance to support PA Security Forces’ efforts at reform, 
within the context of the Roadmap and the Two-State Solution. Working to the 
US Department of State, it is a multi-national team led by a US 3-star General 
with access to relevant PA and Government of Israel institutions. Work is 
focused on bolstering Palestinian security institutions, particularly the Ministry 
of Interior, as well as professionalizing the Palestinian Armed Security Forces  
(PASF).” (Doc.2455, emphasis added) 
 
Having considered the basic security-oriented discourse in which the 
Palestinians were plugged into, now the analysis turns to the degree of the 
Palestinian engagement with it. The basic discourse on peace and security 
creates a scope for policy practices and funds allocation. Once the concrete 
policy debates began to evolve, the image of peace as security has been 
elaborated into a more sophisticated device to legitimize and justify certain 
policy blueprints and their related material consequences. The powerful 
rhetorical device on security helped stabilize and validate the Palestinian 
internal discourse in two ways: first, violent Palestinian policies and acts 
(against their own people) were considered security measures, a Palestinian 
“responsibility” and necessary steps (according to the roadmap, logic of 
motion) towards the Palestinian statehood.  
 
From the beginning, the Palestinian representatives endorsed Israel’s 
exclusive monopoly over “residual powers” which includes security and 
foreign relations (H.48). In other words, half of the “peace and security” 
phrase was at Israel’s discretion. It is worthwhile here to mention briefly the 
philosophical underpinnings of the orthodox peacebuilding in order to 
understand the implications of monopolizing security. Orthodox peace is 
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ontologically dependent on state entities (or authorities) and epistemologically 
it is framed by operations of power and authority. Peace is thus derived from 
“rational” security representations. In practical terms, this reverses the order 
of the phrases to read: “security and peace”. The articulation points to peace 
as a mechanism producing security and not necessarily about justice or 
addressing conflict issues. That explains why this side of peace is 
inappropriate for the question of Israel-Palestine.  
 
After signing Oslo Agreements, the PLO began to rebuild its security 
apparatus while preparing to relocate itself to the West Bank and Gaza, it 
dispensed with existing PLO security apparatus such as the Palestinian 
Liberation Army and al-fida’iyyun. The new Palestinian security structure is 
directly connected with the Israeli one under different formulas such as 
“liaison committees”, “coordination”, “cooperation”, “District Cooperation Office 
(DCO)”, and so on (I.4 1993). As a result of the security 
cooperation/coordination between the Palestinians and Israelis the term al-
mutaradin (the fugitives) entered into the Palestinian security language as a 
security object threatening peace. The fugitives are those who carried out 
activities against Israeli targets, they are wanted by both Israel and the PA. 
Up until 1993, these very individuals would be called al-fida’iyyun, al-thuwar or 
al-munadilun, however, the al-mutaradin subject has replaced the former 
subject-positions altogether because they no longer have a place in the 
transformed Palestinian discourse.  
 
Security-ridded concepts and vocabulary infiltrated the Palestinian perception, 
especially after the endorsement of the Roadmap in 2003. The Roadmap 
represents an operative blueprint of the realist-liberal peacemaking theory, 
which by default prioritizes security. To be sure, the Roadmap is dependent 
on the Palestinian “security performance”. It revived the logic of motion and 
progressive rational thinking, and insinuated a relentless war on Palestinian 
“violence and terrorism”. Meanwhile, bearing in mind that fighting foreign 
occupation is warranted by “any means,” including violent ones, under 
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international law, and reading between the lines of this discussion tells us how 
the legitimate became illegitimate. 
 
The Roadmap “peace” plan articulates two things: the “road” and “map” that 
will guide the Israelis and Palestinians to the destination of “peace and 
security”. The “road” is articulated by “partition”, “two states solution”, “security 
arrangements”, democratization, and economic prosperity. For instance, the 
Palestinian security forces issued a document listing their achievements in 
2008. Among these achievements is  “Security Reform and Capacity Building 
inside the Palestinian Security Institution” which was translated into 
“Countering of terrorism penetrations inside the Security establishment.” This 
included arrests of security services members for cooperating with Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad activist, “failure and neglectance [sic] in guarding Islamic 
Jihad prisoners, and shooting fire towards an Israeli camp.” Also cooperation 
and coordination of activities with Israel were considered an achievement 
number three (Doc.2277). Ironically, cooperation with internal Palestinian 
entities (e.g., Hamas and Islamic Jihad) was deemed punishable, meanwhile 
cooperation with Israel was praised as an achievement and a component of 
the capacity building. 
 
In 2007, the PA started a programme with an adjunct “classification 
committee”, exchange of names, “psychological” treatment in order to “re-
absorb and reintegrate” the fugitives and put them “under control”. Each 
individual was “classified” and the majority of them were made to sign an 
“undertake accepting the terms of reintegration”, names of “non-Fateh militias 
… will [be] submit[ed] to Israel. If Israel does not object, we [PA security] will 
treat them like Al-Aqsa.” (Doc.1832, Doc.1831). According to a PA security 
plan issued in July 2007: 
 
There were three lists: First, a list of 38 names who were not part of Al-Aqsa 
Brigades. The arrangement was that they spend 1 week under supervision and 
are then released. Second, a list of 173 names who were part of Al-Aqsa 
Brigades. They were required to spend 3 months under close supervision and 
then get released if there were no problems.  Third, the PA submitted a list of 
260 names of people “wanted” by Israel, to which Israel responded by a list of 
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110 names that it had no problem with. The PA is awaiting Israeli response 
regarding the remaining 150 names.  (Doc.1950) 
 
In 2004, the PA developed a plan to re-impose the security control over the 
West Bank and Gaza. The modus operandi of the plan internalizes the regular 
Israeli security concepts and mechanisms. It calls for an uninterrupted 
security and political coordination with Israel, prohibits “direct friction with the 
Occupation forces”, security control of certain areas, deploying checkpoints, 
reform Fatah and disarming armed groups within it, and formation of 
operations groups against: (1) suicide operations, (2) Qassam rockets, (3) 
shooting, (4) weapon smuggling and manufacturing, (5) tunnels, (6) violence 
finance, (7) and incitement (Doc.168). In another plan, the PA echoed and 
operationalized the same Israeli terminology such as “suicide operations”, 
“illegal arms”, “information about individuals trying to ensue acts against 
Israel”, “fighting terrorism”, “fighting incitement”, “observe and record 
incitement in mosques”, “increase checkpoint at cities entrances”, “barring 
friction with the Israeli side”, “control of media apparatus”, and  “fighting 
incitement against the PA political programme” (Doc.173). The 2004 and 2007 
security plans seem to be an Arabic translation of the US/UK Plan (see 
Doc.238). 
 
 
The PA adopted the US-UK-made security plans108 proposing “an intensive, 
short-term security drive to address Israeli and US preconditions for re-
engagement” to “enable the PA fully to meet its security obligations under 
Phase 1 of the Roadmap.” The Plan is hierarchical: “formed by [the] US; buy-
in by the Quartet; then buy-in by the PA” and “Palestinians’ performance 
would be verified by the US/UK; we would ask Israel to judge it on results.” 
(Ibid. p.1-2)  
 
                                            
108 See Doc.168; Doc.173 which represent the Arabic version of the British (Doc.238) security 
plans prepared by the PA. 
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The key objectives of the Plan are: firstly, that “PA civil policing... further 
constrain the rejectionists”, secondly,  “systematic security cooperation 
between Israeli and Palestinian agencies.” Thirdly, 
Degrading the capabilities of the rejectionists —Hamas, PIJ [Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad] and the Al Aqsa Brigades— through the disruption of their leadership’ 
communications and command and control capabilities; the detention of key 
middle-ranking officers and the confiscation of their arsenals and financial 
resources held within the Occupied Territories. US and —informally— UK 
monitors would report both to Israel and to the Quartet. We could also explore 
the temporary internment of leading Hamas and PIJ figures, making sure they 
are well-treated, with EU finding. (Ibid. p.2-3, emphasis added) 
 
Security through Institutional/Capacity Building  
Before proceeding with the discussion on institutional building it may be useful 
to re-establish the link between institutions and security in the orthodox 
peace-building thought. Establishing an effective central authority to govern 
the Machiavellian “fortuna” or the Hobbesian “state of nature” is something 
kernel for peace to materialize. In contemporary peace theories, security 
institutional capacity building replaced the classical idea of a sovereign as the 
guardian of peace. While analyzing the text of Israel-Palestine diplomatic 
record, one finds an underlying pattern of peace/security discourse mediating 
concrete policies regarding institutional and capacity building schemes in 
Palestine. 
 
The analysis turns now to examine actual domains that aid serves and the 
specification of capacity/institutional building arrangements, and how this 
structure of aid interlaces with the Palestinian discourse.  
 
Let us recall the wave of optimistic discourse that dominated the political 
debate after the spectacular signing of the Declaration of Principles in 
September 1993. In response, the European Community amended its aid 
regulations to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza (J.4 1994). 
Simultaneously, it crafted a programme called, “Financial and Technical 
Cooperation with the Occupied Territories” as a means to “foster sustainable 
economic and social development” (J.3 1994: 209). Although the programme 
spells out Occupied Territories, in reality, its scope is limited to the spheres 
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which were delegated to the Palestinian authority in accordance with the Oslo 
Accords, and it is perfectly attuned to liberal economic peace.109  
 
In June 2002, the EU together with the US (i.e., the donor countries) designed 
a plan entitled “Donor Support for Palestinian Reform” (Doc.130). The 
responsibility of design, finance and supervision is divided among several 
Western countries. The table below briefly indicates what sectors each county 
is taking care of: 
 
Country/Institution Targeted Sector 
The UK, Belgium, IMF, World Bank Financial Management and 
Economic Policy-Making... 
European Commission (EC), 
Norway, UK, US, world bank 
Public Administration and Civil 
Service Reform 
EC, US, World Bank Strengthening Local Government 
Australia, Denmark, EC, Japan, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, US, 
World Bank 
Rule of Law 
EC, Sweden, UK, US, World Bank Private Sector Development 
Table 1: Distribution of capacity building projects and sectors between different countries  
The plan prescribes “capacity/institutional building” as an “investment in 
peace” and “transition to statehood”. It advances particular sectors that do not 
affect or interfere with the Israeli colonialist policies and projects in the West 
Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. Moreover, each sector is confined within the 
framework of Oslo Agreements, which effectively legitimizes Israel’s 
hegemony and codifies it in agreements. For example, the Paris Economic 
Protocol110 represents the upper ceiling of the Financial Management and 
Economic Policy sector. Donors considered the Paris Protocol as an 
                                            
109 Aid from the European Community covered the following areas: “infrastructure, production, 
urban an rural development, education, health, environment, services, foreign trade, setting-
up and improvement of institutions necessary for the proper working of the public 
administration and the advancement of democracy and human rights.” (J.3 1734/94, article ii, 
1994: 209, J.4 1994)  
110 Paris Protocol was signed in May 1994 between the PA/PLO and Israel. It represents a 
framework that governs and regulates the economic relations between the two entities. 
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indisputable overarching rule. The following example illustrates how the 
representatives of donor countries already internalized the Israeli dominance. 
The EU special representative to the Middle East peace process Mark Otte 
explained that 
 
the salaries that the EU can do nothing, as the money for the salaries is being 
withheld by Israel. The only leverage is for the US to tell Israel to release the 
funds.   
 
[The] AM’s [Abu Mazen] statement that salaries would be paid early in 
Ramadan. He [Otte] said [that] he was astonished at this statement, given that 
Israel is the only party that can allow that. (Doc.728, emphasis added) 
 
Representatives of the US, IMF, World Bank (“Washington consensus”), EU, 
Japan and the UNSCO echoed the Donor Support for Palestinian Reform plan 
in suggesting:  
 
the establishment of seven working groups in the field covering the areas of 
market economics, financial accountability, civil society, local government, 
elections, judiciary, ministerial and civil service reform. The objectives of the 
working groups would be to (i) flesh out the Matrix and identify priorities; (ii) 
provide status reports on Palestinian efforts to date... (Doc.131, emphasis added) 
 
The security paradigm is a paramount feature in the design of such capacity-
building arrangements. The status quo and Israel security conditions were the 
main criteria for choosing which sector to include and which to exclude whilst 
designing reform schemes. Therefore, the overall institutional/capacity-
building arrangements coexisted with the occupation order in place instead of 
ending it.  
 
New security institutions such as the Security Working Groups (SWGs) were 
established to control the flow of information, assessment and “coordination 
with Israel”. A close attention to these plans and statements reveal how 
“coordination” and “cooperation” with the occupation became an embedded 
part of the rules of the game.  The “SWGs will be asked to report on 
Palestinian progress as well as what is requested from Israelis and donors” 
(Doc.131). The colonialist spirit in the design of security institutions goes 
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beyond material aspects to a cultural and ethical one. For example, although 
these groups operate within a non-Western environment, they imposed a 
Western ethical security codes such as the “European Code of Police Ethics” 
(Doc.159, Annex).  
 
In the aftermath of the US call for PA structural reforms in 2002, several 
institutions111 were set up to be part of the gate-keeping infrastructure that 
shape the donors’ mood and priorities. The purpose of the new security 
institutions is to administer the reformation process and  “bring together 
interested donors and international entities”. Yet the task of donors is limited 
to security-related aspects such as finance projects to control Palestinian 
movement and access, security reforms and the areas that may enhance 
security (Doc.1748). Also these institutions (e.g., PNA-TTR and the USSC) 
filtered all “queries and commensurate information responses are coordinated 
through a single donor relations function within the PNA-TTR.” (Doc.1748, 
emphasis added) Bearing on the “path dependence” concept (Pierson 2004), 
the control of information from the beginning offers the best opportunity to 
form the basis of aid-security nexus. 
 
The Israeli veto power is rooted at the micro-level of aid and donor projects. 
This power flows systematically from within and without direct Israeli 
intervention. For instance, during the preparation for the Bethlehem 
Investment Conference in 2010 the Palestinians had already prepared a “list 
of names [whom the] PA wants to invite” to the conference for “Israeli 
[security] clearance” (Doc.2330). It seemed natural and axiomatic for donors 
and planners to seek Israel’s approval in advance. General Dayton explained 
that:  “Nothing had been provided to the Palestinians unless it has been 
thoroughly coordinated with the state of Israel and they agree to it.” (Dayton 
                                            
111 Among the security institutions which were established to control the flow of information 
are the following: Palestinian National Authority Technical Team for Reform (PNA-TTR), 
Security Working Group (SWG), Security Sector Reform and Transformation (SSR&T), the 
US Security Coordinator (USSC). 
  244 
2009: 7) Israel maintains a supreme power over the process of institutional 
building in Palestine. In any circumstances, funding must be approved first by 
Israel because the American “congress won’t approve before checking with 
Israel” (Doc.5171, KD).  
 
The US has maintained a sense of ownership of these institutions because it 
is by far one of the key funders of the PA institutions. Senator George Mitchel 
articulates this point in saying: “it is unacceptable to the US [to give Hamas 
control over the West Bank institutions], after financing and training we’ve 
carried out —this defeats the purpose.” (Doc.4844) Foreign ownership of the 
(supposedly) national institutions provides a means for systematic and 
embedded intervention, control and exclusion.  
 
To understand the actual contents of capacity/institutional building it needs to 
be contextualized. The following statements help to explain how embedded 
the security theme is in the said capacity-building missions.  
 
In April 2004 George Bush sent a letter to Israel’s Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon 
declaring that  
 
The United States will lead efforts, working together with Jordan, Egypt and 
others in international community, to build the capacity and will of Palestinian 
institutions to fight terrorism, dismantle terrorist organizations, and prevent the 
areas from which Israel has withdrawn from posing a threat... (Doc.180, 
emphasis added) 
 
The EU/US reform arrangements link capacity to building to democracy and to 
police training: 
 
Governance and capacity building have been priority areas on the donor agenda 
since the beginning of the peace process, as donor engagement was premised on 
the idea of establishing a foundation for transition to Palestinian statehood. For it 
is part, the World Bank prepared in September 1993 a seven-volume study 
entitled Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace.... 
Institution building, as defined by MOPIC [Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation], includes institutional development, democracy 
development, legal development, and police training and support.  (Doc.130, 
emphasis added) 
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Furthermore, military/security institutions (e.g., MI6, The US Department of 
the Army) and military commanders were the foremost designers of capacity 
building schemes in Palestine. For example, General Dayton decided how to 
spend 80 million US dollars on security:  
 
I’ll leave a copy of the recommendation I gave to my government on how to 
spend it ($43 million on communications equipment, upgrading training centers 
(Bethlehem and Jericho), training, $10 million train officers, $23 million to 
create new NSF [National Security Forces] battalion as discussed before, $3 
million for MoI [Ministry of Interior] for strategic planning capabilities. 
 
US money will focus on capacity building of MoI and focus on NSF while EU 
funds should focus on Police. (Doc.5171, KD, emphasis added) 
 
Besides security, aid is not without instrumental political functions. The EU 
Special Envoy Mark Otte pointed out that the European aid and funding aim 
“to change people’s ideology and political beliefs. It is in the greater interest of 
the EU to see an Islamist government that adopts an acceptable code of 
conduct, and sets a positive example, than a total failure.” (Doc.5173, 
emphasis added) However the US, as he argues, used aid and funding in 
order to fail Hamas’ government. The Deputy Director of the USAID David 
Harden argued explicitly that “The ‘sellability’ of Salam Fayyad’s vision is 
critical, not at the level of the international community, but on the Palestinian 
street. It should include a strategy to ‘regain’ Gaza... USAID is interested in an 
aggressive plan to demonstrate change in environment on the Palestinian 
street and alter the momentum.” (Doc.1871, emphasis added)   
 
Financial and material, aid and donation are premeditated to service and 
administer the so-called capacity/institution building schemes, which became 
the main employer in the West Bank and Gaza and an effective pressure tool 
on the Palestinians. Now, aid is ventured on the basis of the Palestinian 
performance and compliance to arbitrary conditions of the main donors such 
as the US. Deviating from these conditions would swiftly dry out the financial 
sources of the PA, which translates into a chronic, and repeated “salary” 
deficit (azmat al-rawatib). The salary deficit is a pressure instrument on the 
PA that led the PLO/PA President Abbas on 17 October 2006 to declare 
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“bread more important than democracy” as a euphemism for the preeminence 
of the donors’ conditions over the Palestinian national rights, freedom and 
their right to resist the occupation. Another example would explain how 
donors used money explicitly to influence the political choices of the PA. 
German representative to the PA Jorg Ranau unequivocally tried to bargain 
the release of the former Israeli captive soldier for money, in his own words: 
“There will be no money before movement on Shalit.” (Doc.5178, emphasis 
added) Moreover, the flow of the US aid is tightly coupled with the PA’s 
policies. The PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad complained about the 
“difficulty with US money. People on Capitol Hill are displeased with AM’s 
[Abu Mazin, Abbas] comments in [A]mman and our efforts to explain them did 
not succeed.” (Doc.2330) 
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 Conclusions  
What Makes the Palestinian Discourse? 
 
It is worth recapitulating how the story began. Between 1947-8 two 
antonymous events took place simultaneously in Palestine: the emergence of 
an organized Jewish community in the form of the State of Israel and the 
disappearance and disintegration, albeit temporarily, of the Palestinian 
community. This paradoxical event was the happiest moment in Jewish-Israeli 
history and the most “ominous day” in Palestine’s modern history that the 
Palestinians call, an-Nakba, usually translated as ‘catastrophe’ in the English 
language. However, this translation does not capture the inner metaphor in 
the Arabic word that signifies the physical disconnection between Palestine 
and its people. Since “that day” the Palestinian political project has been an 
attempt to find a way to undo an-Nakba and reestablish the links between 
themselves and Palestine. The shift to diplomatic thinking in 1988 and the 
subsequent peace process discourse are just another episode in the search 
for the healing of past wounds and present traumas. 
 
It is worth reiterating what I have observed in the introduction. Today the 
follower of the debate on Palestine since an-Nakba would be overwhelmed by 
the multiplicity of details that dwarf the overall picture. The Palestinians used 
to imagine and speak of Palestine as the totality of everything within the 
mandate map. However, this regularity was discontinued after 1948, which 
opened a space for statements to articulate Palestine by its parts. This also 
triggered a process of a re-interpretation of the ‘self’, the ‘other’ and ‘context’, 
and the relationships that bind them together. While details have attracted 
ample academic inquiry, the evolution and change within and between these 
details did not muster the same attention. What are the underlying rules that 
produced and ordered these details and how they have changed over the last 
six decades is what this research mainly attempted to examine.  
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Since 1948 Palestinian political discourse has been in constant change and 
transformation. The flow of political statements was sustained for a period of 
time, and gradually other patterns appeared while others disappeared. Given 
this situation, what I refer to here, as a Palestinian political discourse is a 
constellation of mini-discourses that belong to different eras; each discourse 
passing its rules of formation into other discourses. Therefore, the discursive 
rules of formation have evolved through a manifold process of deferral, 
differentiation, equivalence, juxtaposition of concepts and ideas that belong to 
different historical and political thoughts. This rich inter-discursive process 
encompassed ample conflicting, ambiguous and paradoxical elements, and 
hence the dynamic and unfixed relationships, which served as the means of 
articulation and de-articulation. In other words, based on such processes 
particular interpretations were constituted and sustained, and simultaneously 
other (competing) interpretations were discontinued.  
 
This dissertation has two interrelated original contributions: the principle 
contribution uncovers the Palestinian political discourse’s main rules of 
formations and logics, its transformation and evolution, and how these logics 
directed policymaking. The second contribution is in the realm of theory; it 
tries to understand the link between change and discourse.  
 
On a theoretical level which is beyond the immediate concern of this research, 
I finding it counterproductive to try imposing criteria of consistency on social 
studies. Social events abound with inconsistent and paradoxical combinations 
that lead the discursive dynamics and inevitably, to change. Therefore, 
academic consistency contravenes social evolution. A second finding claims 
that reliability is at odds with the interpretative enterprise because social 
research itself is an unrepeatable social phenomenon that has its own specific 
temporal and material conditions of production. 
 
Processes of change are tightly related to dynamics of discourse and its 
process of development. I have explored six interconnected mechanisms that 
induce difference and change. Firstly, discursive articulation establishes 
contestable and unstable links, meanings and relations. This is a constant 
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struggle inside discourse that leads to constant slippage of meaning. 
Secondly, text and discourse are essentially intertextual and interdiscursive 
which involves interaction between diverse rules of formation of interacting 
discourses. Such interaction may generate new rules of formation or 
transform existing ones. Thirdly, there is change within the institutions and 
ourselves. Fourthly, following Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of articulation, there 
are elements whose meanings are undetermined and therefore the ongoing 
struggle transforms element into discursive moments and vice versa. 
Transforming element to moments supplies discourse with new meanings that 
have never been available before. Fifthly, hegemony and antagonism are 
unavoidable in discourse; they work in different directions. Antagonism 
contests and destabilizes chains of equivalence, which in turn deconstructs 
existing meanings and subjects and opens up the possibility of new meanings 
to evolve. Hence, hegemony is a matter of degree and contingent. Finally, 
“differend” calls for enabling silence to be uttered; this requires new rules of 
formation, or adjustment of existing ones so that differend ceases to be silent. 
On the other hand, the discursive endeavour de-articulates and turns what is 
uttered into a “differend”. Change takes place inside discourse; it does not 
come from any extradiscursive outside. 
 
To imagine the degree of transformation in the Palestinian discourse one 
simply needs to juxtapose present statements and their processes of 
construction with previous ones relating to the same subject. The discourse of 
capacity building and reformation of the PA opened the debate on the 
“generation” of the “new Palestinian”, a subject-position that systematically 
coordinates and collaborates with the occupation institutions. For example, a 
senior Israeli officer asked General Dayton: “How many more of these new 
Palestinians can you generate, and how quickly, because they are our way to 
leave the West Bank.” (Dayton 2009: 8) However, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
the “new Palestinian personality” which the Palestinian movement wanted to 
“generate” after an-Nakba was perceived as the returnee, sacrifice and the 
revolutionary (al-‘a’id, al-fida’i, al-thawri) respectively.  
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In general, I attempted to summarize the Palestinian discursive rules of 
formation into eleven overlapping rules: (1) an-Nakba and the order of 
discontinuity, (2) an-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution, (3) provisional 
horizon, socialization and referentiality, (4) motion, (5) logic of division, (6) 
statehood, (7) realist-liberalist peace, (8) mathematico-judicial schema, (9) 
market logic, (10) security as peace, and (11) replacement. 
 
1. An-Nakba and the order of discontinuity  
 
The metaphorical meaning that is loaded in an-Nakba meant two things: 
firstly, the discontinuity of the physical joints between Palestinian land and 
people, and secondly: it embodied the seeds of the struggle to recover these 
links. From this perspective, an-Nakba is not only the narrative of the 1947-8 
events, but also the continual reinterpretation and reproduction of the history 
that emerged since then; therefore it is a suitable starting point for 
examination.  
 
The Palestinian literature that appeared shortly after 1948 described the 
events and journey to exile through gloomy expressions that depicted 
contemporary events, mood and psychology. The moment when the physical 
connection between the people and land was superseded represented a 
reference point for the present. It is a paradoxical moment that at once 
separates and connects the social orders in-and-out Palestine and before-
and-after an-Nakba.  
 
The disappearance of Palestine as an “imagined totality” made it possible for 
different identities and spatial mapping and constellations to evolve. The 
mood of the exiled was mediated by legal and political conceptions (including 
events of war) producing “the Palestine refugees” subject. This regime singled 
out the Palestinian refugees and de-universalized their case. Spatially, 
however, Palestine was de-articulated into divisions (occupied and remaining 
land) annexed to different non-Palestinian sovereigns. Likewise, demography 
was reinterpreted afresh into three groups: the refugees, the Jordanian-
Palestinians, and the Arab-Israeli, yet each grouping was ambiguous, 
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uncertain and confused by its own subjects. The internal, regional and 
international environment has radically changed and every Palestinian 
individual has directly to deal with foreign arrangements. An-Nakba de-
articulated Palestine and new discursive reconstruction emerged in a 
relatively short period of time.  
 
The Mandate resolution in 1922 formed the framework for handling the 
question of Palestine. The modality “Palestinian” was erased, and in 
consequence, the resolution represented Palestine in the same operative 
Zionist myth: a land without people for a people without land. The League of 
Nations and its successor the United Nations, and its related bodies continued 
to operate the concepts of Mandate resolution until 1974 when the UN 
recognized the Palestinian people and their right for self-determination. 
Indeed, this language has infiltrated the Palestinian discourse and internalized 
it as “international legitimacy”, which emerged out of indifference to the 
Palestinians’ rights.  
 
The Palestinian political orientations were divided mainly along the lines of 
Pan-Arabism, regionalism and Marxism. Pan-Arabism helped crystalize the 
Palestinian self-representation as part of the al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya and 
therefore, local nationalism (al-wataniyya) did not appear as a nodal concept 
until two decades later in 1968.  Land is a key organizing dominator for the 
Palestinian identity and social status. Land is juxtaposed with honor, dignity 
and privilege; losing land is therefore understood as shameful and 
demeaning. Thus de-linking the Palestinians form their land engraved deep 
identity deformations beyond any quantitative valuation.  
 
The discontinuity of the pre-an-Nakba order informed the construction of new 
power-relations. The pursuit of a representative entity ensued in order to 
reverse the interpretation of the conflict from an Arab-Israeli to a Palestinian-
Israeli one, hence the PLO was established. The PLO Qawmi Charter was the 
first document that codified the meaning of Palestine, the Palestinian and 
Palestinian rights. The constructed “Palestinian right” was tailored according 
to the regional and international political conditions rather than Palestinian 
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aspirations. This explains the dramatic shifts in the definitions of these rights 
and the methods to achieve them without going back the Palestinian people.  
 
The period after an-Nakba until mid-1960s appears as a hiatus in Palestinian 
politics, however, analysis of this study reads it as a preparatory period out of 
which Palestinian political movements and their interpretive frameworks for 
conceptualizing the context, ‘self’ and ‘the other’ resurrected. First, the 
question of Palestine was central to nationalist and Pan-Arabism discourse. 
The PLO construed the liberation of Palestine and Arab unity as 
complementary, ANM considered them dialectal, while Fateh saw liberation 
as a priori for unity. The last conception was a novelty in Palestinian thinking. 
The ANM and Fatah were suspicious of the Arab regimes and refused to join 
the PLO at the outset because they saw it as lacking revolutionary spirit. 
However, the PLO had what Palestinian movements wanted and thus 
emerged the philosophy of engagement with the PLO in order to change it 
from within, until they took it over in 1968.  Since then, the PLO has become 
the space for Palestinian politics. Finally, the construction of Zionism as “an 
enemy” was largely built by a juxtaposition of Zionism with imperialism and 
colonialism, and not out of critical examination of its structures and tenets. 
The association of Zionism with imperialism, and colonialism guided the type 
of struggle. The gradual transformations in certain elements of the Palestinian 
discourse, and its rules of formation have spurred the PLO to rework its 
perception of Israel as an adversary (not an enemy) with whom the 
Palestinians have “compatible goals”. 
 
The language of politics and the regional context provided the terminology 
and conceptual input that constituted a perspective on what had been taking 
place in Palestine and how to act upon the events. Two antagonistic singular 
binaries appeared to depict the conditions and modalities: colonizer and 
colonized, the former impinges on the latter’s freedom. The concept of liberty 
and self-determination informed the construction of the required re/action as a 
struggle for liberation, that is, liberation was construed as an historical 
inevitability. The struggle was either described as armed or popular; neither 
excluded the other. This gave way to fida’iyyun subject-position as an 
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opposition to the refugee identity. The link between liberation and the armed 
struggle was dominant in the discourse. However, it was in constant recession 
as the PLO began to consider diplomatic options until it disappeared 
completely. Liberation and armed struggle stabilized the discourse; however, 
both receded and gave way to the concept of political settlement through 
negotiations and recently, non-violent struggle.   
 
Liberation drew the boundaries and the limits of the Palestinian discourse. It 
also governed and regulated the flow of relationships and linkages between 
statements in the discursive field. Therefore, transformation in the liberation 
construction and its internal rules of formation entailed systematic revisions 
and re-articulations of other concepts. The meaning of liberation has changed 
fundamentally in the passage of the past six decades, and finally was 
replaced by the concept of a “viable state”.  
 
The armed struggle is another nodal concept. While being linked directly to 
liberation, armed struggle was deemed the “only way” for liberation. This 
articulation stressed the missing alternative and therefore delimited other 
possibilities and subsided critical analysis of a liberation-armed struggle 
relationship. Fatah led the first underground operation in 1965, a symbolic 
performative act that impelled the PLO to consider a narrower understanding 
of the struggle as an armed clash with Israel. Indeed, the battle and the 
waging of the war were considered singular, inevitable and fateful. The armed 
struggle proved to be a practical device for interpellation and to achieve 
Palestinian unity under the PLO umbrella by bypassing ideological debates.   
 
The generous discursive capital spent on the construction of armed struggle 
was a potent vehicle utilized to avoid deliberating a grand strategy and its 
ultimate goals. Armed struggle vocabulary became an unchallengeable 
routine. However, ambivalence and the discrepancy between internal and 
public views on the armed struggle (and on most political matters) offered the 
possibility of opening up, elaboration as well as a place for something more to 
be said.  
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Palestinian interpretations of the 1967 war as a lost battle entailed a 
reconsideration of armed struggle. The singular form of “battle” disappeared in 
favor of the long-term battle. The war opened a new horizon and 
opportunities. The armed struggle and its nexus with liberation started to be 
qualified and to appear in a typological order with other political principles, 
and was therefore no longer “the only option”. Instead, political calculations 
modulated the armed struggle until it was finally dropped from the discourse.  
 
In the mid-1980s, the PLO interest in the West Bank and Gaza politics started 
to appear in public as the idea of a “mini-state” state there, on 22 percent of 
Palestine, was sufficiently developed in political thinking. The outbreak of the 
first Intifada stabilized the idea of statehood, which was conceived as a 
realistic possibility. Indeed, the phrase “no voice loader then the voice of the 
intifada” dominated that period and helped to justify the re-order of priorities 
on the PLO’s public agenda. In short, the Intifada provided the necessary 
nexus between outside/inside Palestinians. With the help of the flyer 
mechanism, the referential political language migrated into the discourse of 
“inside”, i.e. from exile into the West Bank and Gaza. Despite the increasing 
intensity and spread of the events on the ground, diplomacy-ridden subjects 
dominated the newspapers’ themes and space. What is outstanding from this 
spatial juxtaposition on paper is yet another unuttered spatial juxtaposition 
between inside and outside (exile), and a relationship between internal 
concrete events and external diplomatic ones.  
 
The terminology of peace, negotiation and dialogue infiltrated the discourse, 
which in effect replaced the articulation of the struggle for “ending the 
occupation” to a “struggle for peace”. The building block of the political 
message looked like this: Intifada + consonants + national + rights + return + 
self-determination + independent state + Arab Jerusalem. Framing the 
Intifada through a matrix of referentiality and PLO politics led to socialization 
en masse in the West Bank and Gaza, we are familiar with this in hindsight.  
 
2. An-Nakba and the pursuit of a solution   
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The second metaphorical meaning of an-Nakba is the search for a solution. 
For the Palestinians the order that followed an-Nakba represented provisional 
and temporary conditions. This perspective has been caught up in a self-
fulfilling mechanism that produces temporary outcomes; therefore, political 
decisions were always indeterminate and justified as temporary. Indeed, the 
Palestinians felt an acute sense of uncertainty because of the lack of the 
possibility to predict. Constructing choices as temporary implies a 
dissatisfaction with the existing situation and a timeframe for those choices. 
However, the timeframe was never specified which led to a blurred boundary 
between the temporary and permanent, and to further uncertainty and 
ambiguity. This was a productive and pragmatic tool, as transformation from 
one phase, or choice, to anther was deemed temporary. This strategy induced 
gradual changes and the reduction of internal opposition.  
 
Zionism, or ‘the other’, has been seen as an incomplete reality and an 
existential problem. This spurred two ways of thinking about how to tackle this 
problem: by liberating either all, or part of, Palestine. Analogy with other 
liberation movements elsewhere in the world in conjunction with the 
perception of Zionism as colonialism and imperialist, informed the liberationist 
logic as the ultimate solution. The content of liberation has been radically 
transformed. At first, liberation was conceived as the act of compelling the 
Jewish settlers to leave Palestine. The new founders of the Palestinian 
movements introduced democratic and liberal elements into the discursive 
field, which were gradually transformed into moments in the discourse, partly 
to distinguish themselves from the previous leadership. Chains of equivalence 
and differentiation mediated over old and new discursive moments. The 
meaning loaded into these new concepts, moments and relationships 
between them inspired and oriented the political thinking. This destabilized the 
previous understanding of the key nodal concepts such as the armed 
struggle, liberation, and ‘the other’ (Zionism) to a more inclusive imaginative 
horizon that entitled everyone to a democratic state. In the 1970s, Zionism 
and colonialism were replaced by two words: “Israel” and “conflict” to signify 
‘the other’ and the type of relationship that binds Israel with the Palestinian 
movement.  
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Liberation continued to organize the discourse, but in different forms. The 
third alternative was partial liberation and a state built on “any liberated part”. 
This option was already present on the menu of what could be said about 
Israel-Palestine in diplomatic language. This logic penetrated into the 
Palestinian political language, and it was considered to be a possible 
“temporary settlement” in 1974. This programme was presented to the public 
as an interim-launching pad pointed towards the ultimate goal of total 
liberation. However, interpretations varied internally. For some movements 
this was an end while for others it was an intervening phase in the struggle.  
 
The Egyptian-Israeli war in 1973 and the peace agreement that followed, 
invoked enigmatic realities for the Palestinians. The war was perceived to be 
a psychological victory, while Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement was constituted 
as a threat. This coincided with internal Palestinian indecision on competing 
visions of a democratic state or a mini-state. The war and rapprochement 
opened the space for already existing calculations within narrow circles on the 
mini-state becoming public, and hence stabilizing the interim and temporary 
logic. Moreover, international and regional socialization bore fruit and 
culminated in the recognition of particular Palestinian rights as inviolable (that 
is, with international and Arab legitimacy). Two important conceptual 
transformations happened at this stage:  firstly, liberation was deferred until 
the Palestinian National Authority was established and there was unification of 
the “confrontational” Arab states. Secondly, the reclassification of Israelis into 
progressive and Zionists forces permitted dialogue with the former, for the first 
time. 
 
The transition from one-state to “a state on any liberated part” was justified as 
an interim “phase”, yet without any conceivable timeline. The implicit message 
is that complete liberation had to wait for future phases. Partial liberation 
produced new grounding rules and regulations, which oriented the discursive 
flow.  
 
The distribution of liberation concepts had been in constant decline in political 
statements until it was totally dropped from the Palestinian discourse in the 
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mid-1980s. Liberation was replaced with “resistance” (resistance vs. 
termination, liberation, liquidation) to the “Zionist occupation” (occupation vs. 
colonialism), “resolve the Palestinian issue”, “to find a just solution for the 
Palestinian issue”, and “the right to confront the Zionist occupation”. This 
transition reordered priorities and self-perception. Refugees, who were the 
main authors of the Palestinian political discourse, were framed as not only 
being a problem, but also a “burden” that needed to be transferred to other 
institutions like an “international mechanism”. This formulation de-links the 
refugee question from PLO responsibility. Later, the right of return was 
construed as a “bargaining chip”.  
 
3. Provisional Horizon, Socialization and Referentiality   
 
Discontinuity of the nexus between Palestine and the Palestinians after an-
Nakba directly exposed the Palestinians to diverse regional and international 
discursive regimes that led to a process of socialization, provisional horizon 
and referential practice. That is, the practice of referring to a wide range of 
diplomatic, political and legal discourse, which the Palestinian constituted as 
international and Arab legitimacy. The referential function premeditated the 
contents of the possible enunciations and governed their dispersion in the 
discourse. 
 
The reference to dual legitimacy supplied the Palestinian discourse with raw 
discursive material and served the internal justification: it represents the UN or 
Arab interpretation of the question of Palestine as legally and morally above 
any other interpretations.  
 
Referentiality infiltrates through discourse, while the referential practice is 
empowered by the perceived positive or legitimate capital that comes with 
citing international law or a widely accepted principle. It precipitates different 
rules for the formation of various discourses and spurs existing relationships 
to evaluate themselves against a reference point.  
 
Referentiality became one of the key rules of formation of the Palestinian 
discourse, which compelled a frequent transformation of “firm” Palestinian 
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national rights (al-huqwq al-thabita). These rights were extrapolated from the 
unfixed and changing dual legitimacy. Thus, any change in the reference 
point/s, systematically opened the content of these rights to changes and 
transformation. The fine outcome of the process of socialization embedded 
the referential practice. As a result, the Palestinian initial political conception 
of their cause as a cause of a population uprooted from its homeland was 
suspended. At the same time, it helped reconstruct the question of Palestine 
into a territorial cause and a conflict over the details of when, where and how 
much.  
 
The invisible alliance between socialization, provisional horizon and 
referentialism has changed the Palestinian self-understanding from inside 
through framing their own discourse. The Palestinians internalized a deformed 
system of power-relations, which had grown indifferent to their aspirations and 
plight. Therefore, they are likely to remain at the receiving end no matter what 
kind of balance of power exists in the relationship between themselves and 
Israel. The flow in the direction of power is embedded, from within and 
internalized in essence. It is therefore not only a matter of a weak versus 
strong dichotomy, but also a system of power differentials from the beginning.  
 
4. Motion  
 
Examination of the peace process and peacebuilding/peacemaking revealed 
a loaded metaphorical motion in the discourse. As argued in the first chapter, 
metaphor is not only a matter of words; it also constitutes abstractions and 
orients actions. Latent motion in kinetic metaphor and tropes provided an 
analytical lens that has helped to structure the Palestinian political thinking 
since 1990. The logic of motion has set the discursive priorities and 
constituted contradictory forces: forward and progressive forces and 
backward forces. Ironically, the metaphorical motion coincided with a physical 
motion and spatial control. The metaphorical motion has also modulated the 
Palestinians’ rights and helped to create a system of classification and a 
revision of previous pivotal concepts.  
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Motion logic directed reason, order and priorities. The process was divided 
into two sequential stages: a transitional phase that would lead to a 
permanent situation. Everything in this transitional phase is conceived to be 
unstable and negotiable, and hence a mixture of kinetic and ambiguous 
terminology evolved as guiding principles. 
 
As the Palestinians have already internalized interim rationale, the principle of 
“moving forward” justified a re-categorization of the “firm Palestinian rights” 
(al-thawabit) into “final status”, “complicated” issues and an impediment to 
progress. Thus these rights connote negative correlation with development 
and progress. The nature of these “issues” is processed within the automata 
of peace rituals. Therefore, deferring key issues to another supposedly 
forthcoming phase was convenient to the Israeli-American conditions, and 
hence circumvented the possibility of substantive solutions. And even when 
later these issues emerged as a subject, it was either too late or processed 
under different conditions, and with hindsight unfavorable conditions to the 
Palestinians. The term “outstanding issues” is deceiving as it misleadingly 
implies that “other” issues were already resolved. This belittles the depth of 
the problem.  
 
Once the process was put in motion, considerable institutional and structural 
power managed, via discourse, to keep it going. Moving “forward”, “progress” 
and “momentum” are hierarchically superior to their implied opposites 
(backward, reactionary, motionless). Therefore, taking measures to “save”, 
“protect” and “revive” the process per se would appear morally defensible and 
practically desirable. The effect of this understanding has re-regulated the 
occupied-occupier nexus through judicial and institutional constructs. It also 
produced new binary categories in Palestinian society such as, pro/anti-Oslo, 
with/against the PA, violent/non-violent, resistance/compromise, 
fugitive/lawful, pragmatic/ideological, realistic/unrealistic, and so forth, which 
led to further Palestinian political disintegration; the current Fateh-Hamas 
“split” (al-’iqisam) is a case in point. 
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The other half of the binary always indicates an anti-peace force and thus 
presented an obstacle to progress. By being “un-pragmatic” and “unrealistic” it 
was assumed to have impeded the movement of the peace process, and did 
not fit this system of peace since it was construed as a danger and threat to 
peace. However, uncertainties in the internal dynamics of motion were 
overtaken by self-assuring presuppositions elicited from the realist-liberalist 
peace-building paradigm. Additionally, peace as motion is loaded with 
meaning in the peace process financiers’ language.  
 
The process of peace inspired yet another “process” modulate motion through 
a “matrix of control”. The latter process has direct impacts on the spatial 
sphere of every aspect of Palestinian life, and political institutions in particular.   
 
The metaphorical abstractions internal to the peace process and their entailed 
actions help to alter key nodal concepts in the Palestinian discourse. Motion-
ridden configurative tropes molded the nature of conceivable actions; they 
gained primacy over revolutionary and self-determination vocabulary. Thus a 
new competing cause, “the cause of genuine peace”, emerged on the PLO’s 
agenda and replaced its original raison d’être as a liberation movement.  
 
Moreover, a “transition and moving forward” rule intercepted the possibility to 
articulate. The possibility itself was constrained and negotiated through peace 
rituals. That is to say, self-imagination is not a reflection of the self but rather a 
complex and unfinished process of analysis, projections and re-projection 
founded on referentiality and peace rituals. The Palestinians are situated in 
uncertain temporary settings during the “interim phase” (“Gaza-Jericho first”) 
while looking for opportunities via peace rituals for further spatial and status 
extension.  
 
5. Logic of Division 
 
Palestine ceased to be perceived or represented as an imagined totality; 
instead, a mosaic discourse representing its parts appeared. This has 
profound effects on the Palestinians as an imagined people. Palestine was 
spatially and demographically bifurcated and categorized into issues and sub-
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issues. This is reflected in the textbooks prepared by the PA. Textbooks are 
an essential medium for making and stabilizing a particular narrative and 
image at the grassroots. These textbooks familiarize students with visual and 
textual representation of Palestine as the West Bank and Gaza, while places 
beyond, are ignored.  
 
The issues that compose Palestine, land, humans and language, were re-
imagined. First, Palestine was divided between: occupied land and remaining 
land, 1948-Palestine and 1967 occupied territories, Israel and the West Bank 
and Gaza. The latter was divided further into areas (A, B and C), settlements, 
individual settlements clusters, land for swaps. Each was categorized into 
sub-groups, tracks and values.  
 
With regard to the refugees, the aim has been to determine how to moderate 
the return option. This led to a process of de-articulation of the refugees 
question through a continued process of replacement. That is, the return 
option was replaced by non-return, “an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution 
to the refugee question”, UNRWA and international law replaced by 
International Mechanism, Arab Peace Initiative, Roadmap, etc. As a result, an 
arcane and ambiguous terminology replaced the simple language of the right 
of return. Furthermore, not only the right of return was bargain chipped but 
also the language that signifies it. The subject of these operations, the 
refugees, was marginalized and absented and therefore public relations 
campaigns developed to market whatever four male negotiators agree upon 
to the refugees and others. Logics loaded in linguistic terms of division and 
exchange operated over the human body. For example, Palestinian prisoners 
in the Israeli jails were also used for diplomatic reasons as bargaining chips 
and to bolster certain leaders. The Palestinian participation in the formula that 
constitutes the refugees and prisoners as bargaining chips is morally and 
strategically mistaken.  
 
From the Israeli-American perspective, this division serves an overall 
objective of creating a Palestinian state on what may be agreed on with the 
PA on each sub-issue without reaching a comprehensive solution, i.e. a state 
  262 
with “provisional borders”. Division made it possible to defer and reorder 
issues in order to continue the status quo. The peace process, by-design, 
permits only generic issues and negotiation subjects. This means that the 
input is always less than the actual problem; hence any outcome is always 
less than an agreement on the total or the core issues. 
 
The peace process introduced additional intermediary institutions to 
administer and run Palestinian affairs. The new institutions coexisted with the 
existing occupation institutions. These intermediaries represent a schema for 
division and delegation of labor between existing and new institutions. So the 
entire act of managing the occupied Palestinians was redistributed afresh.  
 
6. Statehood 
 
Statehood guided the Palestinian vision of the eventual goal of liberation. 
However, with the slow disappearance of liberation, together with the 
appearance of statehood on “any liberated part” and international and regional 
of socialization have contributed to appearance of the statist-oriented thinking 
and the two-state option via a “negotiated political settlement” with Israel.  
 
The apparatus of the “politics of phases”, pragmatism and statist framework 
began to crystallize when the Palestinian movements took over the PLO, and 
it became a discursive platform in 1974. From this perspective, the year 1968 
became a point that opened up the space for the accumulated ideas, 
imaginations, concepts and terminologies in the Palestinian lexicon to 
materialize into concrete acts. The statist mood and terminology invigorated 
the Palestinian understanding of its rights, and produced calculations that had 
constituted statehood, regardless of the size, as the ultimate answer to 
Palestinian vulnerabilities, a manifestation of identity on a specific territory, 
and without fulfilling the right of return.  
 
State and central authority are key features in the realist-liberalist paradigm to 
which the Palestinians already subscribed. To the Palestinian leadership, a 
Palestinian state on part of Palestine was increasingly considered to be a 
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realistic possibility after the inception of the first Intifada. This led to a re-
interpretation of resolution 242 by moving the debate outside the text of 
resolution itself. Hence, the territorial and statist dimensions dominated other 
elements (self-determination and right of return) of what was constructed as 
“Firm Palestinian Nation Rights”. While reckoning with the American-
European rhetorical discourse about a future Palestine statehood, the PA 
began to carry out the realist-liberalist peace precepts and “everything 
possible” to build the state institutions.  
 
The notion of statehood justified the Palestinian violence against the 
Palestinians; it was represented as a security responsibility working towards 
statehood. The PLO/PA operated by the same Israeli security vocabulary and 
concepts to subdue the Palestinian violent struggle against the occupation 
instead of Israel doing it. Current Palestinian institutions, which are supposed 
to lead to statehood, are arranged with American, European and Israeli 
dependency and dominance, over almost all imaginable domains. This 
relationship is also codified in agreements.  
 
7. Realist-Liberal Peace and the Non-Option 
 
Socialization and referentialism played a significant role in orienting the 
Palestinian perception of “the possible” and “the realistic”. The Palestinian 
leadership embraced the realist-liberalist narrative of the “new world order” 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It interpreted this order as tentative to 
Palestinian national rights and therefore decided to work from within, and be 
part of, this order. Accordingly, the PLO/PA forsook the quest for justice in 
favor of a “realistic” territorial existence within the limitations of the so-called 
Arab and international legitimacy.  
 
Meanwhile, the infrastructure of the interim, limited state and national rights 
was already organized and well-distributed decades before the “new” order. 
The content, mechanisms, apparatus and terminology of the PLO peace 
initiative in 1988 were already developed and disseminated incrementally. 
Receiving uncritically the realist-liberalist analysis was contemplated as a 
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vehicle in order to realize what had already crystallized in the PLO’s political 
vision. After a long period of a piecemeal socialization, the PLO internalized 
most, if not all, of the internationally imagined scenarios for the question of 
Palestine. The American-European designed and financed the PA structural 
reformations that incorporated the realist-liberalist peace requirements.  
 
The realist-liberalist peace formula has been operationalized widely since the 
end of the cold war. It suggested a mixture of functional authority, or its 
equivalent, security arrangements and liberal principles (democratization, 
liberal economic development). Peace rituals enacted through diplomatic 
performances (e.g., meetings, speeches, initiatives, communication) 
represented peace as a dynamic and transformative object that “grows”, 
“entrenched”, “built”; it requires a “solid basis”, and it has “enemies” and 
“friends”; it is also precarious and under threat. Subsequently, peace-builders 
must undertake two opposite acts: to “build and protect”. Such perception of 
peace at the cross lines of building/destroying stimulated the construction of a 
“non-peace” subject-position that functions as a constitutive other, the 
“enemies of peace”. This intimately corroborates the construction of an 
internal Palestinian other.  
 
Exclusive articulation moods emphasizing the “non-option, but option x” were 
regularly used to represent the means of the struggle. Initially, the armed 
struggle was construed as the “only mean/road” (al-taryq al-wahyd) to 
liberation. The grammar used to represent the armed struggle continued. 
However, it was replaced by negotiations and diplomacy. Therefore, 
negotiations were considered to be the only option and the only way forward. 
In other words, the means of struggle changed while the grammar of the 
formula that articulates them remained the same.  
 
The transition from armed struggle to diplomacy as the only option, is the 
result of PLO/PA cooptation into the “new” world order in conjunction with the 
stipulation elicited from a realist-liberalist thesis and an internal perspective 
that sees struggle against occupation through violent means as a form of 
terrorism and irrational violence.  Therefore, any vision beyond the American-
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Israeli frames was deemed a non-option. The non-option is never the default 
setting, but always something actively constructed by de-articulating other 
options. Therefore, the non-option was merely among the list of possible 
options.    
 
Discourse need not be coherent or linear. Although the PLO/PA drew heavily 
on international law, referentiality was ignored with regard to the means of the 
struggle since the PLO/PA ruled out any option other than negotiation and 
diplomacy.  Thus, the conceptualization of the means of struggle started to 
speak of “legitimate” or “democratic” or “non-violent” means instead of default 
formula that considers, “any means” as legitimate while resisting foreign 
occupation. In practice, this formulation dispossessed the Palestinians of 
violent means which are legitimate under international law, while Israel 
continues to use, “any means” to sustain the occupation.  
 
8. Mathematico-Judicial Schema  
 
What I refer to as mathematico-judicial schema is a mixture of referentialism 
and market-like operations modulating the discourse since the inception of the 
peace process. This schema regulated the meaning of a “just and 
comprehensive solution” to the Israel-Palestine conflict; in other words, it 
defined the shape of possible Palestinian rights and self-determination. 
Justice and fairness evolved as haggles over less than 22 percent of the 
overall Palestinian land, security and economic development.  
 
Ironically, ending the occupation and addressing the rights of the Palestinian 
refugees did not appear in the supposedly just and comprehensive peace 
formula. Alternative visions of this peace were disregarded from the 
beginning. Text from international law, resolutions, summits, initiatives, etc. 
represented a rich source of discursive material and calculative mechanism to 
work out the details.  
 
The transformation from totality to sub-issues and categories moderated 
through a mathematico-judicial schema of ratios and deferral to various 
legalistic devices. This also altered the role of the PLO and shaped the official 
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and practical relationship between the PLO and PA. Phrases like “middle 
solution”, “political settlement” (hal wasat, al-hal al-silmi) became dominant. 
The consequence of the cooptation and socialization with statist concepts and 
mood of thinking, was that the PLO/PA rationale was misguided by a flawed 
sense of parity, which minimized its non-state power.  
 
9. Market Logic 
 
Market orienting logic is built into the liberalist-realist paradigm, and UNSC 
resolution 242 in particular. This logic infiltrated the Palestinian political 
calculations as they engaged with peace rituals. The phrase “land for peace” 
in resolution 242 established the land and peace convertibility principle; then 
the question arose as to how much, and which, land should be exchanged to 
achieve a particular version of peace. The mathematico-judicial schema 
represented the foundation and mechanism from which certain elements are 
classified and selected; meanwhile, the market-like operations regulated the 
details of the exchange with Israel. 
 
Land, the human body and language were the objects of market models. Land 
was worked out from less than 22 percent of the total area of Palestine. The 
refugees and the Palestinian prisoners represented bargaining chips and a 
political lever. The market face of peace has become a routine in linguistic-
play of the Palestinian political consciousness. Therefore, market-like 
processes compromised the national struggle.  
 
10. Security as Peace  
  
The peace process is fixated in the liberalist-realist peace-building to the 
extent that security became an a priori condition for peace as represented by 
the phrase “peace and security”. This paradigm guided the occupied-occupier 
and peace sponsors/builders power-ridden relationships. The PLO/PA has 
internalized the peace-security paradigm and recognized the literal phrase: 
“peace and security” as an Israeli right. The securitization of peace inspired 
the construction of the “enemies of peace” as a threatening subject-position. 
Securitization justified extraordinary measures against the “enemies”, and 
  267 
hence, security institutions and policies to fight these enemies were 
established. As a consequence, everyday life in the West Bank and Gaza 
became militarized, civil liberties were diminished, violence and torture were 
exercised; and those who did not conform to the peace process mold were 
excluded. Security as peace changed the former subject, from external 
(Israel) to self-imposed violence enacted by Palestinians against Palestinians. 
This proved more effective than Israeli direct control. 
 
As mentioned earlier, order and authority are central to the orthodox peace 
paradigm. Institutions replaced the singular sovereign in the classical theory 
on peace. Capacity/institutional building arrangements in Palestine ensued to 
instill “order” and authority based on security/military frameworks. By 
accepting the latter’s sovereignty over “residual powers”, security and foreign 
relations the PLO/PA have already embraced Israel’s monopoly over half of 
the “peace and security” formula. 
 
The security-oriented discourse set scope of concrete policies and financial 
funds. Capacity building arrangements targeted the “spheres” which were 
transferred to the Palestinians. In other words, the scope of capacity building 
was synchronized with the occupation and what occupier was willing to give. 
While paradoxically embracing the existing occupation order, capacity-
building arrangements were construed as a necessary step towards the 
Palestinian statehood. Moreover, the Palestinian institutions, which emerged 
out of capacity building, codified the occupied-occupier relationship at the 
micro-level under different formulas like coordination, cooperation and liaison. 
Several security institutions functioned as gate-keeping settings that help to 
shape the mood of donors. Once these procedures operated at the micro-
level, they began to constitute and highlight certain possibilities and ignored 
others at a fresh stage that. That laid the first stone in a persistent path of 
dependence. 
 
The PA internalization of security concepts helped stabilize and validate its 
acts against the Palestinians. As the West Bank and Gaza became the 
geopolitical focus and sphere of the PLO/PA, previous security institutions 
  268 
were phased out and new ones emerged, and later re-structured under the 
auspices the US, EU and Israel.  
 
With a near full foreign finance and organization of the capacity building 
arrangements Palestinian society has increasingly become dependent on 
foreign aid, constituting further political pressure on the Palestinians. Currently 
the Palestinians suffer from debt and chronic salary crises, known as the 
“salary deficit”. There is also a sense of foreign ownership of the supposedly 
“national” institutions. In this framework, “security” operated in one direction: 
Israeli security and Palestinian insecurity.  
 
 
11. Replacement  
 
I found that a regularity of replacement of particular figures of speech by 
others is in the discursive material corpus I have examined. It was common to 
find the same grammar and order of certain statements modulating other new 
or modified versions of previous concepts, terms, and tropes. Replacement 
rule refers to the mechanism of substitution of initial tropes with corresponding 
new ones. Replacement facilitates the transition from one position to another 
and transforms the content without altering the overall governing structure. 
This creates a complex situation that renders different interpretation not only 
possible, but also defensible by claiming that the “original” position was not 
given up and that the leadership “beholds the political consonants [or 
unchanging rights]” (al-tamassuk bi al-thawabit al-siyyasiyya) 
 
Above, I have referred to various situations where displacement occurred. For 
example, the substitution and discontinuation of “liberation rationale” in favour 
of the “cause of peace” and an “honourable peace” implied the possibility of 
reinterpreting the relationship between the occupied and occupier. The 
occupied-occupier relationship was reproduced in the form of a dispute 
between two parties which needs to be settled through direct negotiations 
only. In short, dispute replaced conflict, but before that happened, conflict 
replaced occupation, and occupation replaced conquest and imperialism, as 
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shown in earlier chapters. The introduction of the dispute relationship involves 
a difference of opinions about certain “outstanding issues”, less than a 
national cause, and a commitment to resolve “all outstanding issues … 
through negotiations”. Such replacement deceptively uses the same grammar 
and order of discourse and displaces its contents, which as a result turns 
negotiation over basic rights into a dispute over trivial matters. 
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Glossary of Arabic Terms 
 
‘a’id (wun) Returnee, Returnees  
al-‘amal al-fida’i  Sacrifice acts  
al-‘amal al-thawri  Revolutionary acts 
‘amaliyyat al-musalaha The reconciliation process 
al-’ard muqabil al-salam Land/territory for peace 
al-‘awda Return (to Palestine) 
‘awda mu‘tabara Significant return  
azmat al-rawatib Salary Deficit 
al-balad   Refers to the specific habitual area, e.g., 
village, town  
el-blad Signifies the entire Palestine  
al-barnamij al-nidali Struggle’s programme 
barnamij al-nuqat al-‘ashr  The Ten-Point Programme 
al-barnamij al-siyyasi al-marhali Temporary Political Programme 
Dahiyya Victim 
dawla qabila lilhaya Viable state 
duwayla Ministate 
fida’i (yyun) Sarificer, sacrificers 
al-fida’iyyun:  The sacrificers, freedom fighters 
hal al-sira‘/al-niza‘ Dispute/Conflict settlement  
hal wasat  Middle Solution, compromise  
haq al-‘awda Right of return 
hudna Lull  
hukwmat tasrif a‘mal Caretaker government 
al-hukwma al-muqala Deposed government 
al-huqwq al-falastiniyya (al-
thabita) 
The  (Constant, unchanging) Palestinian 
rights (which often referred to as al-
thawabit)  
al-’inqisam The split (between Fateh and Hamas) 
i’qlimiyya    Regionalism 
’ishrak falastiniyyi al-kharij  Engage the outside Palestinians 
al-’isti‘mar al-‘alami International colonialism  
al-jihad al-muqqadas The holily war 
karitha  Catastrophe  
al-kifah al-mussallah  The armed struggle 
kart al-wakala Ration cards given by UNRWA 
kayan Entity 
al-kayan al-falastini  The Palestinian entity 
al-kayan al-’isra’ili The Israeli entity 
al-kayan al-suhywni  The Zionist entity  
laji’ Refugee  
la sawt ya‘lw fawqa sawt al-
intifada 
No voice loader than the voice of the 
intifada (motto of the first Intifada) 
lan ya‘uwdu Would not return 
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mankab The joint between the upper-arm-bone 
and shoulder in humans and the entire 
joints between limbs and torso of an 
animal 
al-majmu‘at al-dariba Striking squads 
al-marji‘iyya The reference, terms of reference 
marji‘iyyat al-‘amaliyya al-silmiyya The peace process terms of reference  
marji‘iyyat al-‘mufawadat  Negotiations terms of reference  
al-mujtama‘ al-dawli The International Community  
manshwr Flyer, leaflet  
al-manashir  Plural of manshwr, flyers  
munadil Struggler, freedom fighter 
mu’aqqat Temporary  
al-‘mufawadat Negotiations 
muktasabat  Gaining, winning 
al-mumkin The possible 
al-musalaha Reconciliation  
al-mutaradin The fugitives 
al-nasr al-siyyasi The diplomatic victory 
naksa  Relapse, refers to 1967 War 
nakaba Incline or slant 
nashatat takhribiyya falastiniyya  Palestinian sabotage activities 
nidal Struggle 
al-nidal al-duplumasi The diplomatic struggle 
al-nidal min ajil al-tahrir The struggle for liberation 
al-nidal al-sha‘bi    The popular Struggle 
qadiyya  Legal case, lawsuit 
qadiyyat al-laji’yyn    The refugees case, issue 
qawmi Belonging to the wide Arab people 
al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya Pan-Arabism 
al-raj‘iyyun The reactionaries 
ru’yyat Bush li al-salam Bush vision for peace 
sawwa To equalize  
shari‘a Law inspired by Islamic religious traditions  
al-sharaf wa al-karama Honour and dignity  
al-shar‘iyya al-dawliyya International legitimacy  
al-shatat The diaspora 
shurut al-ruba‘iyyia Quartet Principles or Conditions 
sulta Authority  
al-ta‘awun Collaboration 
al-ta‘awun ma‘ ’isra’il Collaboration with Israel 
al-ta‘awun al-’amni Security cooperation  
al-tadhiya wa al-nidal  Sacrifice and struggle 
taf‘yyl dawr al-shatat Activate the role of the diaspora 
tahrir  Liberation 
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al-thawabt The consonants, statehood, self-determination and the right of return  
al-thawabt al-wataniyya The national consonants 
al-thawri Revolutionary  
al-thuwar The revolutionaries  
al-tamassuk bi al-thawabit al-
siyyasiyya 
To behold to the political firms 
al-tamassuk bi al-thawabt al-
wataniyya 
Sticking to the national consonants  
tanazulat  Concessions 
al-tariq al-wahid The only way/road 
tasjil sabiqa Register a precedence  
taswiyya  Settlement, compromise  
al-taswiya al-silmiyya Peaceful settlement 
tawhid duwal al-muwajaha  Unite confrontation (Arab) states 
al-tawtin  Resettlement  
al-waqi‘  Reality  
al-waqi‘i The realistic  
watan Homeland 
wataniyya  (Territorial) Nationalism 
wathiqat al-’asra The Prisoners’ Document  
al-wihda al-‘arabiyya  Arab Unity 
yaa jamahir  Hailing the audience, people 
al-zaqat  Islamic religious donation 
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